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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of Europeanization on the foreign policy of the new 
member states of the European Union, using as case studies Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. 
It asks what the extent of Europeanization of foreign policy is and whether and to what extent 
there has been divergence in the way in which the new member states have responded to the 
similar constraints and opportunities of the European integration. Insofar as divergence can 
be identified, a third research question asks why there is policy divergence.  
It argues that the governmental politics and the politics of national identity play a key 
role as mediating factors for the Europeanization of the system of policy making, the process 
of elite socialization and the conduct of foreign policy itself. Three critical international 
events are used as sub-case studies in order to asses the extent of Europeanization of foreign 
policy of the CEE counties: the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, the NATO airstrikes against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008. 
The study’s findings suggest that the pressures of Europeanization leads to convergence 
in some policy areas, but domestic factors such as governmental and national identity politics 
offer a more convincing explanation of divergence. Overall, Europeanization is uneven not 
only across issue-areas, but also across countries. The limits of convergence as an outcome of 
Europeanization and the persistence of diversity are therefore best accounted for by the 
diversity of domestic factors.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ‘NEW EUROPE’ AND THE 
PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION   
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of European integration on the foreign policy of the 
new member states of the European Union (EU) from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
It first asks what is the extent of Europeanization of foreign policy and second whether and 
to what extent there has been convergence and/or divergence in the way in which the new 
member states have responded to the similar constraints and opportunities of the European 
integration. A third research question builds on the empirical findings of the second one 
and asks why there is policy divergence and how can it be explained.  
This thesis argues that the extent to which national responses to Europeanization are 
divergent is primarily due to role of domestic factors, which filter and alter the direction 
and intensity of the inputs from the external environment. Although there are various 
domestic factors likely to make a difference, this thesis argues that the governmental 
politics and the politics of national identity are especially significant with regard to the 
eventual nature of national responses to Europeanization. These two factors play a key role 
when it comes to the way in which Europeanization affects the national systems of foreign 
policy-making and the conduct of foreign policy itself. This study looks at three outcomes 
of the Europeanization process, namely institutional adaptation, elite socialization and 
foreign policy conduct. Empirical evidence from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania 
substantiate the arguments of this thesis.  
On the 1st January 2007, the European Union completed the CEE Enlargement with 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. This process, which began after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, transformed the Union in terms of size, nature and inner dynamic. The 
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Enlargement was a process with deep consequences not only for the nature of the EU; it 
had a major transformative impact on the new member states too. There is no doubt that 
the Europeanization of the CEE countries during the last two decades affected in 
remarkable ways the nature of the polity, policies and politics of this region. This study 
aims to evaluate the extent to which the impact of the EU has transformed the national 
foreign policies of the new members. The CEE Enlargement provides an excellent 
opportunity and rich empirical material for scholars of European integration to investigate 
a variety of questions: what drives European integration, how the surrender of national 
sovereignty can be explained, what is the likely impact of Enlargement on the functioning 
of the European Union, how deep is the influence of Europeanization at domestic level and 
so on.  
However, given the fact that the CEE Enlargement is a recent phenomenon, the 
accumulation of empirical knowledge with regard to the Europeanization of the new 
member states is still underdeveloped. While there is an abundant literature on the impact 
of Europeanization on the old member states, the same cannot be said about the new 
member states. This is one of the reasons why this thesis investigates the Europeanization 
of foreign policy in the new member states.  
Another reason derives from the geography of EU Enlargement. European 
integration was initiated by a core group of six countries to which, in successive waves, 
other countries or groups of countries from the periphery tried to join. The perception of 
being the ‘core’ and being from the ‘periphery’ is important and suggests a dependency 
relation, a relation of power between those countries ‘in’ and those aspiring to be ‘in’ (on 
the centre-periphery debate, see also Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001: 2; Moutritzen, 
1996: 286-92). Certainly, what was the periphery can be conceptualized in different ways, 
according to the motives for which the countries at the fringes tried to make their way in 
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and be part of the core. There are differences in the reasons why some of the former 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), such as the UK and Denmark in 
1973 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, joined the European Community (EC), and 
the Southern members (although Portugal was itself a member of EFTA). In the first case, 
it was an economic calculation. The UK had set up the EFTA alongside other partner 
countries, the so-called ‘Outer Seven’, as a competing project to the ‘Inner six’ of the EC,1 
but abandoned it and joined the EC for the benefit of its greater market. For the Southern 
members, entering the EC was a way of escaping the authoritarian past and embarking on a 
modernization project. Similarly, for the CEE countries, EU integration was the way to 
return to Europe after half a century of isolation (as well as enjoying the economic 
benefits, the free movements of people and the greater political stature on the international 
stage given by the membership). However, despite different motives and historical 
contexts, the history of the Enlargement process illustrates the inherent power component 
of the relationship between those countries in and those out. Given these considerations, 
this thesis deems it important to examine how the perception of power affected the process 
of Europeanization of the new member states from CEE.     
Moreover, the recent CEE Enlargement presents a unique opportunity given the 
sheer number of countries simultaneously following the same path, exposed to the same 
external influences, yet adjusting differently to the European mode of governance. At first 
glance, the CEE countries are more similar to each other than to some of the older member 
states. At the same time, the demands of European integration are the same for all 
candidate countries, reflected for instance in the need to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria 
and to adopt the legislation of the EC. The logical result of this equation would be that the 
                                                
1 The Times, 7 April 1961, ‘Finland: Now, the Seven and a Half.’ 
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transformative impact of European integration is similar across countries. The result would 
be institutional and policy convergence.  
Empirical observations suggest that Europeanization produces not only convergence, 
but also divergence of policies (Harmsen, 1999: 107, Kassim, 2003: 102-6). At the same 
time, the persistence of different national institutional arrangements, political cultures, 
negotiating styles, and policy preference does not automatically lead to institutional and 
policy blockage at European level. In a way, this is the practical confirmation of the EU’s 
motto, ‘united in diversity’. In spite of a series of critical junctures, ranging from the 
‘Empty chair crisis’ in the 1960s to the more recent debilitating saga of the ratification of 
the Constitutional Treaty and the revamped Lisbon Treaty, European integration has been 
advancing in an apparently unstoppable manner. Although the challenge of the current 
global economic crisis, unfolding during the writing up of this study, may derail the 
integration process, it does also contain the seeds for even greater economic integration 
and economic governance (however, it is not the aim of this thesis to explore these issues).  
Yet, the question remains. How the co-existence of convergence and divergence can 
be explained? Furthermore, how is the persistence of diversity going to affect the process 
of European integration in an enlarged Union? Therefore, one of the aims of this thesis is 
to explore how the European integration affected domestic structures and policy processes 
in the new member states. This matter continues to be as relevant as ever due to the 
balance between enlarging the EU and deepening the European integration. Although the 
relationship between widening and deepening of the EU may be seen in trade-off terms, 
the fact is that one tends to complicate the other. In this sense, the CEE enlargement has 
complicated even more the process of deepening of the European integration. Future 
widening of the EU to include the Western Balkans countries and Turkey is likely to 
increase this complexity even further. Although, to a certain extent, the thorny problems of 
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widening of the EU and deepening the European integration have been settled for the time 
being in favour of the former, this state of affairs is mainly the consequence of previous 
commitments made to the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, and not due to an 
overriding enthusiasm in the member states for the idea of further expansion of the EU. 
Moreover, at the level of public opinion, the ‘enlargement fatigue’ and the growing euro-
scepticism mean that the idea of further widening is currently as unpopular as that of 
deepening the EU.  
At a political decision-making level, the problem of widening and increasing the 
diversity of an already diverse European Union is still on the table. While the accession of 
the CEE states and the two Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta was completed, 
Croatia is about to join the club and negotiations are underway with Turkey. The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a candidate country although the negotiation talks 
have not started yet. The remaining Western Balkan countries have been offered the 
prospect of membership when they are ready. Furthermore, the Eastern European 
neighbours of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are courting the EU, although no official 
promise has been provided yet and the current prospects for enlargement beyond the 
Western Balkan states look gloomy. At the same time, the unfavourable economic climate 
pushed a Eurosceptic country like Iceland to seek admission to the EU after decades of 
staying away from the integrationist pressures.  
The problem of persisting diversity is even more relevant in the context of building 
the EU as a foreign policy actor, able to speak with a single voice and act unitarily and 
coherently. The variety of domestic preferences, including sub-national preferences 
(especially in the case of federal or quasi-federal states), still poses daunting problems of 
accommodation of diversity into a coherent policy and common political project. On the 
other hand, the domestic polities and policy-systems are under increased strain due to the 
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centripetal forces at the European level. Moreover, some authors perceived the nature of 
the relationship between the EU and the aspirant countries from CEE as a power 
relationship (see for instance Inotai, 2001, Janos, 2000, Mayhew, 1998, Smith, 2003); the 
conditionality associated with the enlargement process is one visible manifestation of it. 
The power relationship of this kind is more visible when looking at the pre-accession 
period. The accession or negotiation talk was a misnomer, hiding the reality of the bilateral 
relationship’s asymmetry. The candidates could hardly influence the EU policy making; 
however, they had to adopt the EU norms in order to secure admission (Grabbe, 2003: 
303). From a different point of view, as Andrew Janos remarked, the transition from 
communism to a Western type of capitalism and liberal democracy did not mean a shift 
from hierarchy to equality, but to a different form of hierarchy, described as a new 
hegemonic regime (Janos, 2000). This view may appear exaggerated since the integration 
to the EU of the former communist states was their own wilful option, not being imposed 
externally. Yet, this view opens the way for reflecting on the question of how the political 
elites from the new member states perceive the nature of the power game within the EU 
and how this perception translates into policy action. 
For the former communist states, this problem is also linked to the freedom recently 
acquired after half a century of oppressive rule. Their foreign policy is the tool with which 
the newly regained sovereignty is expressed in relation to the outside world. Foreign policy 
is more than a collection of interests formulated by political elites and projected and 
defended outside by the policy machinery of the diplomats and foreign service; it also 
reflects distinct identity conceptions, which specify relations of belonging and exclusion 
and give meaning to policy priorities, content and tools. The study of foreign policy in this 
context implies the need to examine the transformative impact of European integration on 
polity structure, policy process, and the role of identity in the formulation of policy.  
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As indicated from the outset, this thesis emphasises the role domestic factors play in 
mediating and guiding the transformative impact of Europeanization. Some of the 
questions regularly raised in the literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy follow 
an inductive approach, usually asking whether Europeanization does affect national foreign 
policies, how does Europeanization affect national foreign policies or whether 
Europeanization produce convergence (Baun and Dan, 2009, Major 2005, Wong, 2006, 
2007)? Both questions require an inductive research strategy of data collection. First, the 
researcher needs to collect data in order to decide whether the EU caused Europeanization 
or not. The second step is to identify the concrete ways in which the influence of the EU is 
translated into domestic change of policy, polity or politics. Following a similar approach, 
this thesis attempts to explore what is the extent of Europeanization of foreign policy in 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and whether and to what extent the Europeanization 
produces convergence and/or divergence. It does also attempt to deductively explain 
divergence with reference to the role of domestic factors. The thesis argues that 
governmental politics and the politics of national identity account for the differentiated 
impact of Europeanization across the three countries studied here, and by extension to 
other former candidate countries and current member states. Hence, it attempts to o test the 
proposition that governmental politics and the politics of national identity account for the 
diversity of national responses to Europeanization.  
At the other end of the analytical spectrum, the three outcomes (or the national 
responses) to be explained are institutional adjustment, elite socialization and the change of 
foreign policy conduct. Again, opting for these three dependent variables is due to the fact 
that previous studies on the Europeanization of foreign policy were focused on similar 
aspects, although without necessarily granting all three factors the same attention (for 
institutional adaptation, see among others Ágh, 1999, Bátora, 2003a, Allen and Oliver, 
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2006; for elite socialization and identity change, see Aggestam, 2004a, Pomorska, 2007, 
Schimmelfennig, 2000, Smith, 2004; for foreign policy conduct, see for instance Tonra, 
2001, Torreblanca, 2001, Wong, 2006). The argument is that by using analogous analytical 
categories, the Europeanization research agenda can be expanded and the aim of 
comparing different political systems affected by Europeanization can be reached. Besides, 
these three categories target crucial dimensions of foreign policy: the formal organization 
of the institutional framework of making the policy, the ideational construction 
underpinning the design and conduct of the policy, the way in which the national foreign 
policy is defined, formulated and conducted. Hence, this analytical approach is built on a 
multi-layered framework incorporating institutions, identities, and interests in the study of 
the Europeanization of foreign policy.  
In order to organize the relationship between the independent variable 
(Europeanization), mediating factors (governmental politics and the politics of national 
identity) and dependent variables (institutional adjustment, elite socialization and the 
change of foreign policy content), the systems approach developed by David Easton is 
used (see Easton, 1965) and applied to foreign policy analysis by Michael Clarke (1989). 
The main reason for selecting this approach is that it provides a clear frame of reference 
for treating Europeanization as the external input of support or constraint feeding into the 
domestic political system and causing certain types of outputs (the dependant variables). 
This analytical framework is advantageous insofar as it provides a comprehensive account 
of the major dimensions of policy and allows room for the generalisation of the empirical 
findings. The third chapter makes the case for the systems analytical model (pp. 48-51), 
explains at length why this thesis adopts the view that governmental politics and the 
politics of identity are justified mediating variables (pp. 53-56), and discusses in detail the 
three outcomes of the Europeanization process (pp. 56-67).  
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Several reasons justify the selection of the three countries on which the multiple 
case-study design is based. The initial pool of potential cases consisted of the ten new 
member states from CEE, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. One criterion for 
selecting the case studies is related to the integration record. For the aim of this thesis, it is 
important to include a country with a fast-track record of integration, one with a hesitant 
start but which was able to catch up and, finally, a laggard that eventually managed to get 
in. The assumption is that the integration records of different candidate countries, seen 
against the background of similar conditionality pressures, may explain why certain 
decisions have been taken, when and with what impact. Allegedly, a slow paced candidate 
or a laggard would be more willing to compromise to any EU demands as much as 
required in order to catch up with the group of front-runners or simply to be allowed in, 
irrespective of the date when the accession occurs. The selection of Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania matches this criterion.  
Other reasons are related to history and geography. Europeanization, seen as a 
process of international socialization, challenges national identities and interests. This is 
also the case with the three countries selected here. They have intertwined histories defined 
by conflict over people and borders. Also, the policies targeting the Hungarian minorities 
in Slovakia and Romania played an important role during the accession process as well as 
after. The fate of kin Hungarians in neighbouring countries features high on the foreign 
policy agenda of the government in Budapest and is usually a matter of concern for the 
cabinets in Bratislava and Bucharest. History and identity are key factors in understanding 
contemporary foreign policy choices and the definition of the national interest. Hence, the 
three countries provide instructive insights for the aims of this research with regard to the 
nature of ethnic relations within and between countries, relationships between majority and 
minority, the nature of statehood, the configuration of political systems, and approaches to 
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the process of European integration. At first sight, these factors are not immediately linked 
to foreign policy. Nevertheless, they set out the specificities of the internal milieu and 
contextualise the process of foreign policy making and the eventual shape of policy. 
Hence, the selection of countries is expected to yield generalisable observations, which can 
be extrapolated to the CEE region as a whole.  
This thesis has eight chapters. The first chapter, the current one, sets the scene. It 
introduces the topic of investigation, briefly explains how the subject is approached, why 
the topic is important and outlines the structure of the study. The second chapter reviews 
the existing literature in two parts. The first one examines the manner in which various 
scholars examined national foreign policy using the Europeanization approach and with 
what results. The second part looks more closely at the literature on foreign policy of 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania in the context of European integration. The aim is to 
underline the gaps in the literature and, against this background, to show how this thesis 
contributes to the existing literature.  
The third chapter unpacks the analytical approach of this thesis. It consists of three 
main sections. The first one discusses the problematic way in which the Europeanization 
approach was defined, underlining the conceptual diversity and the apparent confusion 
caused by the multiplicity of competing definitions, with negative consequences for the 
epistemic status of the concept. This review of the conceptual definition of 
Europeanization clears the ground and provides the arguments for the top-down view of 
the Europeanization approach adopted in this thesis. The option for the top-down version 
(as opposed to the bottom-up approach) of Europeanization is also defended by discussing 
the peculiar status of the Europeanization of foreign policy approach, equally targeted from 
the perspective of foreign policy analysis (as a sub-field of International Relations theory) 
and European integration theory. It argues that Europeanization makes sense only if it is 
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understood as the top-down domestic impact of the EU and that the bottom-up projection 
of national interests at European level resembles too much the liberal intergovernmentalist 
approach to European integration. Hence, the latter view should be discarded insofar as it 
contributes to the confusion surrounding the concept of Europeanization.  
The second section of the third chapter moves on to outline in detail the theoretical 
framework based on the foreign policy systems approach. It explains that this thesis is not 
interested in examining the political systems approach per se. It simply uses it as a suitable 
organizing analytical framework, which gives sense to the relationship between the 
external input of Europeanization, the two mediating factors of governmental politics and 
the politics of national identity, and the outputs of the Europeanization process to be 
explained. The third section then defines and discusses at length the three outputs of the 
Europeanization process: a) the institutional basis of foreign policy-making and 
coordination of European affairs at national and European level; b) the extent of 
socialization of national foreign policy-making elites; and c) the extent of change in the 
conduct of national foreign policy. The third chapter is then concluded by summarising the 
main points as a way of facilitating the transition to the chapter on methodology.     
The fourth chapter links theory to data collection and analysis. It spells out the 
research strategy, explaining why a deductive approach is more suitable to the context in 
which this study is produced and its research aims. Based on that, the multiple case study 
research design is discussed at length in the subsequent section. The motivation for the 
selection of the three case studies is again unpacked. The last section presents the methods 
used for data collection, the design and timetable of research fieldwork in Brussels and the 
three capitals. All three aspects, namely research strategy, research design and data 
collection are discussed against the background of the three outcomes of the 
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Europeanization process and the research questions posed by this study. In the end, the 
chapter is wrapped up by reiterating the key elements of the methodological approach.  
The subsequent three substantive chapters provide the empirical material for 
answering the research questions. The first empirical chapter (chronologically, the fifth of 
the thesis) is dedicated to the analysis of the Europeanization of the institutional basis of 
foreign policy-making between the early 1990 and 2009. It raises two research questions: 
a) what is the nature and extent of institutional change of the national foreign policy 
systems to the formal and/or informal requirements of participation in EU foreign policy? 
And b) why does the institutional transformation in view of European integration reflect 
different patterns across the national systems of foreign policy in the three countries? The 
structure of the fifth chapter largely corresponds to the historical stages of European 
integration as defined in the methodological chapter, namely the Europe Agreements (EA) 
stage and integration stage, but has also a functional dimension; it analyses institutional 
change not only across time and countries, but also by looking at the transformation of the 
systems of coordination and making of foreign policy at national and European levels. It 
brings into the analysis not only the change of the role of the ministries of foreign affairs 
(MFAs) in the system of national coordination of European affairs, but also the role and 
structure of the Permanent Representations (PermReps) of the three countries in Brussels. 
The chapter provides empirical evidence that governmental and coalition politics is crucial 
in understanding why there are differences across countries in the organization of the 
systems of foreign policy making. 
The sixth chapter examines the transformative impact of Europeanization as 
socialization of identities and interests. As mentioned, the role of history and geography 
featured high in the list of motives for selecting the three countries as case studies of this 
research. Therefore, the first section of the sixth chapter explains how the perception of 
13 
history and historical experiences played a significant role in defining contemporary 
foreign policy choices. The second section overviews the way in which European identity 
features in the national political discourse. Both these sections have the role of setting the 
stage for examining the issue of elite socialization. The two research questions this chapter 
attempts to answer are as follows: a) do the experts and diplomats from the Permanent 
Representations hold different views on the aims and means of EU foreign policy from 
those in the capitals, working in the ministries of foreign affairs? And b) is elite 
socialization simply a process of learning new norms and rules or does it have a deeper 
character that affects the inner self-identification of the participant agents? This section 
aims to investigate whether the national representatives in Brussels have been socialized 
into the norms and rules of EU culture of compromise more than their colleagues in the 
national capitals and are therefore able to perform the role of norms entrepreneurs, able to 
change the traditional perception of prevailing norms and rules. The chapter draws heavily 
on the empirical material collected through interviews conducted in Brussels, Budapest, 
Bratislava and Bucharest with senior officials. The chapter concludes pessimistically with 
regard to the initial assumptions and suggests that the learning of new norms and rules 
does not lead to a deeper socialization of foreign policy officials and that the perception of 
national interests and power is closely linked to the instrumental view of European 
interests in the field of foreign policy.  
The seventh and last empirical chapter moves the focus towards the formal conduct 
of foreign policy, both in terms of general trends, priorities and instruments, and with 
regard to concrete foreign policy decisions. It sets out to answer two research questions. 
The first one asks whether the officially stated foreign policy priorities and commitments, 
interests and the means to achieve them turned to reflect a more salient European 
dimension after accession. The second one looks at the extent to which the conduct of 
14 
foreign policy reflected a preference for EU channels rather than using other 
national/international tools. These two issues are examined in the four major sections of 
the chapter. The first one reviews the early foreign policy choices and the issue of 
continuity and change of national foreign policies before and after accession. The second 
section looks at the top-down relationship between the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the national foreign policies. The third section explores the extent to 
which the perception of national interest became more salient after accession. The fourth 
section moves the discussion a step forward by focusing on three key contemporary critical 
events challenging the national foreign policies of the CEE counties and of the EU as a 
whole: the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, the NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 
and the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008. The selection of these three events 
was justified by different reasons. The war in Iraq was selected as a case study because it 
clearly highlighted the fact that the pro-US standpoints of the candidate countries from 
CEE did not represent a cleavage between the old and new member states; indeed, it 
illustrated the diversity of preferences separating the old member states in two competing 
camps (a third set of preferences was that of the neutral member states). The examination 
of two events related with Kosovo (the NATO airstrikes in 1999 against Yugoslavia and 
the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008) is justified by the fact that 
the domestic pressure on the policy makers in the three countries was far greater, given the 
geographical proximity, historical and cultural links, and political sensitiveness. Besides, 
the two events occurred both before and after accession, which offer the chance of 
analysing whether and to what extent the membership status changed the national foreign 
policy decisions on the two moments.     
The final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the findings against the 
research questions and assumptions and critically considers the limitations of this research. 
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It also underlines the contribution of this study to the literature on the Europeanization of 
foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. At the same time, it contemplates future 
avenues of research. 
 
16 
CHAPTER 2 
EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter has two main sections. The first section reviews the ever-burgeoning 
literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy. Given the substantive body of 
academic literature accumulated over the years, the review leaves aside an important part 
of the literature dealing with the EU as a foreign policy actor, as well as the foreign policy 
of EU member states when studied isolated from the EU context. The scope of the review 
is, in general, limited to those books, articles and conference proceedings or the like, 
examining the influence of and the interaction between the EU and the member states in 
the field of foreign policy or policy coordination of European affairs.  
This approached is justified by the fact that European integration challenged the 
traditional conception of external relations and foreign policy and blurred the distinction 
between the domestic and foreign realms of governmental activity. The coordination of 
European integration and European affairs is a good example of both the peculiar nature of 
the EU and the inadequacy of treating the EU as simply one of the external actors 
influencing domestic politics. As László Kiss aptly remarked (Kiss, 2004: 34),  
‘the interconnection between “international” and “domestic” policy in Union policy 
generate “intermestic”-policy which creates “foreign policy” resembling domestic 
policy’ (for a similar idea, see  Blair, 2004: 199).  
 
Far from being merely a matter of foreign policy, European integration became an 
intrinsic part of domestic politics and policy-making, although reflecting internal 
peculiarities rather than reproducing a pre-existing model (see chapter five of this thesis).  
The second section examines the literature dealing with the influence of European 
integration on the systems of foreign policy-making and coordination of European affairs 
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in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, the three case studies of this thesis. The review does 
not cover those studies examining the national foreign policies with reference to other 
regional or international organizations, such as the Visegrad Group, the Organization of 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC), North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the United 
Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and so on. At 
the same time, it does not examine the issue of bilateral relations. This is simply because 
this body of academic literature falls outside the remit of this thesis, which is mainly 
interested in the influence of Europeanization on the foreign policy of the new member 
states. At the same time, the review does not aim to offer a comprehensive discussion of 
the cited material, but to highlight some of the major approaches employed on this matter 
as well as the gaps in the literature, which this thesis intends to address.   
 
2.2. Literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy 
The field of foreign policy was not targeted by the Europeanization research agenda 
from the very beginning of the integration process. However, the gradual development of 
cooperation in foreign policy matters at European level and the setting up of formal 
institutional mechanisms, such as the European Political Cooperation (EPC), in the 1970s-
1980s, and especially the CFSP in the 1990s, opened the way for examining how national 
foreign policies were affected by the institutionalization of European foreign policy. 
Hence, the increased interest in applying the Europeanization approach to foreign policy 
reflects the developments of this policy itself. The limited progresses of the EPC in the 
1970s attracted only limited academic interest in the early stages. Only a few studies can 
be traced back to that period. Two early works studied the EPC (Allen et al., 1982) and the 
interplay between national foreign policies and the EPC (Hill, 1983). However, these 
attempts were not strictly focused on how the EPC or the EC by and large impacts on the 
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national foreign policies. As the next chapter elaborates in more detail, the main concern of 
these studies was in explaining the EC governments drive to cooperate within the EC 
framework and the emergence and nature of the new foreign policy cooperation at the 
supranational level. During the 1980s, several other studies also analysed the development 
of cooperation in the foreign policy field at the European level without paying too much 
attention to the constraints and opportunities for domestic policy-making caused by the 
participation in the EPC (see for instance Ginsberg, 1989, Ifestos, 1987, Pijpers et al., 
1988).    
A collection of studies, edited by Christopher Hill in 1983, looked at the relationship 
between national and European levels, although focused especially on the manner in which 
divergent national foreign policies may fit into the common framework of the EPC (Hill, 
1983). Keatinge (1983a: 138) was among the first to use the term ‘Europeanization of 
foreign policy’ with regard to the reorientation of Irish foreign policy due to accession to 
the EC (see also in Featherstone, 2003: 10). A few years later, de la Serre (1988) examined 
the scope of national adaptation to the EPC of the then twelve member states of the EC.  
The fact that the 1970s and 1980s were not prolific years from the point of view of 
the academic production on the subject of Europeanization of national foreign policies is 
the consequence of the nature of EPC itself. Established as an elusive, mostly informal and 
highly confidential framework of consultation (Keatinge, 1983b: 338), the 
intergovernmental design of the EPC did not prove a productive ground for researching the 
Europeanization of foreign policy of the EU member states. However, the setting up of the 
CFSP after 1993 changed the situation in the years to come. During the 1990s, a number of 
studies started researching the foreign policy behaviour of the EC/EU member states 
during the two decades of the EPC and the early years of CFSP.  
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As mentioned from the outset, the body of literature focused on European foreign 
policy or the EU as a foreign policy actor is not the main focus of this review. Therefore, 
important studies concerning the EU’s role in the world (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, 
Dannreuther, 2004, Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005), the development of European 
cooperation in foreign policy (Duke, 2000, Smith, 1999, Smith, 2004), or theoretical 
investigation into the peculiar nature of the EU foreign policy (Carlsnaes et al., 2004, 
Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994, Tonra and Christiansen, 2004) do not constitute the object of 
this review. Instead, the focus here is upon the literature on the interaction between the EU 
and the member states in the field of foreign policy. The use of the term ‘interaction’ is 
justified because this corpus of literature covers not only the domestic impact of the EU, 
but also the national input into European policy-making. It is not only about what the 
literature coined as the ‘top-down’ approach, but also the ‘bottom-up’ style of interaction. 
In other words, the member states attempt to project their own interests at supranational 
level. 
For a start, a number of books were produced during the last two decades dealing 
with the individual foreign policies of the EU member states in the context of the emerging 
CFSP. ‘The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy’, Hill’s edited book published in 1996, 
represents such an attempt to analyse the interaction between national and European 
foreign policies (see Hill, 1996a). This publication is in fact an updated and extended 
version of the abovementioned ‘National foreign policy and European Political 
Cooperation’, published in 1983. ‘The Actors...’ is structured in a representative manner 
for an entire body of edited works, published both before and after the setting up of the 
CFSP. A similar type of work is the edited ‘The foreign policies of European Union 
member states’ of Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (2000). The editors put forward a 
comparative analytical framework for the study of the foreign policies of EU member 
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states in the specific context of EU membership. The analytical framework proposed the 
study of: a) foreign policy change through adaptation and socialization; b) foreign policy 
process by examining the domestic and bureaucratic dynamics; and c) foreign policy 
action within or outside the European context. The edited volume provided instructive 
insights into the national foreign policies of the fifteen member states.  
The normal outline of this type of edited book starts with an introductory chapter 
laying down the theoretical argument, usually discussing the peculiar nature of European 
foreign policy and the conceptual difficulties it creates in understanding the conduct of 
national foreign policies of the member states. The main body consists of ten or fifteen 
individual case studies, which are approached along the theoretical lines set up in the 
introductory section. Finally, the concluding part sums up the findings, points out the 
shortcomings of the theory and indicates possible and/or desirable directions for future 
research. This approach is particularly useful insofar as it broadens the universe of case 
studies, accumulates further empirical evidence and eventually expands and deepens this 
novel research agenda itself. 
To date, all old member states have been studied from the perspective of the impact 
of Europeanization on their national foreign policies. Amongst others, Rieker (2005, 2006) 
and Wong (2006) examined the Europeanization of France’s foreign policy, Gross (2007) 
and Miskimmon (2007) looked at Germany, and Forster and Blair (2002), Allen and Oliver 
(2006) or Dover (2007) studied the UK. The Europeanization of Belgium’s foreign policy 
was studied, among others, by Coolsaet and Soetendorp (2000) and Coolsaet (2004), and 
that of the Netherlands by Verbeek & van der Vleuten (2008) and Tonra (2001). Likewise, 
several other authors analysed the interaction between the EU and the foreign policy of the 
member states on the southern flank, such as Spain (Barbé, 2000, Torreblanca, 2001), Italy 
(Missiroli, 2000), Portugal (Koukis, 2001), Greece (Agnantopoulos, 2008, Economides, 
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2005, Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005) and Cyprus (Sepos, 2008: 120-38). The Nordic 
enlargement provided also the opportunity for extending the research into the way in which 
Europeanization affects the status of neutrality of Sweden, Finland (Miles, 2000) and 
Austria (Falkner, 2001, Phinnemore, 2000), following the similar research previously 
conducted on Ireland (Keatinge, 1984, Tonra, 1999).  
Most of the foregoing studies, published as books, chapters in books, journal articles, 
working papers or doctoral theses are focused on single case studies. However, several 
important contributions were produced as comparative case studies, most notably the 
widely cited study of Ben Tonra on the Europeanization of Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign 
policies (Tonra, 2001). Lisbeth Aggestam employed a political-cultural approach in 
examining the Europeanization of foreign policy of Britain, France, and Germany 
(Aggestam, 2004a, 2004b). More recently, Eva Gross selected the same trio of member 
states as multiple case-studies for exploring the Europeanization of policy-making in the 
context of the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Gross, 2009).  
Other studies depart from the case-study method by taking a regional approach in 
examining the impact of European integration on the foreign policy of Central and East 
European countries as a group, not individual countries (see for instance Edwards, 2006). 
Widening the theoretical approach, other analyses look at the national administrative 
structures. As Börzel and Risse remarked, Europeanization influences not only the policy 
process, but also the broad constitutional framework and the institutional design of the 
polity; in other words Europeanization might affect the polity, policy and politics of a 
given member state (2003: 59-60). Thus, the widening of perspective is important insofar 
as foreign policy-making is only a part of the broader process of transformation of the 
national administrations, systems of policy-making and inter-institutional coordination. For 
instance, some authors examined the Europeanization of national administrations and 
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executives in Western Europe (Goetz, 2000, Kassim et al., 2000, Knill, 2001, Mény et al., 
1996). Others explored the institutional transformation of Central and East European 
countries (see for instance, Ágh, 1999, Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007, Lippert et al., 2001) 
(see next section for details).  
According to the focus of the main independent variables, these studies can be also 
classified as primarily of a top-down type, searching for empirical evidence of the 
domestic impact of the EU, or bottom-up, examining the projection of national preferences 
at EU level. In the latter category is for instance, the study of Economides (2005) on Greek 
foreign policy as the advancement of national interests at European level. Also, analysing 
the reactions of EU member states to the Falkands conflict in 1982, Stavridis and Hill 
examine especially the domestic sources of the national foreign polices within the EPC 
framework (Stavridis and Hill, 1996). However, as previously mentioned and further 
explained in the next chapter, this thesis does not subscribe to the bottom-up version of 
Europeanization.  
 
2.3. The literature on the domestic impact of European integration in Hungary, 
Slovakia and Romania 
The literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy briefly discussed in the 
previous section represents a more or less coherent research agenda. By contrast, when it 
comes to the three case studies of this thesis, the literature is more eclectic and less 
consistent insofar as the study of the impact of European integration was not always the 
main topic. In other words, in many cases the focus was placed on domestic politics, while 
the impact of the EU or other external constraints were employed only as peripheral 
explanatory variables. This fact was an important factor in the decision to select Hungary, 
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Slovakia and Romania as the sources for empirical evidence with regard to the 
Europeanization of foreign policy in CEE. 
The Europeanization research was primarily concerned with the domestic impact of 
the EU on the old member states; the inclusion of the candidate countries and new member 
states emerged as a distinct research agenda only recently (Sedelmeier, 2006). The works 
on the domestic impact of the EU on the candidate and new member states subsumed two 
distinct bodies of academic literature. One targets the aspirant, candidate or acceding 
countries; the other looks at the new member states. The former is a vast body of literature, 
spanning more than a decade, and including research on transition and democratisation, 
enlargement and conditionality, and to some extent Europeanization (see also 
Schimmelfennig, 2002); it also includes the studies on the politics of ethnic and minority 
rights or national identity politics. The latter mainly refers to the burgeoning literature on 
the post-accession domestic impact of the EU, including several studies on the 
transformation of foreign policy. The body of literature dealing with national identity 
issues still represents a thriving research agenda, numerous articles being published mainly 
in journals such as East European Politics and Society, Nations and Nationalisms, Europe-
Asia Studies, Slavic Review, Osteuropa or Communist and Post-Communist Studies.    
Without pretending to offer a comprehensive list of titles, I mention the research 
conducted on the Europeanization of foreign policy of Poland (Kaminska, 2007, 
Pomorska, 2007) and the Czech Republic (Rihácková, 2005). Other contributions include 
the study on the Europeanization of Foreign Service in the Czech Republic (Drulák et al., 
2003, Drulák and Königová, 2007) or Estonia (Viks, 2002) or the inputs from the foreign 
policies of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU foreign policy-making 
(Edwards, 2006). In the last example listed, Edwards switches from the top-down to the 
bottom-up logic, exploring the role played by the new member states in the recent 
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developments of the CFSP. He argues that despite a certain incoherence and even mistrust, 
the CEE countries are prepared to play an active role in the future of the EU foreign policy. 
Furthermore, he concludes that the process of socialization of foreign policy-makers was 
swift and it changed the balance from traditional foreign policy thinking, based on the 
valorisation of geography and history. 
A bottom-up comparative explanatory account of national preference formation in 
the new member states and how these preferences impacted on the EU was developed by 
Nathaniel Copsey and Tm Haughton (2009). The argument is that various domestic 
vulnerabilities and perceived shortcomings play a key role in explaining national stances 
on various policy areas and with regard to the overall question of ‘what is Europe for?’ 
(Copsey and Haughton, 2009: 265-6; 284). Yet, too little is known about the preferences of 
the new member states. Given the fact that the next decade will witness an increase in the 
importance of these preferences in understanding the EU policies and politics, the two 
authors also insist that more studies need to be elaborated on this matter (Copsey and 
Haughton, 2009: 284). This thesis aims to provide a sound contribution in this direction, 
although applying a different analytical framework. 
As briefly pointed out above, a number of studies on the CEE countries were 
concerned with the extent to which the Europeanization of national polity affected national 
political institutions and the organization of public administration. In other words, one 
should include the broad institutional and administrative context, which creates the 
framework within which foreign policy is formulated.  
An example is the study on the coordination of European policies in the new member 
states, conducted by Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007). The historical institutionalist analysis 
adopted by the two authors covers the ten new member states from CEE, including 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. According to them, the institutional transformation 
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associated with the need to implement new systems of coordinating European affairs is 
best accounted for by the ‘politics of institutional choice’ involving major domestic 
political and political-administrative actors such as the prime minister, the foreign affairs 
ministry, the cabinet as a whole, the presidency, the political parties represented in 
government (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007: 963-64). Danica Fink-Hafner (2007) 
examined the changing design of the management of European affairs in Hungary, Estonia, 
and Slovenia by contrasting the external pressures of Europeanization with national 
administrative traditions and the patterns of party competitions. A different study, focused 
on five CEE states, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, founded that 
the EU pressures candidate countries to reform the national administration in anticipation 
of membership and that the anticipated EU membership is a driving force for reform of the 
core executives (Lippert, et al., 2001: 980).  
With regard to the case studies of this thesis, the majority of existing contributions 
touch upon related aspects which might affect the formulation or conduct of foreign policy, 
without paying attention to this problem in particular. There is no shortage of studies 
which see foreign policy as ‘grand policy’ rather than as public policy (see for instance 
C!lin, 2002, Gálik, 2003, Muresan et all, 2004, Póti, 2006, Terényi, 2009, Varga, 2000). 
These studies are more concerned with the external dimension of the policy in terms of 
interaction with external actors, either states or regional and international organizations. In 
all three countries, the transatlantic relationship and NATO occupies a privileged position, 
alongside regional cooperation (see for instance Gazdag, 2004). Given the fact that these 
studies are in general the product of local think tanks and research centres, they tend to be 
prescriptive in character and problem-solving orientated (see Duleba, 2004, Magyarics, 
2004, Bil"ík, 2007).  
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Amongst the existing studies, the most frequent are those dealing with foreign 
policy-making in Slovakia. Perhaps this is due to the fact that, being a newborn state, the 
Slovak Republic faced the challenge of setting up from scratch a new institutional design. 
For instance, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA, or Slovenská spolo!nos" pre 
zahrani!nú politiku in Slovak), a national think-tank, arose from the need to create a forum 
for debate on how foreign policy-making should be organized and how the foreign policy 
should be conducted (Duleba et al., 1998).  
A detailed account of the organization of the system of foreign policy in the Slovak 
Republic, in comparison with that of the Czech case, is provided by Zurovchak (1995). 
Zurovchak used a cognitive theoretical approach in order to assess the role that cultural 
factors play in the organization and structuration of Slovak foreign policy. While it 
provides important empirical information, his deductive, theory-testing approach has a 
different aim and scope than the aim of this thesis, namely to explore the impact of 
international organization on domestic foreign policy making in Slovakia. Looking at the 
specific period of the Me"iar leadership and the way in which external factors provided the 
government with constraints and opportunities, Tim Haughton argued that the contribution 
of the Foreign Service to the policy-making process was limited and the conduct of foreign 
affairs hardly dynamic. This was, his argument goes on, due to the limited diplomatic 
experience prior to independence in 1993, as well as to frequent changes at the top of the 
ministry during 1993-7 (Haughton, 2005).  
Instead, examining the impact of Europeanization on Slovak diplomacy, Jozef Bátora 
concludes that the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a new institution missing a 
traditional diplomatic culture,  
‘is prone to be penetrated by norms and values entailed in the evolving system of 
European interstate relations, which has effects upon the role-perceptions and 
identity of the MFA’ (Bátora, 2003a: 116).  
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His study was conducted even before Slovakia became a member of the European Union, 
supporting therefore the argument that for the CEE countries, the impact of EU policies 
and institutions was similar to the effects of the EU on the existing member states, but 
broader and deeper in scope (Grabbe, 2003: 303). The adaptation is more sudden for the 
new member states than for old members (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 7, also Pridham, 
2000: 51-52); the newcomers have to rapidly reorient their relations with third states or 
international organizations in order to comply with the EU requirements in the field of 
external relations and foreign and security policy.  
 Also, employing a bottom-up approach, Vladimir Bil"ík examined Slovakia’s 
inputs into the shape and functioning of the EU’s external relations (Bil"ík, 2004). Several 
similar studies were conducted in Hungary, examining the process of policy-making and 
coordination of European affairs in the context of European integration. The 
Europeanization of policy-making was seen as evolving from an ‘anticipatory’ to an 
‘adaptive’ Europeanization guided by the concrete demands of the EU and the accession 
process (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 28). The success and limitation of Europeanization of 
policy-making in Hungary was linked to the fact that  
‘the removal of both institutional and cultural deficits is the most important policy 
priority for Hungary in the next few years’ (Ágh, 1999: 852).  
 
A related study examining the management and coordination of European affairs in 
Hungary was published in October 2002, one year and a half before formal membership 
(Vida, 2002). Krisztina Vida concluded that Hungary ‘is on the right track towards 
gradual adaptation to EU requirements’ and it should not face any special institutional or 
administrative difficulties during the post-accession stage; accordingly, Hungary was 
assumed to have good chances of turning into an ‘ordinary’ member state in the enlarged 
EU (Vida, 2002: 72).  
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References to the organization of the decision-making process of Romanian foreign 
policy or the coordination of European affairs are scarce and lack substance (see for 
instance Muresan et all, 2004). Instead, more attention was paid to the intricate post-
communist transition and democratisation associated with a more difficult and hesitant 
process of European integration (Ciobanu, 2007, Gallagher, 2009, Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, 
Pop, 2006, Pridham, 2007, Stan, 2002). The Europeanization of Romania’s polity was 
mainly seen from the perspective of pre-accession conditionality, equated in this context 
with democratisation. In general, the fact that Romania was considered a ‘problematic 
case’ is fully proved by the pattern of its integration, dissimilar to the path followed by 
other candidate countries, although similar with that of Bulgaria.  
There is a consistent body of academic literature approaching inter-related matters of 
ethnicity, national identity, nationalism and the shaping influence of the ethno-national 
politics or the politics of national identity on the overall policy of European integration 
(see for instance László J. Kulcsár and Br!d!#an, 2007, Butler, 2007). With regard to the 
EU, this body of literature touches upon the matter of conditionality and the EU norms of 
minority and human rights issues as well as the way in which the national governments of 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania were compelled by the EU to conclude bilateral treaties 
including provisions on the treatment of national minorities (among others, see for instace 
Batt, 1996, Harris, 2004, Haughton, 2005, Nelson, 1998: 318-21, Pridham, 2002, Ram, 
2003).  
 
2.4. Conclusions 
A recent assessment of the state of the art in the field of Europeanization research 
provides a rather gloomy and sceptical view as regards the theoretical achievements 
(Lehmkuhl, 2007: 350-2). At the same time, the extensive number of empirical studies 
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conducted as part of the Europeanization research agenda proves that this concept is 
attractive. New articles and books continuous to be published at the very time of writing up 
this thesis, enriching the existing literature. The very debate and critique surrounding its 
theoretical strength provides in fact evidence for the fertility of this research agenda. This 
is a confirmation of the optimistic observation made by Ben Tonra almost a decade ago 
according to which it  
‘is a pleasure to report on the health and strength of publications in the field… The 
developing scholarship in this area is throwing up new conceptual challenges and 
offering a widening variety of conclusions to some well-established questions’ 
(Tonra, 2001: 168).  
 
Tacking stock of these valuable studies, it is clear that some areas are under-
researched and merit attention. As the following chapters will show, the research material 
collected and discussed in this thesis addresses some serious gaps in the existing 
scholarship. For instance, with regard to the literature on the socialization of national 
officials into the norms and rules of EU culture of compromise and consensus seeking, 
there is almost nothing about the diplomats and senior policy-makers from the three 
countries examined here. This thesis provides empirical material and analysis to fill in this 
gap. Another under-researched topic is the comparison of the different domestic 
circumstances in the three countries in which the decisions with regard to the recognition 
of Kosovo independence were made. While some studies have been produced with regard 
to the institutional adaptation in Hungary and Slovakia, there was less interest in the case 
of Romania. This thesis also addresses this gap. 
Going beyond punctual contributions to the gaps in the literature, perhaps the most 
significant input of this thesis comes from its multiple-case studies design, which offers a 
multi-layered comparative framework for explaining the different impact of 
Europeanization on the policy-making and foreign policy of the Hungary, Slovakia, and 
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Romania. This framework is expected to contribute to the existing body of literature and to 
further the understanding of the impact of European integration on Central and Eastern 
Europe. There is an obvious need to enlarge the Europeanization research agenda by 
adding new in-depth case studies from CEE. A complete picture of what is the impact of 
European integration at domestic level cannot be achieved unless all new EU member 
states are surveyed on this matter. In turn, this would provide the empirical basis for 
comparative analysis across the EU and assessment of the direction, nature, and speed of 
Europeanization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONS, IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS: A SYSTEMIC FRAMEWORK 
FOR STUDYING THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As illustrated in the review chapter, the literature addressing the Europeanization of 
foreign policy is mainly focused on studying the nature, extent, and direction of domestic 
change caused by Europeanization. Even if other aspects are touched upon in the literature, 
such as the theoretical and conceptual substance of Europeanization, the bulk of the 
literature consists of descriptive accounts of how the domestic impact of Europe, in 
general, or the European Union, in particular, is reflected in the shape and content of 
national foreign policies. These aspects are also addressed by this thesis with regard to the 
three case studies selected. However, the question of why Europeanization has uneven 
influence across countries is far less researched. On the other hand, various studies on the 
methodological side of the Europeanization research agenda point to the need for 
alternative explanations: domestic politics or globalization are the options mentioned most 
often (Haverland, 2007: 59). 
Europeanization as an input of the international environment does not cause the 
transformation of foreign policy directly. The influence of the EU is mediated by domestic 
factors. The process of European integration is the catalyst for change, but the 
transformation reflects largely the interplay of internal factors. These play the role of 
mediating factors, which might or might not facilitate domestic change. Two domestic 
mediating factors are considered here, namely governmental politics and the politics of 
national identity. The extent to which Europeanization transformed the foreign policy in 
the three EU new member states is examined along three dimensions, namely institutions, 
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identity, and interests underpinning the making and conduct of national foreign policies 
(the mediating and dependent variables are unpacked and discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter).  
The theoretical framework of this thesis builts not only on the Europeanization 
approach, but also on the systems approach to foreign policy analysis as laid out by Clarke 
and White (1989), but not limited to them (see for instance  Brecher, 1972, Kaplan, 1957, 
Rosenau, 1980). As White agrees, the systems approach  
‘cannot of itself explain foreign policy but it does help the analyst to construct 
explanations by setting out the range of variables involved and the possible 
interrelationship between them’ (White, 1989: 18).  
 
The advantage of this model is that it provides the researcher with a simple and 
intuitive organizing device, broad and flexible enough to include the most important 
processes and interactions responsible for the articulation of foreign policy (White, 1989: 
18). It also provides the advantage of distinguishing analytically between influences from 
external context and domestic environment (Holsti, 1995: 252), notwithstanding the 
difficulty of separating the two in the complex contemporary world. In this way, the 
Europeanization approach is integrated within a systemic analysis of foreign policy.    
If foreign policy is understood as a system fed by inputs from the external and 
internal environment, then the EU may be conceptualized as a sub-section of the external 
environment. Likewise, other external influences on foreign policy exist as well; Holsti 
(1995: 252-5) identifies inputs such as the structure of the international system, the nature 
of the world economy, purposes of other actors, global and regional problems, 
international law and world opinion. The internal environment or the intra-societal 
environment, as defined by the creator of the political systems approach, David Easton, 
may be characterized by a wide variety of sub-systems, not only social, but also cultural, 
economic, or demographic, each of them with their own sub-sections (Easton, 1965: 23). 
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An even wider approach, though not expressing a strict systemic point of view, is that 
foreign policy change  
‘is the result of a complex interplay of stimuli from the external environment and 
domestic-level cognitive, institutional, and political variables’ (Checkel, 1993: 297).  
 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first one discusses the peculiar status of 
the Europeanization approach when applied to the study of foreign policy. Both foreign 
policy analysis and European integration theory approach the study of foreign policy of 
European states. The first section also discusses the way in which the Europeanization 
approach was defined and conceptualized and clears the ground for the theoretical 
argument, developed in the following section.  
The second part spells out in more detail the theoretical framework employed by this 
thesis based on the foreign policy systems approach. It explains at length the reasons why 
governmental politics and national identity politics are used in this thesis as mediating 
factors between the input of Europeanization and the three outputs to be explained.    
The third part defines and discusses the three outputs of the Europeanization process: 
a) the institutional basis of foreign policy-making and coordination of European affairs at 
national and European level; b) the extent of socialization of national foreign policy-
making elites; and c) the extent of change of the conduct of national foreign policy. A 
summary then reviews the main points made in this chapter in order to facilitate the 
transition towards the chapter on methodology.     
 
3.2. Europeanization of foreign policy between foreign policy analysis and 
theories of European integration 
In a recent review, Wong identifies five key research questions emerging from the 
literature dealing with the Europeanization of foreign policy (see Wong, 2007: 322-9). 
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These five research questions are as follows: a) how can the process be conceptualized?; b) 
what is changing and what are the mechanisms and directions of change?; c) what is the 
scope of its effects?; d) is it producing convergence? and e) what is the significance of 
informal socialization as a vector of change? In fact, the first question reflects the 
conceptual and methodological challenge of Europeanization research. The later four 
questions revolve around whether Europeanization stands for the domestic impact of the 
EU or the projection of national interest at the European level. Other questions arising 
from the literature are subsumed in the debate over the manner in which Europeanization is 
conceptualized. For instance, the question of convergence is a possible by-product of 
Europeanization, seen as a top-down process. In this sense, the domestic change caused by 
the EU would lead to the gradual rapprochement of national policies.  
The most controversial issue that springs from these questions is that of multiple 
conceptualizations of Europeanization. The literature review provided for further 
illustrations that the concept of Europeanization is employed in different contexts with 
different meanings. The current use of the Europeanization approach contributes to the 
conceptual confusion over who is doing what and how, which creates the risk of 
overstretching the concept (Radaelli, 2000: 3-4). Therefore, the following paragraphs 
examine the conceptual confusion created by the fact that Europeanization is used 
indiscriminately. It aims to demonstrate that the conceptualization of Europeanization of 
foreign policy as a bottom-up process is misleading. In consequence, it makes the case for 
the use of the top-down approaches.   
The problem of causal direction in which Europeanization acts is a source of 
confusion as regard the very nature of Europeanization. Take for instance Europeanization 
as the projection of national interest at the European level in contrast with Europeanization 
as the domestic impact of the EU. In the former case, the independent variable is a 
35 
domestic factor influencing the dependent variable, located at European level. In the later 
case, the causal arrow is reversed from the EU towards the domestic level. The first is the 
so-called bottom-up approach; the second is the top-down one.  
Besides, scholars dealing with the Europeanization of foreign policy also used the 
concept in relation to a third sense, that of identity reconstruction through a process of 
socialization of identities and interests (Wong, 2005). The argument is that the 
socialization approach is neither bottom-up, nor top-down, but it cuts across levels; the 
outcome of this process is the emergence of a common European interest and identity 
alongside national interest and identity (see Wong, 2005: 141). However, this thesis 
maintains that the socialization approach may be subsumed to the top-down influence of 
the EU, conceptualized in a broader sense. The process of elite socialization takes place 
within the institutional architecture of the EU and it does reflect, to a certain extent, a 
diffuse transfer of norms and ideas from the EU towards national representatives.  
 
i) Europeanization of Foreign Policy and International Relations 
To each of the three foregoing directions or dimensions of Europeanization 
correspond distinct approaches to foreign policy analysis. However, the origins of these 
approaches are to be found in the field of international relations theory; foreign policy 
analysis is a sub-field of international relations. It should be remarked that the study of 
foreign policy is a contested subject-matter on its own, hanging uneasily between the study 
of international relations and public policy (Carlsnaes, 2002). Kenneth Waltz for instance 
dismisses the relevance of foreign policy analysis as a distinct field of study exactly 
because it is driven by both internal and external factors (Waltz, 1996). Similarly, 
Alexander Wendt argued that his social theory of international politics is not interested in 
foreign policy; in other words, the unit-level of analysis of a state’s foreign policy is not 
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relevant for the study of the international system, situated at a different level of analysis 
(see Wendt, 1999: 11).  
However, several clear approaches to foreign policy analysis have been developed 
during the last half-century. According to the type of explanatory factors, these approaches 
may belong either to the internal or external environment of the state. The domestic-
foreign frontier is also a criterion of demarcation of foreign policy for either the study of 
international relations or domestic politics. Even if the clear-cut separation of these two 
domains as determinants of a state’s external behaviour is no longer the orthodoxy, many 
authors uphold the view that the external-internal distinction has practical analytical 
advantages (see Hill, 2003, Holsti, 1995, Rosenau, 1997). 
Some scholars have labelled the explanatory approaches derived from domestic 
politics as Innenpolitik. The term comes from the German Innen, meaning inside, and 
Politik, standing for politics. Innenpolitik stresses the importance of domestic factors as 
determinants of foreign policy (Carlsnaes, 2002: 334, Rose, 1998: 148-51). However, this 
label is sufficiently broad to include diverse and disparate approaches looking at cognitive 
and psychological factors, bureaucratic politics, governmental politics, group dynamic, 
leadership, policy implementation, mass-media and others (see for instance Carlsnaes, 
2002: 334, Hudson and Vore, 1995). The second important tradition in foreign policy 
analysis is heavily inspired by the realist thinking in international relations; it was termed 
Realpolitik (see in Carlsnaes, 2002: 334). Realpolitik, concerned with the influence of the 
international system on state behaviour, includes different versions of realist thinking, to 
mention only the ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ types (for a review, see Rose, 1998: 149-50).  
However, this label is misleading insofar as the influence of the international system 
is examined not only by the realist tradition, but also by neoliberal theory and the theories 
of international regimes, institutions, and organizations. For those theories, the 
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international system continues to be anarchic, but states do not pursue exclusively zero-
sum games, as realists assume; they tend to cooperate in order to reduce transaction costs, 
through building of norms, regimes and institutions. Cooperation in international fora 
creates constraints, as well as opportunities, for participant member states, which affect 
their international behaviour. As Gourevitch remarks, the international environment 
reflects both the distribution of power amongst states (realist view) and the distribution of 
economic activity and wealth (neoliberal approach); in other words, the domestic political 
developments are shaped by war and trade (Gourevitch, 1978: 882-3).   
The Realpolitik tradition reflects mainly a top-down view, in which foreign policy is 
the result of developments at the level of the international system, either malign (realist 
view) or benign (neoliberal view). Innenpolitik’s proponents uphold the reverse bottom-up 
approach in line with which foreign policy mirrors the influence of inputs from within the 
state.  
The third dimension discussed here, namely the reconstruction of identity and 
interests, has its correspondent in the social constructivist approach to foreign policy. 
Crossing the internal – external divide, the social constructivist perspective of foreign 
policy emphasizes the constitutive role played by norms and ideas in defining identities 
and prescribing correct behaviour (Carlsnaes, 2002: 340). Notwithstanding the differences 
within various branches of social constructivist thinking, it should be noted that the social 
constructivist perspective differs from both the Innenpolitik and Realpolitik because of its 
epistemological status. While the first two approaches are derived from an objectivist or 
rationalist epistemology, social constructivism is inspired by an interpretivist 
epistemology. The result is that Europeanization was approached from contrasting 
epistemological standpoints. The objectivist or realist epistemology examines the 
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Europeanization by using the methods of natural sciences. In contrast, the interpretivist 
epistemology employs a research strategy  
‘that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences 
and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action’ (Bryman, 2001: 12-3).  
 
Following from the above, the ambiguity of Europeanization when applied to foreign 
policy results from three factors: a) multiplicity of sources; b) contrasting meanings 
associated with the concept itself; and c) different methodologies.   
 
ii) Europeanization of foreign policy and the study of European integration 
The abovementioned traditions from the field of International Relations theory, 
including foreign policy analysis, have also been a source of inspiration for the students of 
European integration. All three orientations found their way into the study of European 
integration. The concept of Europeanization, as illustrated in the literature review section, 
became common currency only lately; however, its entrance into the parlance of European 
theory can be best understood in the context of stages of European integration (see 
Caporaso, 2007: 24).  
In the initial stages of European integration, the explanatory accounts of this process 
were mainly of a bottom-up type. Starting in the 1950s, these approaches were concerned 
with explaining the flows from society and state towards regional integration. The main 
question in this period was what reasons European states have had for agreeing to 
relinquish parts of state sovereignty in favour of supranational integration. During this 
period, the theoretical approaches to European integration were heavily influenced by the 
mainstream thinking in international relations. As Caporaso argues (2007: 24), both 
proponents of functionalism and intergovernmentalism (or realism) were operating within 
the theoretical paradigm of international relations. They were interested in describing and 
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explaining the move from a decentralized system of balance of power of the Westphalian 
type towards a proto-European polity.  
The advancement of European integration during the 1980s shifted the theoretical 
focus away from bottom-up perspectives towards explaining the process of integration 
itself. During this stage, the process of European integration was given a new impetus as a 
result of the developments leading to the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) and 
the completion of the internal market programme. Likewise, the adoption of the Treaty of 
the European Union and the move towards building the political union further stressed the 
need to examine and explain supranational integration. The attention was no longer 
directed towards the question of why the state delegates parts of national sovereignty to 
regional integration, but how the regional organization functions, who are the main actors, 
and how they interact. 
Finally, during the last two decades, the focus of enquiry turned out to be on the 
domestic impact of the EU, the change that the EU caused to the very states that initiated 
the process of regional integration decades ago. The enhanced pace and deepening of 
economic integration following the internal market programme, set up under the SEA in 
1987, led to increased attention to the processes through which EU impacts on the member 
states. The European Union was already a mature reality, changing significantly the 
context in which member states operate. Therefore, what the concept of Europeanization 
brought about was a change in the analytical focus from member states, seen as sources of 
power-delegation to the EU, to a reverse, top-down relationship (see Börzel and Risse, 
2003: 57-8, Caporaso, 2007: 23-7, Smith, 2000: 613, Vink and Graziano, 2007: 3-7).  
A survey of 116 academic articles published between the 1980s and 2000 shows a 
spectacular increase in the use of the ‘Europeanization’ approach during the 1990s in 
contrast to the scarce use of the term throughout the 1980s (Featherstone, 2003: 4-6). This 
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trend is confirmed by updated data from the last eight years (up to the time of writing up 
this thesis). Between 2002 and 2009 (inclusive), the number of academic articles having 
the term Europeanization (also spelt as Europeanisation) as keyword has increased from 
116 to 446 articles and proceedings papers, an average of over 55 items published every 
year, compared with only nine per year for the decade preceding 2001 (see Table 1 
below).2 
 
Table 1. The use of the term Europeanization in the academic literature for the period 2003-2009 
Publication Year Record Count % of 394 
2009 78 20.76% 
2008 82 19.75% 
2005 58 14.68% 
2007 54 13.67% 
2006 52 13.16% 
2004 50 12.66% 
2003 20 5.06% 
Total 394 99.75% 
 
Although these articles cover a wide array of academic disciplines outside Political 
Sciences, Public Administration or International Relations,3 what this survey attempts to 
illustrate is the ever-growing use of the term and approach in the last decade, reflecting a 
rising concern and interest in the influence of the European Union (or Europe in a broader 
sense) at domestic level.   
In spite of the interest showed in the study of Europeanization, even after almost two 
decades of research in this field, there are still diverging opinions on what Europeanization 
                                                
2 Own assessment based on Social Science Citation Index of the ISI Web of Knowledge’s data for the period 
1980-2010, replicating the survey elaborated by Kevin Featherstone (2003). 
3 With regard to the subject areas, this survey includes articles from the field of sociology, business, 
economics, environmental studies, industrial work and labour, social studies, education or gender (as well as 
others). If the subject area is restricted to political science, public administration, international relations, area 
studies and ethnic studies, the most prolific journals are the Journal of European Public Policy, West 
European Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, Public Administration, Osteuropa, and Journal of 
European Social Policy (based on ISI Web of Knowledge, searching for the term ‘Europeanization’ (or 
Europeanisation) for the period 2003-2010; only journals with more than ten records were included). 
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is and how it can be conceptualised. Some scholars attempted to define what 
Europeanization is not, in order to limit the scope of the concept and make it more 
manageable (Radaelli, 2000). Accordingly, Europeanization does not include convergence, 
insofar as convergence is a potential consequence of Europeanization. Furthermore, 
Europeanization does not include harmonization; Europeanization often results in a 
‘differential’ impact of the EU at domestic level. In fact, this point is widely examined in 
this thesis, one of the main research questions being exactly why Europeanization leads to 
dissimilar national responses. Finally, Europeanization is different from integration. 
Europeanization could not exist without a certain degree of integration, therefore logically 
coming as a subsequent stage of the integration process (all Radaelli, 2000: 5-6, Vink, 
2002: 5-6). Moreover, Europeanization is not synonymous with other factors influencing 
and causing change at the nation-state level, the most important being globalization 
(Major, 2005: 178-9).   
This thesis, however, takes a different view with regard to whether Europeanization 
is or it is not symposiums with European integration. This study examines the 
transformation caused during the process of European integration in the candidate 
countries and after accession the new member states from CEE. Hence, in the case of 
accession, the Europeanization can be safely equated with European integration.   
The relative agreement on what Europeanization is not fades away when it comes to 
defining what the distinctive features of this concept are. For instance, Europeanization 
was defined as ‘Brusselsization’, in other words ‘the steady enhancement of Brussels-
based decision-making’ (Allen, 1998: 42). Europeanization is also defined as ‘the 
emergence and development at European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse-
Kappen, 2001: 3). For Ginsberg (2001: 37), Europeanization stands for a partial important 
explanation of European foreign policy, denoting the process whereby the CFSP moves 
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closer to the norms, policies and habits of the EC, yet without becoming more 
supranational.     
A different view, trying to narrow the scope of the concept, equates Europeanization 
with ‘EU-isation’, insofar as the debate is on the domestic impact of the EU, and not of 
‘Europe’. However, this view is contested; the main argument put forward by critics is that 
Europeanization goes beyond simple ‘EU-isation’, covering a wider range of processes and 
institutions and including a voluntary component of adaptation even beyond the formal 
requirements of the EU (Major, 2005: 178, Vink, 2002: 6-7). The term ‘Europeification’ 
was also employed to depict the fact that the context in which the national policy-making 
is elaborated should be widened in order to include the EU’s major institutions (Andersen 
and Eliassen, 1993). In contrast to the power-sharing understanding embedded in the 
concept of Europeification, other authors contend that Europeanization represents the 
bottom-up transfer of powers from national governments to supranational institutions as a 
shift in policy hegemony from national capitals to Brussels (Lawton, 1999: 94). However, 
for reasons discussed in the next chapter, this thesis does not consider the bottom-up 
conceptualisation of Europeanization as coherent to the main thrust of the Europeanization 
approach. 
For most authors, Europeanization makes sense only if it is concerned with the way 
in which European integration causes change at the domestic level. In other words, despite 
the apparent conceptual confusion, the term Europeanization is mainly used in the 
literature to denote the influence or the domestic impact of the EU (Sedelmeier, 2006: 4). 
This conceptualisation considers Europeanization as an  
‘incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamic become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994: 69).  
 
Drawing on Ladrech’s definition, Radaelli contends that Europeanization 
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‘consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing 
things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies’ (Radaelli, 2003: 30).  
 
The definition not only attempts to clarify what Europeanization is, but it also seeks 
to explain its mechanisms. Similarly, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) propose an exclusive 
top-down mechanism in which Europeanization causes institutional change at the domestic 
level. This mechanism, they contend, may take three different forms. The first is positive 
integration. This type of integration is based on an EU pre-existing model. The member 
states have to comply with this prescribed model. The second type is negative integration. 
In this case, the EU legislation alters the rule of the game. The third type refers to a weaker 
mechanism whereby European polity causes domestic change by altering the beliefs and 
expectations of national actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2-3). All these three 
mechanisms are examined in this thesis with regard to the Europeanization of foreign 
policy in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.  
A related way of conceptualizing the mechanisms of Europeanization was developed 
by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse. The two authors argued that Europeanization can not 
cause domestic change unless Europeanization is inconvenient. In other words it has to be 
a certain degree of misfit or gap between the European and national processes, policies, 
and institutions which creates adaptational pressures. However, the misfit itself is not 
enough; Europeanization cannot cause domestic change in the absence of facilitating 
factors (actors or institutions) which respond to the adaptational pressures for change 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58). The applicability of the ‘goodness of fit’ approach when it 
comes to foreign policy might be contested, due to the intergovernmental nature of the 
CSFP. Yet, the implicit assumption that the researcher should look for indicators of 
discrepancy between the developments at the European and national levels as well as for 
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facilitating factors is compelling and prompted numerous subsequent studies to adopt this 
framework. These assumptions are also implicit in this thesis. 
Given the variety of definitions, it comes as no surprise that Olsen finds that the 
concept of Europeanization is multifaceted. He identifies five meanings of the concept. 
One is that of changes in the external boundaries of the Union, for instance due to the 
process of enlargement. The second refers to the development of institutions at the 
European level. The third points to the penetration of national systems of governance by 
the processes at the European level. The fourth is the export of models of political 
organization. The fifth, and the last one, equates Europeanization with a project of political 
unification which is the EU (Olsen, 2002: 923-4). The ‘many faces of Europeanization’, to 
recall the title of his article, also prompted Olsen, among others, to question whether 
Europeanization is a really useful concept and not only a fashionable one (Olsen, 2002). 
This is also one of the objectives of this thesis, namely to discuss the usefulness of the 
Europeanization approach in explaining domestic transformation of policy-making in the 
new member states from CEE. 
As already pointed out, the study of the Europeanization of foreign policy generated 
conceptual confusion. If one looks at the Europeanization applied to the study of national 
foreign policy from a bottom-up perspective, it is hard to avoid the impression that is all 
about a slightly modified version of intergovernmentalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. 
The bottom-up approach contends that the EU member states attempt to project their 
national ideas, preferences and models at the European supranational level. In doing so, the 
member states  
‘Europeanize their previously national priorities and strategies and create a 
dialectical relationship. By exporting their preferences and models onto EU 
institutions, they in effect generalise previously national policies onto a larger 
European stage’ (Wong, 2005: 137). 
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The national interest is no longer only national, but the EU’s interest as well. 
Moreover, due to the complex nature of the EU polity and policy-making, not only major 
states but also small states in terms of size and resources may export or upload and 
therefore Europeanize their own foreign policy priorities. 
The similarity between this version of Europeanization and the classical 
intergovernmentalist account of European integration is striking. Originating in the 
international relations theory, intergovernmentalism is closely connected with the realist 
tradition. Amongst the key assumptions are those that the nation-states are the key actors in 
the international system and the role of supranational institutions or transnational actors 
does not have a serious influence over the way foreign policy is conducted by national 
governments. In the context of European integration theory, the intergovernmentalist 
version of realism in international relations contends that the direction and speed of the 
integration process is a function of the decisions and actions taken by the national 
governments of the member states (Nugent, 2003: 482).  
These intergovernmentalist assumptions found practical confirmation in a series of 
events that slowed down the pace of the integration process during the 1970s. The most 
important of these was the so called ‘empty chair crisis’, when the French representatives 
refused to attend any meeting of the Community due to conflicting views over the 
financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (for a historical account of the crises, 
see for instance Dinan, 2004). The consequence of this crisis was the Luxembourg 
compromise, in 1966, agreeing that the Commission should consult more closely with 
member states before launching legal initiatives, implicitly granting national governments 
the right to veto the Commission’s proposals.  
This moment is also important for it marks the beginning of a slow but steady 
decline of the integration process during the 1970s. This process was mirrored by the 
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decline of neofunctionalism as the dominant theoretical approach to European integration. 
The intergovernmentalist critique of neofunctionalism received a new impetus. The real-
life political and economic developments in Europe confirmed the intergovernmentalist 
view that national governments remain the drivers of European integration.  
The most significant proponent of this approach was Stanley Hoffman, who, 
throughout the 1960s, attempted to explain the place and role of the Western European 
nation-states in relation to the integrationist project embodied by the European 
Community. He criticised the neofunctionalist ‘logic of synthesis’, embodied by the 
Monnet method. Hoffman argued that the logic of synthesis restricts the freedom of 
national governments. In contrast, what he called the ‘logic of diversity’ implies that in 
areas of key importance,  
‘nations prefer the self-controlled uncertainty of national self-reliance, to the 
uncontrolled uncertainty of the blending process’ (Hoffman, 2001: 49).  
 
In relation to areas of key importance, Hoffman made the distinction between ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ politics as a way to explain why integration was possible in technocratic and less 
controversial fields, but generates conflict in matters where the national autonomy and 
identity were threatened (Rosamond, 2000: 77).  
Likewise, the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, developed by Andrew 
Moravcsik, continues the intergovernmentalist tradition and has three constitutive building 
blocks: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference 
formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiations (see Moravcsik, 
1993, 1999). Therefore, at its core lies the assumption that the process of European 
integration is the result of competing national preferences, bargained over in high-level 
multilateral negotiations.  
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In essence, both classical and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches assume that 
European integration is a function of the willingness of the member states to cooperate and 
delegate powers to the EU; ultimately, the national governments have the last word with 
regard to the direction and intensity of supranational integration. Notwithstanding the 
numerous critiques of its assumptions and approach, intergovernmentalism has been 
widely used in the study of European integration, including that of Europeanization.  
In the bottom-up conception of the Europeanization of foreign policy, states are the 
main actors and agents of change in contrast with the apparent passivity that characterize 
them according to top-down approaches. The member states are the active agents that use 
the European Union as a platform to promote and project national foreign policy ideas, 
preferences, and models. Whether a state is large or small, holding important capabilities 
or not, the EU might provide a better framework for the projection of national interests and 
preferences in the world than a country’s own resources would afford (Wong, 2005: 137). 
At the same time, a country may choose to play a dual game, using the EU as a platform 
for promoting some specific objectives, while acting outside the EU framework to reach 
other objectives.  
The main flaw of Europeanization understood from a bottom-up perspective is that it 
conflates two distinct approaches, namely Europeanization itself and 
intergovernmentalism. In contrast, the top-down version of Europeanization of foreign 
policy provides for greater internal consistency with the main thrust of the Europeanization 
research agenda. As highlighted in the literature review chapter, there is a broad agreement 
with regard to the direction in which Europeanization operates as the domestic impact of 
European integration on polity, politics, and policy (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 60, Caporaso, 
2007: 27, Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 6, Vink, 2002). Whether one speaks about policies 
in the areas where the European Community has exclusive, shared or support competences 
48 
in relation to member states, the fundamental logic directing the research focus is from the 
EU towards the member states. Therefore, the top-down approach is the one favoured by 
this thesis.  
Not only reasons of a theoretical nature justify the choice of a top-down approach. 
Another motive is closely connected to the length of membership. This is an important 
practical consideration. At the time of writing up this thesis, for Hungary and Slovakia the 
experience of being EU members is 5 years while for Romania it is 2 years. One may 
argue that this is a short period for assessing how effective a new member state is in 
projecting its national preferences at EU level. Arguably, at this stage it is more fruitful to 
examine the domestic impact of the EU rather than the other way round.  
 
3.3. Europeanization of foreign policy: a systems approach 
The reason why this thesis uses the systems approach to foreign policy analysis is 
that this model has an important heuristic value. The model is employed as an organizing 
device for specifying the relevant variables and defining the boundaries between them. The 
author of the political systems approach, David Easton, did not devise this theory having in 
mind international politics or foreign policy analysis (see Jackson and Sørensen, 2003: 
283); however, he pointed out that one can equally see the international realm as a system 
governed by similar rules to those characterizing the domestic political system (Easton, 
1965: 487). This is exactly what Simon Hix does in his study of the EU as a political 
system, contending that the EU has all the essential elements characterizing any 
democratic political system (see Hix, 2005). 
The aim here is not to discuss the application of the systems approach to the realm of 
international politics. The research focus of this thesis is on the impact of European 
integration on the national systems of foreign policy in three of the new member states of 
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the EU. Before describing in more detail the way in which the systems theory is employed 
here, a few general points about the foreign policy system approach are necessary. The 
subsequent paragraphs outline the basic components of the systems approach applied to 
foreign policy, as developed by Clarke (1989: 27-55). Having as a starting point the 
research design developed by Michael Brecher for his analysis of Israeli foreign policy 
(1972), Clarke advanced five essential features that any analytical framework for the study 
of foreign policy should include. First, he maintains, any endeavour to specify a foreign 
policy system has to detail the components of the system; in other words, to identify which 
forces matter, how they are different from other forces, and what is their place within the 
system. The second feature is that the system has to be conceptualized in a holistic manner. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some components of the system benefit from a greater 
understanding than others, the system is a whole, the parts being subsumed to the entirety. 
Third, the conception of the system is dynamic. Because the object of study is a system of 
human action, which is intrinsically fluid, the researcher has to describe and explain a 
reality in continuous transformation. Fourth, the system is always in a relation of 
interdependence with its environment. The fifth and the last feature is that the components 
of the system are also interdependent, reacting with each other (all from Clarke, 1989: 31).     
The national foreign policy system is seen as an open system fed by inputs and 
producing outputs and feedback loops. The inputs are produced by internal and external 
environments of the state and create the context in which the decision-makers operate. 
Inputs create pressures or demands and provide for supports and reinforcements for 
decision-makers. Easton defines inputs of demand or pressure as  
‘an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to particular 
subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so’ 
(Easton, 1965: 38).  
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The demands create disturbance or stress in the system. An example of input as 
pressure or demand is the accession criteria that the Central and East European countries 
had to satisfy in order to be invited to open the negotiation talks. In the foreign policy 
domain, the EU policy in the field of arms export control, the EU policy towards Russia, or 
the EU recognition policy towards the independence of Kosovo are only a few examples of 
external inputs creating demands or pressures for national decision-makers.  
However, the system’s environment, external or internal, does not provide only 
inputs of demand, but also inputs of support. The inputs of support are described as 
expressions of political support from allies or less visible dimensions such as the power of 
traditions, continuity or the like (Clarke, 1989: 33). As illustration, one may consider the 
case of a member state’s participation in a EU crisis management operation. An input of 
support may be the fact that there is no internal opposition within the governmental 
coalition as regards sending a military contingent to the EU mission; likewise, the country 
may have important political or economic interests in the region where the EU mission is 
to be deployed.  
The range of outputs the foreign policy system may produce is wide. Easton 
conceptualizes outputs in a broad sense, as ‘authoritative allocation of values’, expressed 
in the form of binding decisions, their implementing actions and certain associated types of 
behaviour, which are able to influence the environment of the system (Easton, 1965: 349-
51). In other words, the outputs stand for governmental decisions and policies.4 Between 
inputs, both of demands and support, and outputs, there is the category of processes. 
Easton is not very specific about how inputs are transformed into outputs within the 
                                                
4 In an attempt to order different types of outputs of a foreign policy system, Clarke (1989: 33-4) identifies 
five categories: informational, declaratory, procedural, administration of transfer payments, and overt or 
physical action. 
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‘black-box’ of the state, although attempts had been made elsewhere to address this 
shortcoming (see Almond and Powell, 1966).  
A final step in the operation of a foreign policy system refers to the way in which 
outputs feed back into the system. The outputs influence the environment of the system 
and in a circular loop end up by altering the inputs of the system. The feedback effect is the 
feature that provides the systems approach with the analytical tool to capture the dynamic 
nature of any system of human action. However, the study of feed-back is outside the 
interest of this thesis. As mentioned, the scope here is limited to the impact of the EU on 
the national systems of foreign policy.   
While the systems approach exhibits features of a holistic approach (Caramani, 2008, 
Clarke, 1989), Europeanization is a middle range theory (Olsen, 2007: 91); it deals with a 
limited number of variables, which allows the researcher to investigate empirically the 
relationships between them, as well as with other variables (Layder, 1998: 16). Within a 
systemic framework, Europeanization stands for the relationship between two types of 
variables. On the one hand, it is the external input created by the political processes and 
policies at the level of the European Union feeding into member states’ foreign policy 
systems. In terms of outputs of Europeanization, this thesis examines three components 
most likely to affect the nature of foreign policy:    
a) institutional framework of policy-making;  
b) socialization of identities and interests; and  
c) practical conduct or behaviour of foreign policy.   
The first component refers to the policy-making process and the infrastructure 
underpinning the elaboration and implementation of foreign policy. The second component 
relates to the ideational motives and preferences embedded in the national cultures and 
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identities and how these are affected by Europeanization. Finally, the last component deals 
with the policy itself, its main objectives, and means to implement the policy. 
As already pointed out, the key questions of this research are as follows:  
a) What is the extent of the impact of Europeanization on the foreign policy of the 
new member states?  
b) Why is the impact of Europeanization uneven across countries?  
This thesis ask whether and to what extent Europeanization has a differentiated 
impact upon various states, but also moves further and attempts to explain the divergence 
in the behaviour of the old as well as new member states of the EU. The conduct of 
European nation states is often uncommon and sometimes unpredictable and inconsistent 
although in the official discourse the theme of common interests and values is 
omnipresent. Therefore, the differentiated national response to Europeanization is one of 
the puzzling issues that this thesis attempts to explain. There is a need to differentiate the 
relevance of Europeanization as an independent explanatory factor from other competing, 
alternative explanations, such as the role of domestic factors or globalisation forces (see 
Lehmkuhl, 2007: 343). The mediating domestic factors provide the key to understanding 
why, given similar external inputs, different countries react in different ways to 
Europeanization. The same reasoning may apply to the way in which Globalization 
influences the national states and why do they react in different ways to otherwise similar 
pressures. This is also an important reason for preferring to focus on domestic specificities 
as a way to understand differentiated reactions.   
As already illustrated, the role of domestic sources of foreign policy or the 
Innenpolitik is key in understanding foreign policy behaviour. As Christopher Hill 
remarks, it would be an error to assume that  
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‘state behaviour can be understood solely by reference to the external realm of 
power balances, geopolitics and the anarchical society’ (Hill, 1996b: 5).  
 
He enumerates domestic sources such as constitutional structure, bureaucracy, 
political parties, political culture, media and public opinion (Hill, 1996). Also, analyzing 
the foreign policies of the old member states of the EU, Manners and Whitman identify 
five domestic factors influencing foreign policy-making, namely the constitutional design, 
the role of sub-national governments, the relationship between governments and parties, 
the role of special interest groups and the breakdown of domestic-foreign distinction 
(Manners and Whitman, 2000: 252).  
The analytical framework proposed in this thesis builds on two distinct sets of 
mediating domestic factors, which are assumed to explain the differentiated impact of 
Europeanization:  
a) governmental politics; 
b) the politics of national identity. 
The causal relationship between inputs and outputs may be graphically represented 
as in figure below (see Fig. 1).  
Fig 1. Graphical representation of the foreign policy system approach employed by this thesis  
 
54 
Before explaining this graphic, it is important to clarify the semantic use of ‘causal 
relationship’ as employed above. At least with regard to the issue of socialization and 
identity politics, the term ‘cause’ is not used in a positivist vein, meaning a directly 
observable, ‘out-there’ relationship that can be quantified. As John Ruggie (1998: 869) 
aptly observed, when it comes to ideational factors causation simply does not exist and it is 
more appropriate to approach this matter in terms of ‘reasons for action’ rather than 
‘causes of action’. Hence, Europeanization ‘causing’ a change of identities and interests 
through the process of socialization does in fact mean that European integration simply 
creates the historical context wherein certain normative and policy practices might emerge.  
With regard to the figure above, the left arrow pointing towards the domestic level 
generically represents the input of Europeanization. The input of Europeanization is 
filtered by the two mediating factors of identity and governmental politics. The causal 
effect of the two mediating factors is represented by a block arrow pointing towards the 
three outcomes to be explained. However, it is worth highlighting that while the role of 
governmental politics is crucial in explaining all three outcomes of the Europeanization 
process, the role of the national identity politics is more salient with regard to the 
socialization of identities and interests and the perception and definition of national 
interests to be promoted and defended by foreign policy means.  
The politics of national identity is understood here as an idiosyncratic set of ideas 
held by national policy-makers about political community; these ideas are used to activate 
a sense of unity and solidarity in order to legitimise political action, including in the field 
of foreign policy (Aggestam, 2004a: 40). These ideas about the national political 
community and its relationship with the outside world represent the main mediating factor 
between the input of Europeanization and the expected outcome of the socialization of 
identities and interests at national level.  
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Governmental politics is one of the key determinants of a country’s foreign policy. 
This thesis proposes a broader view on governmental politics, one which looks equally at 
the role played by top political leaders or high-level civil servants, their political parties 
within the coalition cabinets, as well as inter-ministerial and inter-state agencies 
competition. In pluralistic societies, the fragmentation of the executive power is an 
important factor affecting the overall direction and content of the policy process. The 
overwhelming majority of governments in the three countries studied in this thesis have 
been coalition cabinets. Political parties have different agendas, ideologically oriented, 
which are reflected also in the way in which they see the organization and conduct of 
foreign policy. The change of governments following elections is usually being watched 
with great interest because it may result in a change of foreign policy preferences.  
Likewise, there are differences between a majority and a coalition government. In a 
coalition, multiple partners may come up with different agendas and competing visions, 
acting as veto-players. The mediating role of the veto-players was conceptualized 
especially in terms of the dispersion of power at domestic level, which in turn empowers 
different actors (at regional or local levels, organized as unions, business associations etc) 
with diverse interests to oppose or divert the constraining influence of Europeanization. 
The same is true in the case of coalition governments. Far from being a unitary actor, the 
political and policy agenda of a coalition cabinet reflects not only the different agendas of 
constituent political parties, but also competing intra-party interests. Within a coalition 
cabinet, there is a structural threat of blockage or dissolution. Any political party, member 
of the governing coalition, may block a foreign policy initiative agreed by the other 
members of the cabinet by threatening to defect from the government, which may even 
require new elections (Hagan et al., 2001: 171). Under what specific circumstances this 
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mix of competing interests has an influence of the political agenda and policy process is a 
matter that this thesis explores at length.     
The following section looks in more detail at each of the three individual outcomes 
of the Europeanization process, trying to clarify the contentious aspects, laying out the 
analytical approach and spelling out the research questions.  
 
3.4. Three Dimensions of Europeanization 
i) Europeanization as institutional change 
The first dimension focuses on the institutional change of the foreign policy system 
in the three new member states. The neoinstitutionalist approach to foreign policy 
highlights the role of institutions in shaping action (Lecours, 2005: 8). The major question 
asked by the historical institutionalist branch of neo-institutionalism relates to why 
common events or processes lead to different outcomes in different countries through time 
and space (see Lecours, 2005: 14). Hence, this approach is deemed appropriate for 
answering the question why, given the common constraints and opportunities posed by the 
Europeanization process, the national systems of foreign policy were designed differently. 
Accordingly, the historical institutionalist methodology is used to answer this question.5       
A common critique of the neo-institutionalist approach is that it is more comfortable 
in explaining continuity than change. However, the neo-institutionalist literature puts 
forward three arguments on the possibility of institutional change: a) the thesis of 
exogenous shocks (historical institutionalism); b) the idea that institutions are transformed 
when they become dysfunctional or yield sub-optimal outcomes (rationalistic approaches); 
and c) isomorphism and convergence (sociological version).  
                                                
5 The practical use of the historical institutionlist methodology is outlined in the section dedicated to 
methodology. 
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The external shock view argues that domestic processes of institutional reproduction 
resulting in institutional continuity may be disturbed by exogenous factors such as 
international events. External factors may break the institutional reproduction cycle and 
create opportunities for institutional transformation. The European integration process is 
the external opportunity that created the incentive for internal transformation, including in 
the field of foreign policy. There is a wide agreement with regard to the fact that all 
member states have to adjust institutionally to the requirements of participating in the EU 
system of foreign policy-making. For the old member states, this process was not 
unidirectional, since they have the chance to express their own preferences on the design of 
decision and policy-making process of European foreign and security policy.  
Yet, for the new member states, the adaptation of the national systems of foreign 
policy-making to the formal and informal functional requirements of the CFSP was a pre-
condition of the accession process. Therefore, the institutional reorganization undertaken 
in view of EU membership and after integration is one of the most visible indicators of EU 
impact at the domestic level. The design of the national systems of foreign policy before 
accession was different, therefore not adequate for performing the role of a member state. 
Policy-makers had to work towards transforming the old institutional structures according 
to the requirements of participation in the EU foreign policy. The institutional 
transformation affected institutions located at both domestic and European level, although 
at different temporal stages. Domestic institutions located at European level denote mainly 
the permanent representations to the European Union. In fact, the European level became 
an issue only when the accession process was almost completed.   
The second argument is that institutional transformation takes place when institutions 
are dysfunctional and create sub-optimal outcomes and is the result of strategic decisions 
of political actors (see Lecours, 2005: 12). As an example, one may think of the result of 
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the general elections in the year 2004 in Romania, or in Slovakia of the year 2006, leading 
to new governmental coalitions. If the change of government is associated with measures 
of institutional reform in the field of European affairs, this is an indicator with regard to the 
fact that the institutional change was the result of an inter-coalition bargaining rather than 
EU demands. Similarly, the competition amongst different ministries or executives 
agencies for resources and power may influence the dynamic of institutional 
transformation.    
The third argument is that of institutional convergence through isomorphic 
transformation. In the absence of a unique European administrative model, including in the 
field of European foreign policy, the hypothesis that institutions in a similar domain tend to 
look alike seems counter-intuitive and needs empirical evidence. However, one may look 
at the relatively similar structures of the permanent representations of Hungary, Slovakia 
and Romania, and to believe that this is an indicator of convergence. Alternatively, one 
may think that it rather reflects a rational approach to the need of replicating the functional 
and structural configuration of the Council of the European Union6.  
This thesis makes a clear distinction between organizational change and institutional 
change. Michael Bauer points out that the difference between the two might be conceived 
as the distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics, where organizational change is 
subsumed to the former category, while institutional change falls into the category of high 
politics of inter-organizational engineering (Bauer, 2008: 628). Also, this thesis is less 
interested in the subtleties of the decision-making; the focus is more on the structural and 
functional aspects of the policy-making process. The distinction between decision-making 
and policy-making process is the distinction between discrete decisions and a long-series 
                                                
6 Throughout this thesis, when it comes to the Council of the European Union the following terminology is 
used interchangeably: Council of the EU, EU Council, Council of Ministers, or simply the Council.  
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of interrelated activities; it is the distinction between once-and-for-all acts and a long-term 
process (see Cherns, 1979, Rose, 1969).  
Another point that needs to be clarified is about the relationship between the systems 
of foreign policy and the broader systems of coordinating European affairs. For most of the 
1990s, European integration was treated as a top foreign policy priority by the CEE 
countries (Vachudova, 2005) and handled accordingly by the actor best placed to deal with 
it, namely the ministries of foreign affairs (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007: 969). In this 
way, the two systems have partially overlapped. Therefore, the analysis of institutional 
change in the three countries goes beyond the foreign policy system, to include the broad 
system of coordinating national foreign policy and European affairs.      
To sum up, by examining institutional change in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, 
this thesis intends to answer the following two research questions:  
Research question 1: What is the nature and extent of institutional change of the 
national foreign policy systems to the formal and/or informal requirements of participation 
in the EU foreign policy?  
This research question aims to provide descriptive empirical data about:  
a) the role of the MFA in the system of national coordination and the relationship 
between the Foreign Service and the prime-minister’s office or other state agencies 
responsible for coordination of European affairs; and 
b) the changing structure and functions of national coordination of European affairs 
and foreign policy at European level by looking at the Permanent Representations to the 
EU of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and their relationships with the capitals. 
Research question 2: Why does the institutional transformation in view of European 
integration reflect different patterns across the national systems of foreign policy in the 
three countries?  
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This last research question mirrors in fact the question why the impact of 
Europeanization is uneven across countries. It is concerned with the puzzling issue of 
continuing diversity against the background of harmonization pressures of the European 
integration. Governmental politics is assumed to play a more important role in the 
refashioning of the national systems of coordination of European affairs and foreign 
policy-making than the Europeanization process itself.  
 
ii) Europeanization as socialization of identities and interests 
The second line of enquiry deals with the way in which the Europeanization process 
affects the self-identification of national foreign policy-makers. Europeanization in this 
context is synonymous with socialization, defined as internalization of EU substantive and 
procedural norms and rules. In a broader sense, the Europeanization of identities and 
interests represents an instance of international socialization. The social constructivist 
assumption underpinning this approach is that international institutions may be conceived 
as social environments that socialize state or state agents (Checkel, 2007: 15). For many 
authors, the European Union stands for the perfect case of a dense and complex network of 
institutions and institutionalized practices, rules and norms challenging national identities 
and loyalties (Checkel, 2007).    
There are numerous obstacles hindering international socialization but probably the 
most important has to do with the previous socialization within the framework of national 
political culture and identities. Historically, the influence of the national community over 
its constitutive sub-groups was so overwhelming that the state became the main agent 
responsible for the direction and weight of the socialization process (Levi, 1974: 157). 
Therefore, the issue of international socialization within the EU framework needs to be 
examined against the background of national identity politics.  
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In the case of the previous dimension of Europeanization, the influence of European 
integration as an external input is contrasted with the competing explanatory variables of 
governmental politics. In the case of this second dimension of Europeanization, the 
socialization of identities and interests is also examined against the background of the 
politics of national and European identity in each of the three countries. For this reason, the 
chapter dedicated to this matter examines the main features of the discourse and politics of 
national identity in the three countries selected here as case-studies. As underlined above, 
the politics of national identity is defined here as the set of ideas held by national policy-
makers about political community, which are used to activate a sense of unity and 
solidarity in order to legitimise political action, including in the field of foreign policy 
(Aggestam, 2004a: 40). 
The Europeanization literature identifies cognitive and normative structures 
alongside public policies or domestic legal and political configurations as domains of EU 
influence (Radaelli, 2003: 35-36). For scholars working in the field of Europeanization of 
foreign policy, the study of cognitive and normative aspects offers a welcome window of 
opportunity. This is mainly because the weak formal powers of the EU coupled with the 
strong role of national governments makes it difficult for the researcher to uncover hard 
empirical evidence with regard to the domestic impact of the EU. Instead, some scholars 
contend, the process of European integration and the participation in the framework of 
European foreign policy may lead to adoption of supranational and procedural norms and 
rules (March and Olsen, 2004, Smith, 2004).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the norms and rules characterizing EU foreign policy 
cooperation are taken for granted; in other words, the research undertaken by other 
scholars is not questioned. However, what this thesis questions is whether and to what 
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extent there is evidence of socialization of foreign policy elites from the new member 
states.   
There is already a rich body of literature on Europeanization of foreign policy, which 
makes the point that the constant interaction, debate, and trial-and-error learning during the 
last thirty years of cooperation in the realm of foreign policy resulted in the emergence and 
institutionalization of a specific European ‘culture of compromise’. This culture of 
compromise contrasts with the traditional intergovernmental style of cooperation specific 
to other international organizations. In practical terms, this means attitudes and behaviour 
that prioritize the common European interest instead of thinking solely in terms of national 
interests, and preferring the EU framework of cooperation to alternative means, either 
national or international. 
Accordingly, the state representatives’ preferences are defined and redefined through 
interaction in the highly normative and institutionalized framework of cooperation of the 
EU Council. This leads to a diplomatic coordination reflex, which grew up as a reciprocal 
disposition of national representatives participating in EU foreign policy cooperation (see 
Glarbo, 1999: 644, Nuttall, 1992). In summary, the EU culture of compromise refers to the 
following informal norms and rules: consultation, consensus-seeking, trust, reciprocity, 
mutual responsiveness, respect for other member states’ domaines réservés and the 
prohibition against hard bargaining (see Lewis, 2000: 261, Smith, 2004: 122).  
The two main research questions here are as follows:  
Research question 1. Do the experts and diplomats from the Permanent 
Representations hold different views on the aims and means of EU foreign policy from 
those in the capitals, working in the ministries of foreign affairs?  
The assumption here is that the process of socialization affects differently various 
state agents involved in the policy process at European and national levels. The level of 
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analysis is the individual involved in policy formulation. For some authors, the state as a 
corporate agent is the most appropriate unit of analysis for studying the impact of 
socialization. The argument is that there is no need for individuals to internalise 
international beliefs and rules insofar as these are institutionalised in domestic policy-
making process (see Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 112). However, this approach overlooks 
the main link in the causal chain mediating between international and domestic system, 
namely the individual policy-maker. As Werner Levi pointed out more than three decades 
ago, the target must be the individual relevant to the making and executing of foreign 
policy; the socialization of states is in reality the socialization of individuals (Levi, 1974: 
150;61). 
For this reason, this thesis makes the distinction between two groups of state 
officials, according to their proximity to policy-making in Brussels. There is, on the one 
hand, the group of national representatives working in the Permanent Representations to 
the EU, in Brussels. The other group consists mainly of policy-makers from the foreign 
affairs ministries in the capitals and to a lesser extent the staff dealing with European 
affairs in the office of the Government and European Committees of the national 
parliaments.  
I assume that the national representatives in Brussels act as agents of 
Europeanization of national foreign policy, not only as promoters and defenders of national 
interest at the EU level. The national representatives in Brussels, interacting continuously 
with their counterparts in various formations within the Council of the EU, with 
representatives from the General Secretariat of the Council and European Commission, are 
placed in a specific cultural environment. At least theoretically, this environment has a 
strong socialization potential. If indicators of socialization are to be found anywhere, then 
this place is the Permanent Representation of a member state. In this sense, the position of 
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national diplomats or representatives is dual, being involved in a two-level game between 
national capital and Brussels (see Putnam, 1988). The national representatives play a 
different role from the traditional diplomatic services, notwithstanding the fact that the role 
of the ministries of foreign affairs is changing in the EU context (Hocking and Spence, 
2005). On the other hand, the policy-makers from national capitals, working in the 
ministries of foreign affairs or elsewhere are less socialized into EU norms and rules and 
express less supranational conceptions than their colleagues in Brussels.  
The second research question asks about the type of socialization. James March and 
Johan Olsen (1998, 2004) have argued that action within an institutional setting is driven 
either by a logic of anticipated consequences and previously defined preferences, or by a 
logic of appropriateness and a sense of identity. While the former is based on rational-
choice models and emphasizes the egoistic and self-interested nature of human agents, the 
latter argues that the norms and rules of a given community are followed because they are 
considered right and legitimate (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). However, the two authors 
admit that in reality the logic of action within an international organization is rather 
blurred, mixing both types of logic (March and Olsen, 1998: 952).  
Research question 2. Is elite socialization simply a process of learning of new 
norms and rules or does it have a deeper character that affects the inner self-identification 
of the participant agents?  
At minimum, the result of the socialization process is expected to facilitate a more 
balanced and flexible approach of national foreign policy actions within the EU 
framework. Ideally, the normative and substantive norms underpinning EU foreign policy 
are not only shared, but also interpreted in the same manner by all member states, paving 
the way for common action. The topic of collective action is further explored in the 
following section. There is a close link between the interpretation of norms and foreign 
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policy action. Besides, the perception of the way in which power is exercised within the 
EU has a key role in shaping the outputs of the Europeanization process.  
 
iii) Europeanization of foreign policy action 
The third dimension of Europeanization approached in this thesis refers to the extent 
of change of the conduct of foreign policy. It shifts the analytical focus from foreign 
policy-making to the actional and visible conduct of foreign policy. What I mean by 
‘visible conduct’ may be inferred from the following definition: 
‘Foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly 
stated goals, commitments and/or directives, are pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward 
objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – 
which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy’ 
(Carlsnaes, 2002: 335). 
 
The use of this operational definition of foreign policy is justified by four reasons. 
The first is the scope of foreign policy, delineated as formalized objectives and 
commitments. The second refers to the issue of legitimacy. The national officials are the 
legitimate representatives of the state. The third relates to the purposive character of 
foreign policy. The national officials endeavour to influence the external environment 
according to their own preferences. The fourth element is the distinction between internal 
and external realms, the later falling outside national control. Another observation is that 
this definition makes the distinction between the official discourse, which clearly states the 
interests, objectives, and tools of national foreign policy, and the practical behaviour of the 
government oriented towards the achievements of national goals.   
Accordingly, this thesis looks at these two general aspects, which are formulated as 
the following two research questions:  
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Research question 1. To what extent do the officially stated foreign policy priorities 
and commitments, interests and the means to achieve them reflect a more salient European 
dimension after accession? 
Research question 2. To what extent does the conduct of foreign policy reflect a 
preference for EU channels rather than using other national/international tools?7 
The timescale covers mainly the period after the opening of the accession talks until 
2009, although some reflections are being made on the nature of policy preferences in the 
three countries after the fall of communist regimes. There is clear evidence that the initial 
foreign policy choices, made in the early 1990s, were different across countries. At the 
same time, even if eventually all CEE countries firmly turned the course of their foreign 
policy towards Euro-Atlantic integration, there are important nuances as regards the 
balance - occasionally even tension - between this priority and other foreign policy 
objectives. Therefore, even if the focus is placed upon the last decade, it is also important 
to examine the way policy developed during the first decade after the Cold War in order to 
understand the evolution of political thinking about the European integration before and 
after formal accession.       
At least before accession, one may assume that the inputs of demand can be easily 
associated with the obligations of candidate countries to align their national positions to the 
EU’s statements, declarations, common positions and joint actions. However, after 
accession the voluntary nature of EU foreign and security policy means that it is more 
difficult to identify the inputs of demand. Here, it is important to take into consideration 
the context within which a specific national debate on foreign policy matters takes place. 
While it is unlikely to expect a radical change of the national strategic priorities in the 
foreign policy field, one may anticipate noticing a change of tone, of the way in which 
                                                
7 Manners and Whitman (2000: 10-12) refer to this as ‘foreign policy with or without the EU’ as an indicator 
of the Europeanization of foreign policy (see the literature review chapter as well, pp. 18-9). 
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these goals are expressed in the official discourse. While no direct imposition is to be 
expected from the EU on national authorities, developments at the European level create 
and induce stress into the national system of foreign policy. Eventually, it is national 
politics, either as governmental politics or identity politics that bear the responsibility for 
the way in which policy outcomes are formulated. 
The EU membership has greatly increased the scope of foreign policy in all member 
states far beyond their own capacity. At the same time, membership does not offer only 
opportunities for external action, but also imposes constraints when national preferences 
diverge from the mainstream European position. Uwe Puetter and Antje Wiener (2007) 
have argued that in spite of the assumptions about shared norms and community of values, 
in situations of external crises the normative divergences among the member states often 
lead to contradictions and divergences as regards the appropriate policy responses. Since 
its inception, the gradual development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was 
deeply undermined by acute divergences amongst the member states in cases of external 
crises. As an illustration, it suffices to recall the recognition of successor states from the 
former Yugoslav Federation, the war in Iraq in 2003, the NATO airstrikes against 
Yugoslavia in 1999, or the recognition of Kosovo independence in 2008. The proposed 
assumption for these failures is that a change of national preferences is improbable when a 
specific combination of factors located at domestic, European and/or international level 
occurs in crisis and the perception of this situation by the local foreign policy elite 
determines a radically different interpretation of the facts. It does represent the limits of 
Europeanization of national foreign policy when it contradicts directly the official 
definition of what the national interest is. 
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3.5. Summary 
This chapter put forward the analytical framework on which this research is built. It 
consisted of three main sections. The first section reviewed and discussed the conceptual 
confusion resulting from the way in which Europeanization has been conceptualized. 
Against this backdrop, an attempt was made to map the genesis of the Europeanization of 
foreign policy approach, placed at the interface and drawing from both foreign policy 
analysis and European integration theory. It clarified the way in which this thesis employs 
the concept of Europeanization as the strictly top-down impact of the EU at domestic level. 
Hence, it critically rejected the use of the bottom-up approach on the grounds that it 
overstretches the concept of Europeanization and it runs the risk of conflating it with 
liberal intergovernmentalism. The second section moved on to describe the systems 
approach used in this thesis as an organizing device able to structure clearly the 
relationship between the external input of Europeanization, the mediating factors of 
governmental politics and the politics of national identity and the outputs of the 
Europeanization process, namely institutional adaptation, elite socialization and the change 
of foreign policy content. Finally, the last section unpacked the way in which this thesis 
conceptualizes the three outputs of the Europeanization process with reference to historical 
institutionalism and social constructivist approaches to foreign policy change. The next 
chapter is dedicated to the methodological apparatus. It links theory to data collection and 
illustrates how this thesis plans to answer the research questions and test the assumptions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM THEORY TO EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
 
4.1. Research strategy 
As outlined in the previous sections, the three outputs of the Europeanization process 
that this thesis aims to examine are institutional change, elite socialization, and foreign 
policy conduct. The selection of these three outcomes of the Europeanization process is 
justified by two reasons. On the one hand, these three aspects have been extensively 
approached by the Europeanization literature (see also p. 7). By choosing the same factors 
to analyse, although in a different context and using different case studies, this thesis aims 
to satisfy the criterion of consistency. In other words, it attempts to employ the same, or at 
least as similar as possible, assumptions which are made by the core of the research agenda 
on the Europeanization of foreign policy. If similar assumptions, applied to different case 
studies, confirm the results of previous research, then this fact is evidence of the validity of 
the research agenda itself. Alternatively, contrasting or different results may lead to 
rethinking and reformulation of the initial assumptions.  
On the other hand, the three outcomes of Europeanization cover core aspects of 
foreign policy: a) the system of foreign policy-making and the institutional infrastructure 
underpinning the process; b) the process of identity reconstruction, which is an important 
assumption of the Europeanization of foreign policy research agenda; and c) the practical 
content of foreign policy, its values, aims and means. Along these lines, this thesis is 
concerned with both material and ideational factors, both structural and process related 
aspects of foreign policy. There is an implicit risk of overextending the scope of research, 
arising from both conceptual and logistical challenges. In spite of these challenges, I 
maintain that a three-layered approach covering institutions, identities, and interests is 
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more beneficial for a deeper understanding of how and to what extent the EU is a source of 
foreign policy change in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.                
The fact that the choice of the three outcomes to be explained derives from existing 
assumptions poses the task of making a decision between either deductive or inductive 
research strategies (alternatively, an option can be made for the hypothetical-deductive 
method).8 The fact that the impact of European integration on foreign policy in Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Romania is a relatively understudied phenomenon would suggest that an 
inductive strategy has to be followed. There is an uncharted territory out there; the facts are 
relatively unknown and, therefore, the researcher should start by collecting data. At a later 
stage, subsequent to data analysis, the researcher is expected to generate a theory to make 
sense of the data collected. The main difficulty with this approach is that it overlooks the 
rich literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy in the old member states, the 
burgeoning literature on the new members, candidate countries or even non-member states, 
which already provides for a substantive body of empirical data. Far from being a tabula 
rasa, the field abounds in empirical findings of different kinds.  
Given the above, this thesis employs a deductive approach. It contends that the 
collection of further empirical data from overlooked or under-researched case studies is, of 
course, important, but even more significant is testing the factual data against existing 
theory in order to refine and improve the theory and eventually to contribute to the growth 
of the research agenda itself.  
Kenneth Waltz, being critical towards the inductive method, explains that the 
accumulation of empirical data by observations and experience never guides the observer 
straight to knowledge of causes, because data do not speak for themselves (Waltz, 1979: 
                                                
8 The hypothetico-deductive method combines both inductive and deductive approaches, in a two-way 
process of inductively building hypotheses based on empirical observation, mapping deductively their 
consequences and testing them in order to reformulate or reject according to the results (see Walliman, N. S. 
R. (2006) Social Research Methods. Course Companion. 1st ed. London; Thousand Oaks: Sage.) 
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4). In a similar way, the point was made that the accumulation of facts is only the first step 
that has to be followed by inferring beyond empirical data to something broader and 
unobservable (King et al., 1994: 9). Any set of empirical data needs to be interpreted in 
order to be relevant. The aim of data collection is explanation. However, this project does 
not follow Waltz’s view of theory because he approaches theory as statements that explain 
laws, laws being defined as invariant relations between given variables (Waltz, 1979: 5).  
The approach of this thesis is that the role of data collection is to provide the basis 
for description as a necessary step towards explanation and theory testing. In other words, 
this project starts by answering the ‘what’ question: a) what sort of impact does the EU 
have on the foreign policy of the new member states? and also b) whether and to what 
extent the Europeanization cause convergence or/and divergence? The second step is to 
look at the ‘why’ question. As long as all candidate countries have to adapt to the same 
institutional requirements of participating in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
why is there variation across institutional settings designed by each individual country for 
answering these requirements? At the same time, if the substantive content of foreign 
policy, defined as strategic priorities and means to achieve them, is not being altered as a 
consequence of accession, why does this happen? Does the way in which power relations 
within the EU are perceived in the new member states alter the outcomes of 
Europeanization? Does the initial set of assumptions still hold or have they to be refined 
and updated?  
This thesis follows a deductive strategy. The option for a deduction strategy suggests 
that the type of data envisaged for testing the theory is of a quantitative type. Any research 
strategy entails a particular orientation to social research, contrasting quantitative with 
qualitative approaches. The difference between the two goes far beyond the simple fact 
that quantitative approaches use statistical measurement while the qualitative ones do not. 
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The two approaches are rooted in different epistemological foundations. On the one hand, 
the quantitative approach is based on a deductive orientation to theory testing, a positivist 
scientific model and an objectivist view of reality. On the other hand, the qualitative 
approach follows an inductive path towards generating theory, using an interpretivist 
epistemological orientation and a view of social reality which assumes that the world is the 
creation of people’s ideas (see Bryman, 2008: 22). However, it was argued that this 
distinction is ambiguous, being seen either as a fundamental dichotomy or a useless and 
false one (Layder, 1993, in Bryman, 2008: 21-2). In reality, there are studies which, for 
instance, use qualitative data to test theory, as well as quantitative analysis having 
interpretivist implications; therefore, the use of mixed research methods, combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods, is being increasingly used (Bryman, 2008: 22-3).  
The very nature of the outputs of the Europeanization process considered here (i.e. 
institutional change, elite socialization and foreign policy conduct) point towards the use of 
qualitative data, despite the fact that the overall research strategy is deductive. The 
following paragraphs explain what type of methods and data this thesis chooses for the 
study of each individual outcome and why. 
 
i) The first outcome of the Europeanization process approached in this thesis is 
institutional change of the foreign policy making. As previously highlighted, the scope of 
analysis is not strictly limited to the examination of the extent of change of the formal-
legal institutional infrastructure; it aims to explain variation across countries due to the 
intervention of mediating variables, namely governmental politics and national identity 
politics. Therefore, the two research questions here ask:  
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a) What is the nature and extent of institutional change of the national foreign policy 
systems to the formal and/or informal requirements of participation in the EU foreign 
policy? and  
b) Why does the institutional transformation in view of European integration reflect 
different patterns across the national systems of foreign policy in the three countries?  
The examination of these two research questions involves a comparison across 
different stages of institutional transformation, at both the national and the European level. 
To a significant extent, this approach uses the building blocks of the historical 
institutionalism branch of neo-institutional theory. Historical institutionalism is interested 
in the role institutions play in the conflict between interests, ideas and power (Steinmo et 
al., 2001). Key for historical institutionalism is the impact that early institutional choices 
have over subsequent policy or political developments (Peters, 1998).   
Historical institutionalism employs the technique of periodization, which divides the 
period of time under review into stages, comparing periods before and after the creation of 
an institution (Lecours, 2005: 15). There are two stages considered here: a) the Europe 
Agreements stage, covering the period from signing association agreements between the 
EU and CEE countries9 (1991/1993) until the opening of the accession talks (1997/1999),10 
and b) the integration period, starting with the accession talks until the end of the year 
2008. The empirical evidence suggests that the change of the institutional design might be 
easily associated with changes of governments or the political configuration of the 
governmental coalition rather than with the input originated at EU level. This is also true in 
                                                
9 The Europe Agreement between the EC and Hungary was signed in 1991, came into force in 1994; 
however, its trade provisions entered into force in 1992, under an Interim Agreement. In the case of 
Romania, the Europe Agreement was signed in 1993, entering into force in 1995. The trade provisions 
entered into force earlier, in 1993, under an interim agreement. The Europe Agreement between the EC and 
Slovakia was signed in 1993, entering into force in February 1995. It should be noted that a previous 
agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia in 1991, which became outdated due to the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia into two new states. 
10 The European Council addressed the invitations for opening the accession talks in 1997 to Hungary and in 
1999 to Romania and Slovakia.   
74 
the case of the inter-institutional competition, reflecting the role played by bureaucratic 
politics upon the way in which institutions are structured.  
From the perspective of what type of methods are best suited to answering the 
research questions, the main choice is for qualitative data. The techniques of document 
analysis and in-depth interviewing are the main qualitative methods employed. A more 
detailed account of how this thesis employs these methods follows in the section dedicated 
to research methods (see this chapter pp. 82-7). The use of quantitative data, such as 
figures showing the increase in the number of staff of the Permanent Representation, or a 
specific unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, to a certain extent, unavoidable; 
although it does not say anything about the reasons why the number of staff changed. Even 
in this case, the numbers are provided by qualitative primary sources, such as official 
documents or interviews, and not from a direct exercise of quantification. Furthermore, the 
study of formal institutions is often conducted from a legal-institutionalist perspective, 
paying particular attention to formal rules enshrined in fundamental laws and regulations. 
This is to say that the study of legal acts and regulations is a qualitative enterprise before 
anything else.  
 
ii) The second outcome of Europeanization is elite socialization. The study of policy-
making is but one indicator of the transformative influence of the EU (or the absence of it), 
and perhaps not even the most important. For some scholars, the study of the socialization 
effect of the EU and the extent of change of national, group or even individual identities is 
at least as, if not more, important. In most cases, the authors interested in the examination 
of Europeanization of foreign policy as socialization have especially used case study 
research designs and qualitative methods and data. In relative contrast, some authors 
interested in the relationship between international institutions and socialization use not 
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only the case study design, but also process tracking as the main method of data 
collection.11 These studies use quantitative, such as longitudinal surveys, or qualitative 
methods, such as in-depth interviews. In some cases, in order to increase research 
reliability and internal validity, triangulation is used, combining primary and secondary 
sources, qualitative and quantitative data. Therefore, the study of international socialization 
could be approached from different methodological perspectives.  
As recalled from the previous sections, one research question asks whether the 
experts from the Permanent Representations hold different views on the aims and means of 
EU foreign policy from those in the ministries of foreign affairs. Furthermore, the second 
question attempts to explore the intensity of the socialization process: is it limited to 
learning or does it go beyond that, affecting the profound self-identification of the subject. 
Therefore, the indicators used to assess the extent of socialization of national officials 
relate to:  
a) the way policy-makers perceive and act according to the EU procedural norms and 
rules; and  
b) the supranational versus intergovernmental preferences that policy-makers hold. 
For the first indicator, the more positive the views on the EU norms and rules are, the 
more socialized the national official is. For the second indicator, the more a collective 
action at European level is preferred to an undertaking conducted mainly in national terms, 
the more socialized the national official is. 
In other words, I need to compare the views of two distinct groups, one in Brussels, 
the other in the national capital. For this reason, the research method used to investigate the 
views expressed by the members of the two groups is the in-depth interview. Nevertheless, 
                                                
11 The process tracking is the research method examining the intervening causal process between the 
independent and dependent variables. In contrast with the statistical methods, it is more suited when the 
outcome to be explained is the result of multiple interactions characterizing the real world (see George, A. L., 
and A. Bennett. (2005).  
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there are considerable methodological difficulties associated with any attempt to examine 
an issue as elusive as the socialization of identities and interests using a single method. 
This thesis acknowledges the fact that the in-depth interview as the main method of data 
collection has its limits. The interviewees might not always like to disclose their deepest 
views on the matter. Bearing in mind the aim of the research questions on socialization, 
other research methods present inconvenience as well, such as survey or documentary 
analysis. Not only is the survey method problematic, as showed above, but the study of 
official documents also is. In fact, the latter source might be hardly expected to provide 
useful information at all to answer the question of, for instance, how a national 
representative perceives the working methods within the EU Council, or the understanding 
with regard to the exercise of power or compromise.  
Hence, the need for triangulation as a way of increasing the validity and reliability of 
data.  For instance, triangulation was also used by Alexandra Gheciu in a study about the 
socialization potential of NATO over Czech and Romanian decision-makers. In order to 
increase the validity of data she combined the use of in-depth interviews, participant 
observations of NATO courses and workshops and discourse analysis of official 
documents (see Gheciu, 2005: 984). This thesis makes use of a similar approach to 
triangulation, which is based on three alternative, yet complementary sources. One is 
participant observation. Most of the questions asked in this thesis arose during an 
internship at the Permanent Mission of Romania to the EU, which spanned the period 
November-December 2005.12 This internship provided me with the chance to participate 
and observe the meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC, also known by its 
French acronym of COPS, which stands for Comité politique et de sécurité) and Political-
Military Group (PMG), two formations of national representatives where matters of EU 
                                                
12 At that time, Romania has had the status of observer to the EU, pending the ratification by all member 
states of the Accession Treaty. 
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foreign, security and defence policy are debated. While inherently subjective, this 
alternative source of information is valuable since it offers me a way of checking the 
responses of interviewees against my own opinion and feelings as participant in these 
meetings.  
The second source of information derives from the secondary literature. Even if the 
secondary literature I make use of is not directly related to the specific questions of this 
thesis, it helps in understanding and contextualizing the way in which national 
representatives from other new member states faced the challenge of adapting to a new 
environment, and what their experiences and feelings were.  
The third alternative method to cross-examine the issue of socialization is related to 
political discourse in the form of speeches or interviews. On the one hand, it is not possible 
to compare the two target groups because the instances when the national ambassadors in 
Brussels make public statements during their mandate are actually rare. Therefore, only 
speeches, press conferences, and statements originating from the ministries of foreign 
affairs, prime minister, and president (in the case of Romania especially) can be examined. 
The argument is that the speeches on EU foreign policy related issues are elaborated within 
the departments dealing with EU foreign policy, therefore by people who are part of the 
target groups. The way they understand and view the cooperation within the EU 
framework, reflecting perhaps the extent to which they are socialized, might be reflected in 
the statements they produce. The assumption is that the official foreign policy speeches 
might be seen as a medium mirroring the extent to which national foreign policy-makers 
and decision-makers internalized European norms and rules, or the extent to which they 
are socialized. At the same time, the political discourse draws from the officially stated 
normative principles and values giving sense to and legitimizing the national foreign 
policy. 
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iii) The technique of periodization is used for the third output of the Europeanization 
process as well to compare and assess the extent of change across historical periods.13 The 
foreign policy priorities, goals, and means are written into official documents and 
expressed in the public discourse by high-level political actors. This fact points directly 
towards the use of qualitative sources of data. On the other hand, foreign policy analysis 
has a long-standing tradition of using quantitative techniques. The behaviouralist turn of 
the 1960s and 1970s, reflected for instance in the attempts to develop comparative studies 
of foreign policy across large number of countries or variables, is an illustrative example, 
although a commendable failure (Carlsnaes, 2002: 333). This is, again, one of the main 
problems associated with the use of statistical methods when the problem to be analysed 
requires a more interpretive approach.  
The sub-case studies used in this thesis of the US-led war in Iraq, NATO’s military 
intervention in Yugoslavia and Kosovo’s declaration of independence require a close 
investigation of public statements and domestic political context surrounding it. The 
content of the official positions in the three countries with regard to these three critical 
events is examined. With regard to the first sub-case study, the timeframe covers mainly 
the period preceding the war and the immediate aftermath (between the summer of 2002 
and until the end of 2003).  
The timeframe for the next two sub-case studies covers the period 1999, after the 
adoption by the United Nations of resolution 1244, until Kosovo’s Parliament declared 
unilateral independence from Serbia in February 2008, and the subsequent months when 
the members of the international community either recognized or rejected it. I contrast the 
content of official declarations of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania during this period to 
                                                
13 The same periodization used for the study of institutional change is employed for the study of the change 
of goals and means of foreign policy.  
79 
the EU positions and initiatives. The input of demands from the EU represents the need to 
agree a common European position on Kosovo declaration of independence as part of the 
aim commonly agreed by all EU member states that the EU should speak with a single 
voice on the world stage. However, the input of support for a common European position 
was very low in Romania and Slovakia, but greater in Hungary. The seventh chapter 
discusses at length the specific circumstances leading to these different decisions in each of 
the three countries analysed here (see chapter seven, pp. 213-30). 
Based on the above, the research methods employed here allow for triangulation as a 
way to increase the validity and reliability of the data collected. The main sources of data 
used are official documents, in-depth interviews and media reports, supplemented by 
secondary sources. On the concrete use of each of these methods, further details are 
provided in the section on research methods. However, the next section outlines and 
justifies the option for the multiple-case study research design.  
 
4.2. Research design 
The foregoing sections have explained why this research strategy is deductive - and 
why it relies on qualitative methods and data. The decision of what sort of research design 
to use mainly derives from research strategy. Hence, opting for the multiple-case study is 
due partially to the fact that this design involves a comparison of few countries and the 
collection of qualitative data (see Bryman, 2008: 60).  
Moreover, the interest in the topic was from the beginning of the research process a 
regional focus rather than a purely national one. While researching individual countries 
presents clear benefits, the usage of multiple cases has the advantage of providing more 
comprehensive evidence for answering the research questions (Herriot & Firesome, 1983, 
in Yin, 2003: 46). Besides, the use of multiple-case study research design is justified by the 
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fact that it helps to identify regular and understandable patterns and explanations of foreign 
policy (Kaarbo, 2002: 5).  
In addition, this method is well suited for area studies research (Przeworski and 
Tenne, 1970 in Landman, 2000: 28). Finally, as illustrated in the literature review chapter, 
numerous analyses of Europeanization of foreign policy were focused on single countries 
(see for instance Agnantopoulos, 2008, Economides, 2005, Miskimmon, 2007, Pomorska, 
2007, Rieker, 2006, Torreblanca, 2001, Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005, Wong, 2006). At 
the same time, it should be pointed out that most Europeanization studies (not only 
Europeanization of foreign policy) are case-studies (see Haverland, 2007: 66). Instead, a 
multiple case study approach is expected to provide a more solid basis for better 
understanding why similar Europeanization pressures cause different responses across 
candidate countries.   
Therefore, the difficulties lay less in the need to compare than in what sample of 
countries to use and why. The final choice was also facilitated by the fact that my interest 
is in the new member states from CEE. On the one hand, I come from this region; 
therefore, I am personally more interested to understand the regional dynamic. On the 
other hand, the countries in CEE are less researched in contrast to the Western states, even 
if, it should be noted, this situation is changing rapidly.  
This research design is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s ‘method of difference’, in 
which the instances to be compared with one another must be exactly similar, in all 
circumstances with the exception of the one under investigation (Mill, 1851: 422). In other 
words, the three countries examined here are assumed to be as similar as possible with the 
exception of the outcome to be explained, namely the differentiated effect of 
Europeanization. For instance, their communist past, geographical location, efforts to 
reintegrate to the Western organizations are the similar features. In the current 
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terminology, this method is called the ‘most similar systems’ design, which brings together 
systems as similar as possible in as many features as possible with the exception of the 
outcome to be explained (Sartori, 1994: 22; Keman, 28: 72-76). The option for this model 
derives from the deductive strategy employed in this thesis. Allegedly, the countries from 
CEE are more similar to each other than to their Western counterparts in the EU. The 
features that are considered similar for comparative reasons are the former communist past, 
the process of democratic transformation and transition to market economy, the common 
geographical area they share and the common challenges due to the process of integration 
to the European Union.  
In terms of case selection, both conceptual and practical reasons justify the final 
decision. The choice in favour of three case studies was made on the ground that it is 
logistically possible and theoretically more enriching than only one case. Some of the 
countries in the region are more researched than others. Poland, due to its size and 
influence, is perhaps an illustrative case of greater academic interest. For a start, the 
different integration records justify the selection of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania as the 
three case studies of this thesis. Hungary was considered a frontrunner of integration 
process, invited in 1998, acceding in 2004. Slovakia’s invitation had been postponed in 
1998, but the country was able to catch up with the Luxembourg Group14 and to join the 
EU in 2004. Romania, invited to join the EU in the second wave, alongside Slovakia, was 
not able or willing to become a full member before 2007. The assumption is that the cross-
national variation in the accession paths may provide useful insights for explaining 
differences in the organization of national systems of foreign policy. Secondly, these 
                                                
14 The Luxembourg Group is the informal name given to group of six candidate countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe and Mediterranean region (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus), 
which were invited to open to accession talks at the Luxemburg European Council in December 1997. By 
contrast, the remaining applicant countries, the so-called Helsinki Group, were invited to open the 
negotiations at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. The Helsinki Group consisted of Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and the Slovak Republic.     
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countries have different kinds of political regimes. The type of executive – legislative 
relations has an impact on the organization of policy-making systems. Thirdly, all three are 
connected historically and geographically. The process of international socialization 
challenges the existing identities and interests of national officials, their conceptions of 
statehood, and relationships between national and supranational. Slovakia is a new state, 
emerging after the split of Czechoslovakia. Hungary, as part of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire, has an imperial past and suffered important loses of territories and 
people in favour of neighbouring countries, Romania and Slovakia among others. 
Therefore, a related reason for choosing the three countries has to do with the specific 
positions in the field of minorities. Both Romania and Slovakia have large Hungarian 
minorities, which are an issue of particular interest for Hungary. The question of 
minorities’ rights has emerged frequently as a contending issue in foreign policy relations 
between Hungary, on the one hand, and Romania and Slovakia, on the other hand, and the 
issue was frequently raised at the European level.  
One last word is required here about the way in which the three countries are ordered 
throughout this thesis. The option to start with Hungary, followed by Slovakia and 
concluding with Romania, is based on the integration record of the three countries, which 
was one of the main criterion for their selection. Hence, it makes more sense to organize 
the sequence in which they are approached based on the integration record criterion rather 
than other criteria (alphabetically for instance). 
 
4.3. Methods and data collection 
The main research methods for the collection of primary data are documentary 
analysis and in-depth interview. The documentary analysis refers to three categories of 
documents: a) official policy papers; b) media reports; and c) political discourse. 
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The first category covers a wide range of material originating at both state level and 
EU level. National documents include fundamental laws, governing programmes, laws and 
regulations concerning the organization of the core executive, policy strategies, white 
papers, annual review reports and so on. EU documents refer mainly to the European 
Commission’s Opinions on the three applicant countries, the regular monitoring reports on 
their progress towards membership, relevant Conclusions of the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) and the European Council.  
This type of document is limiting insofar as the political context is concerned. The 
web of circumstances and motives leading to a particular policy decision needs to be 
uncovered by using complementary sources of information. This is why the second type of 
documents relates to media sources, mainly newspapers articles and news agencies reports. 
Most media reports of interest for the area of concern of this thesis were issued throughout 
the previous almost two decades and hence are not easily available. However, the daily 
reports produced by the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts and national wire services 
and international press agencies, available via the Lexis Nexis database, compensate for 
the disadvantage of not having direct access to the original source of information.  
The third category of documentary source for analysis is what may be generically 
coined ‘political discourse’. In fact, this umbrella term covers a broad array of material, 
such as speeches addressed by foreign ministers to annual meetings of diplomats, speeches 
of prime ministers and presidents, official statements of spokespersons, press conferences 
or interviews. In general, the website pages of the institutions concerned provide a wealth 
of information, although sometimes the data are outdated and the access limited.  
The preferred method for the study of documents is qualitative content analysis, 
which is based on searching for themes in the body-material analysed. In contrast to 
quantitative content analysis, which applies predefined categories to the material, the 
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qualitative analysis starts with some preliminary category, susceptible to later refinement 
and sensitive to the context in which the documents were generated (see Bryman, 2008: 
529-31). Therefore, the study of official documents, mass-media reports and public 
speeches is conducted with the aim of collecting primary information on specific events 
and decisions and to clarify the context, especially the political context, in which these 
events were taking place. Secondary sources are also extremely helpful in understanding 
the domestic and external context surrounding an event. Secondary sources refer especially 
to reports and studies published by local research institutes. Only a few academic articles 
can be included in the category of secondary literature. However, I did request further 
clarification on the topics under investigation from the interviewees.            
The other main research method used in this thesis is the interview. In contrast to the 
extreme forms of unstructured or structured interview, the option of this thesis is for semi-
structured, in-depth interview, especially because I needed a flexible framework to allow 
the interviewees to communicate not only information and opinions, but to express their 
own feelings and ideas about the topics. This is particularly important in the case of 
socialization. As previously discussed, the interview is the major source of data collection, 
even if observation, secondary literature and speeches or interviews analysis are used as 
complementary methods in order to increase research validity and reliability. However, for 
the first and third outcomes of Europeanization, the interview is but one of the research 
methods, alongside documentary analysis and secondary sources.   
A potential alternative to the interview would be the use of a longitudinal survey 
applied to a statistically representative sample of policy-makers from the three countries. 
However, even if the research option had been for a longitudinal survey, this would have 
not been a feasible option, on both conceptual and practical grounds. There is a trade-off 
between accuracy and understanding. The other side of the fact that the structured survey 
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provides for statistical accuracy is its weakness in terms of insights and comprehension of 
the context. There would also be difficulties from a practical point of view. Though 
theoretically possible, it is difficult to hope for full cooperation of institutions like 
ministries of foreign affairs in all three countries researched here. While more transparent 
and public relations oriented than a decade ago, these are still opaque and secretive 
institutions.  
Consequently, the sampling of interviewees was performed with the aim of including 
people who are the most relevant to the research questions; this is to say people involved in 
policy-making process as senior officials or political leaders. A senior official, due to his 
experience and understanding of human relations, is usually more open to a fair discussion 
than a junior policy expert is. This is also true for political leaders, despite the fact that 
occasionally they might tend to express partisan views. The latter is perhaps more fearful, 
therefore sticking too much to the official position. Any in-depth interview in this case 
would miss the point.  
Eventually, the sample of interviews consisted of: a) two individual interviews 
within each of the three Permanent Representations of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania to 
the EU; b) two-three interviews within each individual ministry of foreign affairs; c) one 
interview within the prime-minister’s office, with the exception of Hungary; c) one to three 
interviews within the foreign affairs and European affairs committees of the national 
parliaments; d) one interview within the Romanian presidential administration only.  
In addition, for background information and alternative insights into the topic, I 
conducted several other interviews with independent experts in research institutes or think 
tanks.15 Hence, I conducted 3 interviews with independent experts in Bratislava, at the 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association and Institute for Public Affairs (IPP, Slovak acronym 
                                                
15 For a complete list of interviews, see Annex 1. 
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IVO, standing for In$titút pre verejné otázky), and 2 interviews in Budapest, at the 
Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA, Hungarian acronym MKI for Magyar 
Külügyi Intézet). The length of the time spent in Slovakia and Hungary for research 
fieldwork was two and a half months, while in Romania it was only three weeks. 
Since the interview method is used across all three outcomes of Europeanization 
(institutional change, elite socialization and foreign policy content), the guide of the 
interview is actually split up into three corresponding categories of issues-area.16 With few 
exceptions, most of the interviews were recorded. This approach is criticised on the ground 
that the interviewees might tend not to be as communicative as they would have been in 
the absence of the recording device. However, I consider that the advantages of recording 
the discussion overcome the minuses, notably the fact that the researcher may focus and 
think over what the interviewee is saying, instead of being concerned with taking notes. 
Besides, substantial information is lost during the note taking and difficult to recover from 
memory. From this point of view, it is much safer to record the interview. Most of the 
interviews were transcribed, the text introduced into computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software (i.e. NVivo). The analysis was conducted based on open coding and 
concept identification. During the analysis process, I was concerned with understanding 
the perception and meaning given by subjects to categories such as norms and values 
characterizing EU foreign policy, the importance of learning, the intergovernmental versus 
supranational, common European versus national interest and so on. With regard to 
quoting the interviewees throughout the thesis, I identified by name only those officials 
who explicitly agreed on being acknowledged as such; in all other instances, I only 
referred to the place and year of the interview, as a way of respecting the confidentiality 
requested by interviewees.  
                                                
16 For the questions on which the structure of the in-depth interview was based, see Annex 2. 
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While the study of official documents and media reports did not cause significant 
difficulties, most of the materials being available and easily accessible online, the in-depth 
interview method of data collection created the need for research fieldwork abroad. 
Therefore, the stage of research included travels to Brussels, Budapest, Bucharest, and 
Bratislava. The fieldwork was undertaken during December 2007 in Brussels, April-June 
2008 in Bratislava and Budapest, and October 2008 in Bucharest. There is an obvious 
time-gap between subsequent stages of fieldwork. However, the time-gap does not affect 
in any way the context to which the research questions of the thesis refer. As regards the 
issue of Kosovo, the possible problem rests on the fact that the discussions in Brussels, 
with diplomats at the three permanent representations, took place before the formal 
declaration of independence, while the trips to Bratislava, Budapest and Bucharest 
followed a few months after. However, the interview is not the only method to examine 
why the three countries responded differently against the background of searching for a 
common position at EU level. With the benefit of hindsight, I may add that the views of 
the experts in Brussels did not differ from those of the policy-makers in the capitals on this 
matter, even if they had been questioned before the formal declaration of independence. 
 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter linked the analytical framework to the methodology of this thesis. In the 
first section, it explained why a deductive research strategy was preferred. As detailed, it 
uses similar theoretical assumptions to those put forward in other studies of 
Europeanization of foreign policy, but targeting insufficiently researched cases. The aim is 
to test the empirical data against existing theoretical assumptions in order to refine and 
improve them and eventually to expand the research agenda itself. The multiple case 
studies research design is then discussed in the subsequent section, which provided the 
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arguments for the selection of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania as the three new member 
states examined in this thesis. Finally, the last section introduces the research methods of 
data collection, explaining why documentary analysis, in-depth interview and participant 
observation fit the aims of this research. The section critically commented on the 
limitations of these methods and on how triangulation is used in order to increase the 
validity and reliability of data. Besides, it described how the fieldwork in the four capitals 
was organized. The next three chapters present and discuss the empirical findings of this 
study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is, first, to examine to what extent the national systems of 
foreign policy-making in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania were influenced and 
transformed by the process of European integration and, second, to explain why there is 
cross-country variation. To these aims, the chapter proceeds according to the historical-
institutionalist approach previously discussed.  
The structure of this chapter has both a chronological dimension and a functional 
one. On the one hand, it examines the successive historical stages corresponding to the 
advancement of the integration process from the early stage of signing the Europe 
Agreements until the end of the year 2008 (the cut-off date for the aim of this thesis). From 
the viewpoint of structure, this period is split into two chronological blocks:  
a) The Europe Agreement or the pre-accession stage (from 1991 in Hungary and 
1993 in Slovakia and Romania until 1997 in Hungary and 1999 in Slovakia and 
Romania); and 
b) The integration or the accession and post-accession stage (from 1997 in Hungary 
and 1999 in Slovakia and Romania until 2008).  
On the other hand, the chapter examines two functional issues throughout the two 
historical stages:  
a) The changing role of the MFA in the system of national coordination and the 
MFA’s relationship with other institutional actors holding responsibilities in the field 
of European affairs; and 
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b) The changing structure and role of the Permanent Representations to the EU of 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.  
In other words, the first point examines the issue of management and coordination of 
European affairs and foreign policy at national level. The second points shift the focus of 
investigation from the domestic to the European level by examining the changing status 
and role of the permanent missions to permanent representations to the EU. According to 
the assumptions regarding the role of domestic factors, the influence of Europeanization is 
contrasted with the input coming from the governmental politics in the eventual design and 
functioning of the institutional framework of policy-making.  
This chapter is introduced by a brief outline of the constitutional features 
underpinning the political systems in the three countries and concludes by summing up the 
arguments and empirical findings. 
 
5.2. Initial legal-institutional choices  
The study of transition processes in CEE emphasizes the importance of the initial 
conditions (i.e. different historical legacies, level of economic development, political-
institutional traditions) as causes of the future trajectories of these countries. The three 
states examined here are good illustrations of this point; aspects connected with these 
initial conditions are examined throughout this thesis. Therefore, the current chapter starts 
by examining the early constitutional choices made in the three countries insofar as these 
choices had important consequences with regard to where political power lies, who are the 
main actors, and how they interact.     
In Hungary, the process of political change began with the political contestation 
within the incumbent communist party after 1985 and especially during 1988-1989, 
opening the way for the emergence of the main political parties. Several political 
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organizations were created in opposition to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(MSZMP, Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt). Among these, there were the Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SzDSz, Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége), the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF, Magyar Demokrata Fórum), the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz, Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége), and the historical Independent Smallholders Agrarian Workers 
and Civic Party (FKFPP, Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt). In October 
1989, MSZMP was dissolved and recreated as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP, 
Magyar Szocialista Párt) (see Bugajski, 2002: 341-9). These political parties were to play a 
major role in the setting up of the new constitutional foundation.17 
The design of the post-communist Hungarian constitution and political regime was 
the result of the bargaining process among the communists and democratic opposition 
during the roundtable talks in 1989-1990. The eventual outcome, while a compromise, 
reflected the preferences of the democratic opposition. Accordingly, the amendments to the 
fundamental law endowed Hungary with a clear parliamentary political system, strong 
government, a strong and pro-active constitutional court able to check and balance the 
executive power, an indirectly elected and weak president, and high thresholds for political 
parties to enter the unicameral parliament. The result of these early constitutional choices 
was a political stage dominated by a few large political parties and stable majorities in the 
parliament. It also allowed Hungary to enjoy a higher level of governmental stability over 
the years in comparison with other CEE countries (Batory, 2008, Tism!neanu, 2000). Due 
to this legal-institutional political design, the major actor responsible for the external 
relations of the country is the executive. Formally, the activity of the executive is overseen 
by the legislature. However, since the prime minister is usually the head of the political 
                                                
17 In fact, the new constitutional order is the result of the gradual amendments during the 1989-1990 period 
of the Constitutional law from 1949. 
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party holding the majority of seats in the parliament, the watchdog role of the legislature is 
practically diminished and the autonomy of the executive enhanced.18   
In Slovakia, the initial constitutional choices were preceded by almost three years of 
constitutional negotiations between the two constituent republics of the Czechoslovak 
Federation (Stein, 1997: 45). The constitution of the new Slovak Republic favoured a 
parliamentary system, inspired by the Czecho-Slovak tradition (Stein, 1997: 49), and an 
indirectly elected president. The executive is also accountable to the unicameral 
legislature, which is elected through a proportional representation electoral system. 
However, different from Hungary, the presidential institution was granted stronger powers 
in relation to the prime minister, even if it is weaker in relation to the legislative power. 
The haste with which the constitution was drafted in 1992 created numerous ambiguous 
and contradictory provisions (Malovà and Haughton, 2002: 105), negatively affecting the 
policy-making process and straining the relationships between various branches of the 
government. For instance, the constitution provided that the head of state has the right to 
recall the prime minister and other members of the government;19 at the same time, it did 
not clearly specify what might happened in a situation where the president reject a prime 
minister’s request to dismiss a minister or ambassador (Malova, 1994: 416). Moreover, the 
fundamental law grants the head of state, and not the prime minister, the power to decide 
which member of the cabinet shall take over the management of a department in a situation 
                                                
18 However, this constitutional design was not without negative consequences. With the benefit of hindsight, 
one may argue that one of the biggest problems of the strong role for the prime-minister within the executive 
and over the parliamentarian majority is the phenomenon of ‘state capture’. According to the World Bank, 
state capture is a form of corruption, manifested in the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the 
public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government 
policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to 
public officials (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001). The phenomenon of ‘state-capture’ was even more acute in 
Romania, given the pre-eminence of the unreformed and corrupt successor of the former communist party on 
the political scene until 1996 and even after (Vachudova, 2009: 45) 
19 Art. 102 (f) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic of 1992. 
93 
where the previous holder of that portfolio is recalled by the president.20 The way in which 
the 1992 constitution defined the nature of the relationship between the prime minister and 
president was a source of serious political conflict between Vladimir Me"iar, the head of 
government (1992-1998),21 and Michal Ková", the head of state (1993-1998). This led to a 
constitutional crisis in 1998, which was eventually overcome by amending the 
fundamental law by changing the system of electing the president and clarifying its powers 
(Malova and Rybá%, 2008). Accordingly, since 1999, the president is directly elected in a 
two rounds ballot for a five-year renewable mandate.  
The constitutional design of Romania, crafted in 1991, favoured an even stronger 
role for the presidential institution in relation to the government and the parliament. This 
choice reflects both the constitutional tradition of the country and the idiosyncratic nature 
of Romanian transition from totalitarianism to liberal democracy. If the constitutional 
models adopted in particular in Hungary and to a great extent in Slovakia were inspired by 
the post-war German parliamentary system, Romanian law-makers favoured the French 
presidential design, as provided by the constitution of the Fifth republic (T!nasescu, 2008). 
Unlike the strong dissident movements in Hungary or Poland in the 1980s, the by-product 
of violent dictatorial rule of Nicolae Ceau&escu was the absence of political contestation 
(Vachudova, 2005: 39-40). Hence, the new political force taking over the political power, 
following the uprising in December 1989 was not the debilitated democratic opposition, 
but the second echelon and dissidents from within the communist party, organized as a 
wide political platform called the National Salvation Front (FSN, Frontul Salv!rii 
Na#ionale) (see also Gallagher, 2009: 204).  
                                                
20 Art. 116 (7) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic of 1992.  
21 However, between March-December 1994, Me"iar was replaced as prime minister by Jozef Morav"ík, due 
to a vote of no confidence in the Parliament.  
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The absence of a strong political contestation and opposition, coupled with a 
paternalistic type of civic culture of masses during the early 1990s, helped the leaders of 
the FSN, especially its leader, Ion Iliescu, to sponsor and eventually impose their own 
vision as regard the constitutional system (Gallagher, 2005, Gallagher, 2009, Gallagher 
and Andrievici, 2008, Tism!neanu, 1993). Accordingly, the constitution created a directly 
elected president with stronger powers than in any other former communist state 
(Gallagher, 2009: 18). The president was supposed to be apolitical and above party politics 
(Stan, 2002). In practice, this has never been the case (T!nasescu, 2008). The president 
nominates the prime minister and dismisses the ministers at the recommendation of the 
premier. He may preside over cabinet meetings, dissolve the parliament, and appeal 
directly to the people, bypassing the legislature, in matters of national interest. The 
electoral system was based on proportional representation, requesting a minimum 
threshold of 3%.22 This system allowed numerous small parties to get access into the 
bicameral assembly and contributed to a fragmented and fluid political landscape, even 
though one dominated by the FSN and its successors,23 at least until 1995.  
The three countries discussed here made different initial constitutional choices due to 
specific circumstances. Therefore, the three political regimes cover a spectrum ranging 
from parliamentary to semi-presidential systems. As the remainder of this chapter 
                                                
22 The electoral system was modified in order to raise the threshold to 5% for political parties and 8% for 
political alliances. 
23 FSN disintegrated in 1992. It resulted in a hard-line faction around Ion Iliescu and a reformist one around 
the Prime Minister Petre Roman, which became two of the dominant parties in Romanian politics in the years 
to come. The former faction was the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN, Frontul Democrat al 
Salv!rii Na#ionale), later renamed as the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR, Partidul 
Democra#iei Sociale in România). In 2001, as a result of mergers with other minor parties, it became what is 
today the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partidul Social Democrat), the most important representative of the 
left. The faction of the Prime Minister Roman was renamed in 1993 as the Democratic Party (PD, Partidul 
Democrat) and kept this name until 2006 when, following the merger with a splinter faction of the Liberal 
Party (PL, Partidul Liberal), it became the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL, Partidul Democrat Liberal), a 
major centre-right political party. 
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demonstrates, the type of political regime left its mark on the structure and dynamic of the 
policy-making process.  
 
5.3. The Europe Agreements (Pre-accession) stage 
The first historical period examined here is the ‘Europe agreements stage’. This 
phase mainly corresponds to the period preceding the negotiating and signing of the 
association agreements until the formal opening of the accession talks with the aspirant 
countries from CEE. The association agreements were also known as Europe Agreements 
in order to illustrate their importance and different status from normal agreements with 
third countries. Broadly speaking, at least during the early 1990s, the EC member states 
had tried to clarify what kind of future relations they wanted to have with the CEE 
countries. This is because at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the West 
European governments were undecided on how to deal with the post-communist countries 
knocking at the EC’s door and unenthusiastic about the prospect of enlarging the EC/EU 
(see Mayhew, 1998: 11). Hence, the EAs were seen from two different, contrasting 
perspectives: as stepping-stones towards full membership by the CEE countries; 
conversely, some Western European governments, like France for instance, conceived the 
EAs only as a long-term alternative solution to enlargement (Smith, 1999: 91) 
On the other side, even if some of the CEE countries plainly expressed the strategic 
objective of joining the EC, others were more ambivalent. The rhetoric of the ‘return to 
Europe’, dominating the official discourse in CEE countries, hid different political realities 
and expectations. Countries like Hungary and Poland, starting the transition to liberal 
democracy and free market earlier than other states in the former Soviet bloc, hoped to 
become members of the EC as early as possible. Instead, for countries like Romania, given 
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the violent break with the totalitarian past,24 the main priorities were inwardly oriented 
towards the consolidation of the new political regime.  
The difference is visible for instance with regard to the position towards the 
European Community. Hungary’s new prime-minister, József Antall, stated after winning 
the first democratic elections in Hungary, in March-April 1990, that the objective of his 
country was to became part of the EC/EU by the year 1995.25 Instead, Ion Iliescu, the 
FSN’s leader in Romania had made less bold claims on this matter than Antall, aiming 
only at strengthening ties with the Common Market.26  
Even if the EC had first established contractual relations with Romania as early as in 
1974,27 the communist authorities saw how a trade and economic cooperation agreement, 
under negotiation in 1987, had stalled since then due to the appalling human rights record 
of the Ceau&escu regime.28 Accordingly, in 1990 the post-communist government in 
Romania inherited a frozen relationship with the EC. Hence, formal contractual relations 
between Romania and EC were re-established almost two years later than in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, which secured formal contractual relations in 1988, by signing trade 
agreements. Furthermore, when the European Council in Dublin, in April 1990, tabled the 
idea of association agreements with the former communist states, the first CEE countries to 
conclude these agreements were Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, in December 
1991, while Romania signed the agreement only in February 1993.  
                                                
24 However, even if Romania was the only post-communist country where the revolution was so violent and 
bloody, numerous authors consider that, in reality there was no definitive divorce with the past in Romania. 
The nature of post-communist politics in Romania was considered as ‘illiberal’ (Vachudova, 2005: 37-61), 
‘liberal authoritarian’ (Fischer, 1992: 47) or ‘crypto communist’ (Tism!neanu and Kligman, 2001), given the 
fact that the political arena was dominated by ex-communists playing the ethno-nationalist card.  
25 The Guardian, July 18, 1990. ‘Hungary to join West 'within decade'’. Later on, Antall did accept that the 
accession could not be attained before 1997-8 (MTI Econews, July 29, 1991).     
26 BBC, April 30, 1990, EE/0751/B/1, ‘PNUC President on Foreign Policy.’ 
27 In 1974, the EC and Romania concluded a Generalised System of Preferences Agreement, followed in 
1980 by an Agreement on Industrial Products. At the time, Romania was perceived by the West as pursuing a 
more independent policy from Moscow.  
28 The Associated Press, January 5, 1990, ‘EC Seeks Improved Ties With Romania.’ 
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In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the aim of EC membership was clearly 
expressed, even if acknowledging that its achievement was unlikely in the near future.29 In 
the Slovak Republic of the Federation, while the objective of EC membership was also 
clearly assumed, the way to achieve it was seen through the lenses of the ongoing debate 
about the constitutional settlement between the two republics. The Slovak preference for a 
confederative type of constitutional arrangement, with strong republics and weak federal 
structures, also implied a request for stronger foreign policy competencies at the level of 
republics (Kopecky and U"e', 2003: 165). The association agreement was seen through 
this prism. Accordingly, the Slovak government asked for the insertion in the preamble of 
the Europe Agreement of the provision that the implementation of the agreement was to be 
carried out by the two republics. The justification put forward in this case was that insofar 
as 80% of the provisions of the agreements are to be implemented by the republics, it 
makes sense to transfer to them supplementary powers.30 The real reason for the Slovak 
authorities was, however, the desire to devolve further responsibilities in the area of 
foreign policy from the federal government to the governments of the two constituent 
republics.31 The overall aim was to enhance the position of the Slovaks in relation to the 
Czechs within the Federation.   
The EAs aimed to provide for an appropriate framework of political dialogue, the 
gradual establishment of a free trade area, including the expansion of trade and economic 
relations, and the setting up of new rules, policies and practices as the basis for integration 
into the Community32 (for a detailed examination of the provisions of the Europe 
                                                
29 The Associated Press, March 2, 1990, ‘Czechoslovakia Would Like to Join EC.’ 
30 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 5, 1991, EE/1221/B/1, ‘Slovak Premier on Constitutional 
Talks; Budget: EC. Negotiations.’ 
31 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 28, 1991, EE/1214/B/1, ‘Federal government discusses 
association agreements with EC.’ 
32 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and Hungary, including 
Exchanges of Letters with Declarations and final act (Brussels 1991). 
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agreements, see Mayhew, 1998). While the backbone of the agreements consisted of 
economic provisions, the political significance stands out as well. On the one hand, the 
agreements laid down the legal framework towards greater political convergence in all 
fields of EU competence (Rupp, 1999: 90). On the other hand, the agreements made clear 
references to the objective of integration into the EC, endorsing the aspirations of CEE 
countries. The negotiation of the EA also provided the first negative experience for the 
CEE officials involved in discussions with the EC’s representatives. The way in which the 
negotiations were conducted plainly demonstrated that the Western members of the EC 
were not keen to compromise on their trade interests in order to help the fragile economies 
of their Eastern partners (Mayhew, 1998). The asymmetry of power relationship between 
the two sides (Western versus CEE governments) was reinforced by the fact that the latter 
perceived the membership as being in the direct interest of their countries, while the former 
were lukewarm about the prospect of enlargement (Mayhew, 1998: 10). A decade later, 
during the negotiations for membership, the asymmetry of power was felt again (see also 
this chapter p. 113). This experience had an important impact on the elite socialization 
process as well. The next chapter examines in more detail the extent to which the 
perception of power asymmetry shaped the attitudes of the representatives from the new 
member states with regard to the EU culture of cooperation and compromise.  
The legal-institutional framework of the Europe Agreements with regard to political 
and technical dialogue between the EC and the associate countries stipulated the creation 
of three categories of institutions of association, namely the Council, Committee and Joint 
Parliamentary Committee, as well as a mechanism of dispute resolution. The setting up of 
these instruments in the associate countries was a straightforward process. However, more 
difficult was to decide on the question of which domestic institutional actor ought to be in 
charge of coordinating the European affairs of the country.  
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The coordination and management of European integration was and continues to be a 
challenging task affecting other member states as well. For instance, during the early years 
of negotiating the United Kingdom accession to the European Community, the role of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was briefly threatened by the creation of the 
position of a cabinet minister with EC responsibilities. This position was abolished after 
accession in 1974 and since then, the FCO occupied central stage, although sharing 
responsibilities with the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office (see Allen, 2005: 258-
9). Instead, a completely different picture characterizes the French system of coordination. 
The key player in the coordination mechanism is centred on the General-Secretariat for 
European Affairs attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. Yet, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy is still the exclusive competence of the MFA (Morrise-Schilbach, 2005: 
115-21).  
Even if the coordination arrangements in the UK and France are distinct, what they 
have in common is the centralised bureaucratic style of public administration. Instead, in 
federal countries like Germany or Austria, or a quasi-federal state like Spain, different 
arrangements suits better the more fragmented and pluralistic patterns of policy-making. In 
fact, a review of the existing arrangements across the member states would illustrate the 
diversity of models adopted by different countries in order to fit both domestic 
circumstances and the demands of Europeanization. While is not the aim of this thesis to 
engage in such an enterprise, it is worth highlighting the fact that Europeanization affects 
all member states, both founding members and newly joined countries, and even non-
members dealing with the EU. The objective of this thesis is limited to examining the 
responses to Europeanization of the three new member states from CEE. 
Given the fact that the relations between the CEE countries and the EC did fall, at 
least in the initial phases, within the scope of foreign policy, the actor best placed to be in 
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charge of coordinating and managing this matter should have been the MFA. However, 
empirical evidences from the three countries demonstrate that this was not always the case. 
There are important differences across countries as regard when and to what extent the role 
of the MFA increases in relation to other institutional actors. For instance, while the role of 
the Hungarian MFA grew more powerful after 1996, the management of European affairs 
in Romania was mainly centred on the Prime Minister’s Office. In Slovakia, to a certain 
extent similar to Hungary, the limited expertise of the newly created MFA did not allow it 
to play the key role during the negotiation of the EA; however, its position became 
stronger in the subsequent years of this first stage.  
 
i) Hungary (1990-1998) 
In Hungary, the fact that the MFA did not play the main role until 1996 is because 
European affairs and relations with the EC were seen from the perspective of the economic 
component of the association agreement. Vida (2002: 59) contends that, until 1996, the 
system of coordination of European affairs was two-centred, the responsibilities being split 
between the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and the MFA.  
However, this division overlooks another important actor, which was the Ministry of 
International Economic Relations (MIER), competing with both the MIT and MFA. In 
fact, when the Office of European Affairs was created in 1990 by the then Prime Minister 
József Antall, its location was established within the MIER and not MFA or MIT, 33 
mainly because the economic diplomacy was the responsibility of the MIER. At the same 
time, the expertise for dealing with the trade related aspects of the EA was concentrated in 
the MIT. Besides, when the coordinating Inter-ministerial Committee for the 
implementation of the EA was created in April 1992, it was endowed with a bicephalous 
                                                
33 MTI Econews, March 24, 1995, ‘New head of Office of European Affairs appointed.’ 
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leadership structure. The Committee was co-chaired. One chairperson was Endre Juhasz, 
the Head of the Office of European Affairs of the MIER and future ambassador to the EU. 
The other chairperson was Sándor Peisch, Deputy Secretary of State and Head of the 
Europe Department in the Foreign Ministry.34  
This arrangement created an undesired tension in the coordination system between 
the three ministries, and especially between the MIER and MIT. At the same time, the 
decision to remove the source of tension and to streamline the coordination system was not 
originated by any request of the EC/EU. In fact, the resolution of this matter was the 
outcome of the change of governing coalition following the parliamentary elections in 
1994. The MIER, including the Office of European Affairs was integrated into the 
structure of the MIT in the summer of 1994. The context in which this decision was 
adopted fully demonstrates the importance of governing coalition politics in shaping the 
institutional framework of coordinating European affairs (see below).  
The two rounds election in May 1994 marked the return to power of the socialists in 
Hungary, alongside the free democrats. The two component political parties were the 
MSzP, with 209 seats in Parliament (54%) and the SzDSz, with 69 seats (17%). Together, 
the two parties secured no fewer than two-thirds of the seats in the new Parliament. The 
decision to integrate the MIER, including the Office of European Affairs, into the structure 
of the MIT was part of the coalition agreement.35 Apparently, the decision aimed to 
rationalize the activity of the cabinet and to reduce the number of ministries from 13 to 
12.36 However, downsizing the number of ministries suited well the algorithm of 
distributing the ministerial portfolio, with eight ministries for Socialists and four for the 
Free Democrats. At the same time, even the outgoing political state secretary in the MIER, 
                                                
34 MTI Econews, April 10, 1992, ‘EC association agreement - inter-ministerial committee.’ 
35 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 29, 1994, ‘new appointments; Foreign minister on personnel 
changes, Slovak draft of treaty.’ 
36 MTI Econews, July 5, 1994, ‘Parliament Winds Up International Economic Relations Ministry.’ 
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Laszlo Bogar, agreed that the ministry was a source of dispute from the outset and its 
abolition was not an error.37 Therefore, if between 1990 and 1994 there were three 
ministries dealing with European affairs, between 1994 and 1996, the two remaining 
competing institutional actors in this field were the MFA and MIT.  
The role of the MFA was challenged again in 1996 when the European Commission 
sent to the Hungarian government the technically demanding questionnaire for assessing 
the readiness of the applicant country. The answers to the 167 pages of the questionnaire 
were supposed to provide, in three months, a comprehensive report on the political and 
economic situation in Hungary. Budapest’s application to EU membership was submitted 
on 31st March 1994 and assessed by the European Commission. Based on the answers to 
the questionnaire, the European Commission elaborated the opinion on Hungary’s 
application for membership to the EU, which recommended the opening of accession talks 
with Budapest (Commission, 1997a). However, during the process of answering the 
questions, a serious concern emerged with regard to the ability and skills of the MFA’s 
staff, ‘used to the Cold War’s generalities’, to understand and answer the technical 
questions sent by the European Commission (interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008).  
Against this background, the system of coordination and management of European 
affairs was reviewed and adjusted. In this case, Europeanization, or the demands 
originating at the EU level and expressed as a technical document (the questionnaire), was 
the source of domestic institutional change. It became clear that the fragmentation and 
inter-institutional competition between the MFA and MIT had a negative influence on the 
management of European affairs. The solution adopted by the socialist Prime Minister 
Gyula Horn was to transfer the entire office of European affairs from the MIT to the MFA 
(interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008; see also Ágh and Rózsás, 2003, Vida, 2002). The 
                                                
37 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 1, 1994, ‘Parliamentary and Government Affairs; Parliamentary 
committee supports move to amalgamate ministries.’ 
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professional background of Gyula Horn, who used to be a senior official in the MFA 
during the communist regime and a foreign minister in the last communist government of 
Miklós Németh (Lomax, 1995: 88), should be recalled here. Accordingly, the professional 
background of the prime minister might provide a partial explanation for this decision. 
This move provisionally closed a cycle whereby the Office of European Affairs had 
an uncertain institutional status, being first established as part of MIER, transferred to MIT 
and eventually integrated to the MFA. After formal accession in April 2004, however, the 
coordination was to became again a source of inter-institutional rivalry, the Office of 
European Affairs being moved away from the MFA, to the Office of the Prime Minister 
this time (see also this chapter, pp. 117-8)   
The result of the decision to unify the diplomatic and sectoral specialisation 
enhanced the required expertise of the MFA, streamlined the coordination process and 
ensured a higher degree of synergy (Vida, 2002: 59). At the same time, the Horn 
government set up the European Integration Cabinet in February 1996, and the Strategic 
Task Force on Integration. The Cabinet of European Integration, headed by the prime 
minister and consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, justice, economy and 
finance ought to be the main decision-making body on European integration. The Strategic 
Task Force, set up within the prime minister’s office, was composed of 18 working groups 
with the aim of advising the Integration Cabinet (Ágh, 1999: 843). 
Furthermore, the role of the MFA was further strengthened when the Government 
decided to create in April 1996, the State Secretariat for European Integration within the 
MFA. The main responsibility of the new body was to deal with all matters related to the 
accession process38 (European Commission, 1997a). Therefore, the MFA emerged from 
                                                
38 MTI Econews, April 5, 1996, ‘Santer and Kovacs Meet for Working Breakfast.’ 
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the inter-ministerial competition in Hungary during the EA stage as the most important 
institutional actor on European affairs (see also Rupp, 1999: 98).  
 
ii) Slovakia (1993-1999) 
In the Slovak Republic, the management and coordination of European affairs is 
closely linked to the overall process of setting up a new political system and new 
institutions and mechanisms of foreign policy making. The main challenge in this 
enterprise was the absence of a tradition of statehood in Slovakia, including in conducting 
foreign policy which is a fundamental attribute of any sovereign state (Duleba et al., 1998: 
11). What Slovakia had to do, different from Hungary or Romania in this case, was to 
invent the institutions and processes of foreign policy (see also Haughton, 2005: 3).  
Although a Ministry of International Relations (MIR) was created in the Slovak 
republic as early as 1990, its functions were mostly related to developing external cultural 
links and cooperation with other state’s regions, but not with national governments 
themselves. The powers and role of the MIR were limited by the constitution. The federal 
constitution provided that only the MFA, as part of the federal government, shall represent 
the state in international relations (Bátora, 2003: 271, Duleba, et al., 1998). As Bátora 
(2003: 272) explains, despite the fact that the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was built on 
the existing structure of the MIR, the source of inspiration came from the way in which the 
federal Czechoslovak MFA had been organized. In logistical terms, Slovakia also inherited 
from the defunct federation, on a proportional basis with the Czech Republic, a series of 
properties abroad, which allowed the opening of diplomatic missions in 53 states and 4 
permanent missions to international organizations (Duleba, et al., 1998: 12). 
The new staff of the MFA increased rapidly during its first year of existence, from 
the initial 40 employees of the MIR, most of them lacking diplomatic experience, to 
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around 400 (plus 350 diplomats posted abroad) at the end of 1993. Many were hired 
hastily and without too much attention being paid to their professional skills and abilities 
(Bátora, 2003: 271-2). While some of these new staff came from the federal MFA, some 
other Slovak diplomats chose to carry on their activity in the newly established Czech 
MFA (Haughton, 2005: 3), for personal circumstances or since they were rejected in 
Bratislava, being seen as not loyal to the newly formed Slovak state (Duleba, et al., 1998: 
14).  
Besides, the endeavours to build the new political and administrative institutions in 
the first year of Slovakia as an independent state were undermined by political instability 
and fragmentation of the ruling political parties, namely HZDS and SNS39 (Malová, 1994: 
417). For instance, during 1993-4, no fewer than four political leaders alternated at the 
MFA’s helm. The first foreign minister, Milan K'a(ko, was dismissed as a consequence of 
the political struggle inside the HZDS, and replaced with Jozef Morav"ík, the former 
foreign affairs minister of Czechoslovakia and future prime minister of Slovakia between 
March and October 1994 (see Malová, 1995). Following Morav"ík’s taking over as 
premier, the new foreign affairs minister Eduard Kukan, a career diplomat, was appointed. 
Kukan’s mandate was short lived, even if he remain foreign minister a few more weeks 
after the parliamentary elections held in the autumn of 1994 due to the length of the post-
election process of coalition formation. With the formation of a new cabinet, the new 
foreign minister became Juraj Schenk, a member of the HZDS.  
It was not only the political instability that affected the functioning of institutions 
and policy-making, but also the nature of nationalistic political game and anti-democratic 
practices pursued by Vladimir Me"iar, the prime minister between 1993-1998 (with the 
                                                
39 During 1993-1998, Slovakia was governed by a coalition led by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS, Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko), the far-right nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS, Slovenská 
národná strana) and the Association of Workers in Slovakia (ZRS, Zdru(enie robotníkov Slovenska), a 
populist radical left oriented political movement. 
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exception of the period between March and October 1994). These practices prompted 
numerous observers of CEE politics to include Slovakia in the group of illiberal, 
authoritarian states, alongside Romania and Bulgaria (Vachudova, 2005). Moreover, the 
political relations between Slovakia and the EU became strained, leading eventually to the 
non-invitation of Slovakia to the opening of the accession talks for full membership along 
the other three members of the Visegrad Group.    
The inherent problems of a new beginning prevented the MFA from playing a key 
role in the management and coordination of European affairs. For instance, the team 
involved in the negotiation of the new association agreement with the EC,40 during the 
spring and summer of 1993, was not led by the MFA’s representative, but by Peter Mihok, 
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The MFA’s representative was 
simply a member of the team, alongside other officials from the ministries of economy, 
agriculture, finance, as well as the customs authority.41 Despite the international dimension 
of the agreement under negotiation, the role of the MFA was not different from that of any 
other sectoral ministry or state agency involved in talks. In contrast with Hungary, where 
the role of the MFA was challenged by other ministries, but relatively similar to Romania, 
where the coordination was centred on the prime-minister’s office, in Slovakia the 
challenger was the governmental office itself as a centre of coordination. After the signing 
of the association agreement, a Council for the implementation of the EA, led by Jozef 
Kalman, deputy prime minister, was created within the government. The aim of the new 
                                                
40 Following the division of Czechoslovakia, the two successor republics had to negotiate new association 
agreements with the European Community.   
41 CTK National News Wire, April 14, 1993, ‘Slovak Delegation to discuss association accord with EC 
Thursday.’ 
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organization was to monitor the way in which the agreement’s provisions are 
implemented42 and to draft the strategy for Slovakia's European integration.43  
To a certain extent, the position of the MFA in the national system of management 
and coordination of European affairs changed after the legislative elections in September 
1998, when the populist-nationalist coalition led by Vladimir Me"iar was replaced with a 
new cabinet, having Mikulá$ Dzurinda, the chairman of the Slovak Democratic Coalition 
(SDK, Slovenská demokratická koalícia)44 as the prime minister. The new government, 
while based on a ‘coalition of coalitions’, consisting of ten political parties45 (also, see 
Harris, 2004: 190), was united by the desire to get Slovakia out of the international 
isolation brought in by the political practices of the previous government. The aim of 
catching up with the other three countries of the Visegrad Group and joining NATO and 
the EU constituted important incentives for overcoming the political heterogeneity of the 
governmental coalition. Besides the political will to repair the damaged international 
reputation of Slovakia, emphasis was also placed on strengthening of the institutional 
capacity to deliver the electoral promises and to reach political objectives.     
 
iii) Romania (1990-1999) 
In Romania, the EA stage lasted until the opening of the accession talks for 
membership in December 1999. Different from Hungary, the role of the MFA during this 
                                                
42 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1994, ‘Coordination centre for the implementation of the 
European Agreement set up’. 
43 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 16, 1995, ‘Foreign minister on foreign policy, Slovak-
Hungarian basic treaty.’ 
44 SDK was a coalition of five political parties, namely Democratic Union (DU, Demokratická únia), 
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH, Kres)anskodemokratické hnutie), Democratic Party (DS, 
Demokratická strana), Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS, Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska) 
and Green Party in Slovakia (SZS, Strana zelen*ch na Slovensku). 
45 Besides the SDK, the new cabinet included representatives of the other parties previously in the 
opposition, namely the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL‘, Strana demokratickej +avice), the Party of 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK, Strana ma,arskej koalície or in Hungarian MKP, Magyar Koalíció Pártja), and 
the Party of Civil Understanding (SOP, Strana ob"ianskeho porozumenia). 
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period remained limited to diplomatic and political aspects related to European affairs. All 
aspects linked to the EU first pillar policies were dealt with by a department established in 
1992 within the Prime Minister’s Office. The organizational set-up of the MFA in 1992 did 
not reveal a special interest in European integration, EC related issues not being dealt with 
by any dedicated unit; instead, this was part of the job of a directorate responsible for 
relations with CEE, EFTA, and NATO countries.46 A dedicated department for European 
affairs was established only in 1994.47   
At this stage, relations between Romania and the EC were mainly limited to the 
implementation of the trade and cooperation agreement, signed in October 1990, in effect 
since May 1991. The trade agreement was important both in terms of its economic 
consequences and since it represented the end of the isolation of Romania in Europe, due 
to the political unrest in Bucharest during the first half of 1990 and the suspicions with 
regard to the democratic credentials of the new government.48 However, in May 1991, at 
the time when the negotiations between the EC and Visegrad countries were well 
underway to signing the EAs, Romanian authorities were only in a position to submit the 
official application for opening the negotiation talks. Eventually, the talks started in the 
summer of 1992 and were finalized in February 1993 when the EA was signed. 
There is evidence of the limited role of the MFA even at this early stage. Since the 
formal contacts between Romania and the European Community during the 1970s and 
1980s were commercial relations, at the beginning of 1990s the negotiation of EA was 
seen in a similar way, as talks on a commercial agreement (interview, Vasile Pu&ca&, Cluj-
Napoca 2008). Therefore, the team of negotiators was represented by a state secretary in 
the Ministry of Trade, and not by the MFA.  
                                                
46 Governmental Decree No. 814/1992. 
47 Governmental Decree No. 479/1994. 
48 European Report, October 24, 1990, ‘EEC/Romania: Final Signing of Cooperation Agreement Ends 
Political Saga.’ 
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The Romanian context was similar from this point of view to the Hungarian one; in 
both cases, the EC/EU affairs were dealt with by the economic and commercial branches 
of the government rather than by the Foreign Service. In both cases, the European affairs 
were mainly perceived at this early stage as trade relations, reflecting the experience of 
communist administration dealings with the EC before 1989 (mainly in commercial terms) 
(interviews, Vasile Pu&ca&, Cluj-Napoca, 2008 and Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008). This 
perception was the basis of a long-term inter-institutional rivalry, challenging the role of 
the MFA in both countries. However, as this chapter illustrates, the eventual outcome 
turned out to be different with regard to which institutional actor would play the major role 
in coordinating European affairs. 
Nevertheless, there was a positive side to the fact that Romania started the talks after 
the Visegrad countries. As Mayhew argues, the negotiations talks with Romania (and 
Bulgaria) were concluded very rapidly. On the one hand, Romanian officials were willing 
to conclude the agreement as soon as possible. On the other hand, there was little space to 
depart from the existing template negotiated with the Visegrad states (Mayhew, 1998: 24). 
Nonetheless, the speed came at a cost. The main strategy of the small and inexperienced 
team of Romanian negotiators was to show flexibility during the six rounds of talks in 
order to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible and to claim a political success, even 
if this was not the most effective cost-benefit deal (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008: 
27). Besides, in contrast to the texts of the previous EAs, the agreement included for the 
first time provisions on the respect of human rights, democratic principles and market 
economy as mandatory requirements (Smith, 1999: 97). It should be noticed that these new 
provisions were received with consternation by the Czech and Slovak negotiators when 
they started discussing the new agreements as independent states; there was no such a 
provision in the EA signed by Czechoslovakia in 1991.  
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In spite of these inauspicious circumstances, the entry into force of the Europe 
Agreement in February 1995 was hailed as a ‘historic date, like a turning point’ and a 
‘victory for the country’.49 It paved the way for the negotiation of a broad national strategy 
across political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, academics, and 
economists around a national strategy to prepare the integration into the EU and for 
submitting the official application for membership on the 22nd June 1995.  
Soon after the entry into force of the EA, the Romanian government adopted two 
decrees, one enhancing the role of the Department of European Integration (DEI) of the 
Government as the main agent responsible for the European integration of Romania, the 
other creating the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration (ICEI). In both 
cases, the prime minister stood in a position of power due to the direct control over the 
process of coordination and management of European integration. The ICEI, in which all 
ministries and relevant state agencies are represented at high political level, is chaired by 
the prime-minster. Besides, the head of the DEI, with the rank of state secretary, is the 
executive president of the Committee, being also directly subordinated to the prime 
minister. According to this arrangement, the prime minister has a direct control both over 
the process of inter-ministerial coordination and the day-to-day management of European 
integration.  
Apparently, this arrangement might have had the potential to stir up tensions 
between the prime minister and president, given the formal, wide political powers 
conferred on the head of state by the Constitution. In the case of Romania, the semi-
presidential constitutional design creates a different context from the parliamentarian 
regimes in Hungary and Slovakia. If in the latter cases, the struggle for inter-institutional 
power lay within the cabinet, in the former case it also added the presidency as a key actor 
                                                
49 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 3, 1995, ‘President hails the coming into force of EU 
Association Agreement’. 
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competing in the exercise and control of the executive power. In Romania, the special, 
personal relations between the prime minister, Nicolae V!c!roiu, and president Ion Iliescu 
might explain why there was, in fact, no tension and the arrangement worked for both 
sides. A reason for this situation is the political support granted by the president to the 
premier between 1992 and 1996. The technocratic premier was highly dependent on the 
political backup of the president in order to deal with the political parties in the Parliament 
(see Verheijen, 1999: 207).  
At the same time, this arrangement was convenient for the president since it provided 
him with a convenient way to oversee the developments in the management and 
coordination of European integration without being directly involved. Moreover, the 
arrangement was maintained even after the general elections in 1996, bringing to power a 
coalition of centre-right opposition parties50 and a new president, Emil Constantinescu.51 
The DEI of the Government was kept in place and strengthened by the appointment of a 
minister delegate at its helm instead of the previous state secretary. The reason for this 
change was the need to provide the head of the DEI with more political clout in relations to 
other fellow ministers in the cabinet (interview, Bucharest, 2008). However, as will be 
showed later, following the decision adopted by the European Council in December 1999 
to open the accession talks with Romania, as well as five other aspiring countries, 
including Slovakia, further changes in the management and coordination of European 
affairs were deemed necessary.  
 
                                                
50 The governing coalition was formed around the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR, Conven#ia 
Democrat! Român!) an alliance of political parties motivated by their desire to create a united front against 
PDSR. The most important members of the CDR were the Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party 
(PN-CD, Partidul Na#ional -!r!nesc Cre&tin Democrat) and National Liberal Party (PNL, Partidul Na#ional 
Liberal). The governing coalition also included PD and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR, Uniunea Democrat! Maghiar! din România or RMDSz, Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség in 
Hungarian).  
51 Emil Constantinescu was the presidential candidate of the CDR at the presidential elections in 1996. 
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5.4. The integration stage 
The beginning of the accession talks with Hungary in March 1998, and Slovakia and 
Romania in early 2000 increased dramatically the visibility of European integration for the 
public opinion and transformed the previously remote prospect of integration into an 
almost tangible reality. At an institutional level, the opening of the accession talks 
intensified the political and technical dialogue between the representatives of the European 
Commission and national delegations and required further political-administrative 
adjustments.   
From a formal point of view, the institutional framework whereby the bilateral 
dialogue and negotiations took place was that created by the EA, consisting of the 
association councils, association committees, and joint parliamentary assemblies. What 
changed was the design of coordinating European integration within the acceding 
countries. It is true that institutional changes were also introduced in the previous years. In 
a sense, the EA stage was an exploratory period, wherein the governments were trying to 
understand how to deal with the EC and what were the best mechanisms towards this goal. 
As the previous section illustrated, at the end of the EA stage the most important 
institutional actor responsible of coordinating European affairs in Hungary turned out to be 
the MFA. In Slovakia, the role of the MFA became more salient, yet without taking over 
the role of the office of the government. In Romania, the Office of the Prime Minister was 
the most important actor throughout this period. 
However, in view of the opening of the accession talks, further changes were deemed 
necessary. There was no formal requirement coming from the European Commission that a 
position of chief negotiator has to be created; yet, all candidate countries set up one 
(Slovakia and Romania) or linked the functions of negotiation with a pre-existing role 
(Hungary). Nevertheless, this does not mean that there was no formal demand at all. 
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Contrary, the Europeanization pressures were felt with regard to what was defined by the 
European Commission as appropriate administrative capacity, which was also reflected in 
the field of the CFSP. The regular reports of the Commissions might be seen, in this sense, 
not only as technical factsheets on the state of candidates’ preparedness, but also as 
normative demands prescribing the right course of action.   
The concrete experience of accession talks demonstrated that, in fact, the idea of 
negotiation itself is misleading insofar as the power asymmetry between the two sides was 
so disproportionate (see also this chapter, p. 98). As András Inotai remarked, the gross 
imbalance between the ‘policy-maker’ (the EU) and the ‘policy-taker’ (the candidate 
country) was augmented by the fact that the EU is one of the major economic players in 
the world while the candidate countries participated in the discussions individually (Inotai, 
2001: 16-17). Hence, there was not a great deal to be negotiated, with the exception of 
some transitional periods on a case-by-case basis. The EU legislation, the acquis 
communautaire, had to be taken on as such and implemented into national legislation. In a 
way, the power nature of the accession talks recalled the sour experience of negotiating the 
EA in the early 1990s and shaped the perceptions of those national representatives 
involved that there is an inherent dose of unfairness in the negotiation process. Even at the 
time when the negotiation talks were conducted, the unfairness of the power distribution 
was observed and considered a potential danger for the post-enlargement functioning of 
the EU. As Karen Smith remarked, the norms of reciprocity and mutual trust between the 
old and new member states, which represent the lubricant of the integration process, could 
be more difficult to built if the candidate countries resent the unfairness of the accession 
talks (Smith, 2003: 120).  
At the same time, the accession talks made clear that the European integration is as 
much a matter of external policy as it is about wide and deep internal political, economic, 
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and social transformation. European integration was no longer a matter of foreign policy 
alone, but a national strategic objective involving all central and local public 
administration and state agencies. Foreign policy itself became only one ‘chapter’ among 
no less than thirty-one, all of them making up the acquis communautaire. The national 
foreign policy became subject to harmonization with EU’s acquis, like any other sectoral 
policy. However, due to the intergovernmental framework of cooperation provided by the 
treaties for CFSP, the space of manoeuvre was greater in this case. The third chapter 
examines in more detail the impact of Europeanization over the substantive content of 
foreign policy in the three countries, before and after accession. This section is limited 
only to domestic institutional changes at national and European level.  
 
i) Hungary (1997-2008) 
The accession phase strengthened the role of the Hungarian MFA even further as the 
operational centre of coordination of European integration. This status of the MFA 
remained virtually unchallenged until after accession, even if two changes of government 
occurred during this period.52 According to the relevant governmental decree (2179/1998) 
the MFA leads the accession process in its entirety, heads the Hungarian delegation, 
represents the government within the framework of the institutional basis of the association 
agreement and reports on all issues related to the accession process to the government and 
Parliament (see Vida, 2002: 59).  
The decision taken by the Orbán government in 1998 to close down the Cabinet of 
European Integration and the Strategic Task Force on Integration, previously set up by 
                                                
52 The parliamentary election in May 1998 caused the replacement of Horn’s cabinet with a new coalition led 
by the FIDESZ, under the new name of Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Union (FiDeSz-
Magyar Polgári Szövetség), with 38% of seats in Parliament, and including the FKFPP and MDF, with 12% 
and 4% of the seats in the Parliament. This coalition lost the next election in April 2002 in favour of 
socialists and free democrats, their allies during the 1994-8 governing coalition.   
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Gyula Horn, and to establish a new Department of European Integration within the prime 
minister’s office did not challenge the role of the MFA for two reasons. On the one hand 
the new body was mainly responsible for providing information and policy scenarios to the 
prime minister and not for managing EU affairs proper (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 15). On the 
other hand, as Vida (2002: 59-60) and Ágh and Rózsás (2003: 21) argue, the key element 
of the revised institutional architecture was the State Secretariat for Integration (SSI) of the 
MFA.  
The secretariat was actually set up by the Horn government in 1996 and throughout 
the premiership of Victor Orbán remained unchanged. The head of the secretariat, with the 
rank of secretary of state,53 was exclusively and directly answerable to the prime minister. 
This arrangement created an inevitable duality in the system, by separating European 
integration from other foreign policy matters, affecting the overall efficiency of the 
institution (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 10). At the same time, the direct link between the prime 
minister and the state secretary for European integration means that the head of the 
government wanted to have a greater control over the process. In the absence of this direct 
link, the access of the prime minister to first-hand information and its ability to control the 
decision-making process might have been weakened. 
The internal structure of the Secretariat was based on two departments with distinct 
functions, headed by deputy state secretaries. While one department dealt with economic 
matters, legislation, and justice and home affairs issues, the other one was responsible for 
political cooperation, CFSP, institutional matters, communication and EU assistance, and 
support. The core of the Secretariat was the General Department for EU coordination, 
                                                
53 The first head of the Secretariat, during 1996-8, was Ferenc Somogyi, career diplomat and future minister 
of foreign affairs during 2004-6 and current ambassador of Hungary to the United States. During Orbán’s 
premiership (1998-2002), the new state secretary was Péter Gottfried, the future president of the Office for 
European Affairs established within the Government apparatus in 2004. The last head of the Secretariat was 
Péter Balázs until 2003, the future ambassador of Hungary to the EU between 2004 and for a short while 
European commissioner for regional policy (until the end of Prodi Commission). 
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which also provided the secretariat for the Negotiating Delegation, Interministerial 
Committee for European Integration and the European Integration Council (Vida, 2002: 
60). However, once the socialists returned to power in 2002, the Medgyessy government 
changed the organizational structure of the secretariat by adding a section on external 
economic relations. Again, the justification for such a move was that 80% of the external 
trade was conducted with the EU member states.54 The title of the secretariat changed 
accordingly to that of State Secretariat for Integration and External Economic Relations 
(SSEIER). The new arrangement was short lived since in 2004 the secretariat was phased 
out due to Hungary’s accession to the EU.55 
Another key position established during the accession phase was that of Chief 
Negotiator. Different from Slovakia and Romania for this matter, the role of chief 
negotiator in Hungary was entrusted to the head of the Permanent Mission to the European 
Union. Apparently, the fact that the chief negotiator was appointed the Hungarian 
ambassador to the EU,56 Endre Juhász, was due to the need for direct contact and 
proximity with Brussels institutions, especially the Commission. The head of the 
Negotiating Delegation, overseeing the activity of the chief negotiator, was the foreign 
minister, assisted by the head of the SSI (Ágh and Rózsás, 2003: 14, Vida, 2002: 60). This 
arrangement suggests a separation between the operational tasks, entrusted to the 
ambassador in Brussels, and political tasks, retained by the foreign minister. Furthermore, 
after concluding the accession talks, the newly created position of minister without 
portfolio in charge of coordination of European affairs, assigned to the former chief 
negotiator, did not challenge the role of the MFA. It should be remarked that this position 
                                                
54 See also the figures on the website of the Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency, viewed 
March 2010, online http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=foreign_trade.   
55 MTI, March 25, 2003, ‘Foreign Ministry to be reorganized.’ 
56 Endre Juhász is a career diplomat, appointed as the head of the permanent mission of Hungary to the EU in 
1995 and as chief negotiator between July 1998 and April 2003. Since 2004, Endre Juhász is the Hungarian 
representative in the Court of Justice of the European Communities.  
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was created against the background of the reshuffling of Medgyessy cabinet in May 2003. 
It seems that its aim was to offer a temporary governmental seat to the former chief 
negotiator, at least until he took over new responsibilities as one of Hungary’s 
representatives in EU institutions. 
Despite the fact that the contribution of Hungary to the development of CFSP was 
positively assessed by all regular reports of the Commission, the same cannot be said about 
the administrative capacity to implement in full the CFSP provisions. The regular reports 
issued in 1999 and 2000 pointed to the fact that the MFA needed to make further structural 
changes (European Commission., 1999a, 2000a). Moreover, while the report issued in 
2001 observed that the administrative capacity of the MFA was strengthened, and that both 
the positions of political director and that of European correspondent were created 
(European Commission, 2001a), the report published one year later signalled that the MFA  
‘has an administrative set-up, which is basically compatible with EU CFSP 
structures. It has a European Correspondent, but no Political Director yet. However, 
there is an equivalent post whose holder assumes the Political Director’s tasks in co-
operation meetings with the EU.’ (European Commission, 2002a).  
 
The two reports are contradictory with regard to the setting up of the position of 
political director. It is plausible to assume that this misunderstanding was caused by the 
erroneous or confused information provided by the Hungarian authorities to the European 
Commission and wrongly interpreted by the experts in charge of elaborating the report. 
The fact is that, although the CFSP chapter was easily concluded (see also chapter seven, 
p. 189), the very question of administrative capacity, one of the Copenhagen criteria for 
accession, created some difficulties even for the MFA, a front line ministry, directly 
exposed to and involved in dealing with the EU.  
Following the formal accession of Hungary to the EU, the role of the MFA on the 
coordination of European Affairs was challenged once again. From the 1st of January 2005 
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the European affairs unit of the MFA was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. 
This decision may be explained again with reference to the dynamic of governing coalition 
politics, although the personal rivalry between the Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy and the 
Foreign Minister László Kovács, both top leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Party, played 
a role as well. Two factors facilitated the eventual adoption of the decision to transfer the 
European unit from the MFA to the PM’s Office. On the one hand, coalition politics led to 
a cabinet reshuffle, following the stepping down of the Prime Minister Medgyessy in 
August 2004 and his replacement with Ferenc Gyurcsány. On the other hand, the Foreign 
Minister Kovács took over the post of European Commissioner in November 2004, which 
meant that a key opponent to such a measure withered away.  
However, the management of European affairs by the Office of the Prime Minister 
was short lived. Instead of streamlining the coordination process, it resulted in ineffective 
management. Simply the procedure of transfer of an entire office from the MFA to the 
Government paralysed to a certain extent the activity of the affected unit, not only 
operationally, but also psychologically (Interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008). The 
uncertainty with regard to the future status had a negative effect on the operation of the 
unit at a time when the management of post-accession funds was a matter of key 
importance. Hence, after the general elections in 2006, the European coordination returned 
to the MFA. Similar to the previous instances where the role of the MFA was challenged 
by the inter-institutional competition, the Foreign Service emerged as the main actor 
responsible of managing European affairs.   
Currently, the European Director with the rank of State Secretary heads the European 
Affairs Directorate of the MFA. The Department is the main coordinator body linking the 
executive and the legislature; it is also responsible of the functioning of the Interministerial 
Committee for European Coordination (Kovács, 2006: 22-25). The fact that this position 
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was entrusted to Tibor Kiss, the former Ambassador to the EU for the period between 
2004-2009, suggests a transfer of knowledge and skills acquired at European level to the 
domestic, day-to-day coordination of European affairs (see next chapter for a more detailed 
discussion about the elite socialization).  
 
ii) Slovakia (1999-2008) 
 During the accession stage, the position of the Slovak MFA was further consolidated 
within the system of coordination and management of European affairs. In contrast to the 
early years of searching and institution building, the foreign ministry became able to cope 
with the daunting task of representation, policy-making, policy coordination, and strategy 
development. As Bátora (2003b: 271) argues, during the early years of its existence, the 
position of the MFA was subject to frequent changes in reaction to shifting foreign policy 
priorities. In contrast to numerous changes at the MFA’s helm during the first years of 
Slovakia’s existence as an independent state, in the period between the 1998 and 2006 only 
Eduard Kukan held the foreign minister portfolio. 
The position of deputy prime minister in charge of European integration was 
maintained in the new governmental coalition, being offered to Pavol Hamzik, a member 
of the Party of Civic Understanding. The Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration 
also chaired the Ministerial Council for European Integration, which had the aim of 
providing the high-level political coordination. The operational support was provided by 
the Department of European Integration (DEI) in the General Secretariat of the 
Government, reporting to the Deputy Prime Minister and coordinating the activity of 29 
sectoral working groups and 15 European Integration units established in the ministries 
(European Commission, 1999b). It should be noticed that this department relied on only 
ten experts as of 1999 and this number actually decreased over the following years. 
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Because of the limited capability to undertake the task of coordinating and managing 
European integration, support for the coordinator role of the Deputy Prime Minister was 
provided by the MFA, through the State Secretary for European Integration and the 
relevant European Integration Section of the MFA.  
Besides, the new position of chief negotiator was created within the MFA and 
entrusted to Ján Fige+, a State Secretary in the MFA and leading member of the Christian 
Democratic Movement.57 The Chief Negotiator was also the chair of the advisory body for 
the Ministerial Council of European Integration. The advisory body consisted of the heads 
of the European Integration units and the heads of the working group of the Negotiation 
Team, and was chaired by the Chief Negotiator (see Bátora, 2003: 271-82). The decision to 
create a special position of chief negotiator within the MFA was similar with the 
arrangement foreseen in Romania, as well as in some other candidate countries; however, 
it differs from the Hungarian solution, which assigned this task to the head of the 
Permanent Representation to the EU.  
Different from Hungary, the regular reports of the European Commission did not 
mention any problem with regard to the administrative capacity of the MFA. In fact, the 
regular report on Slovakia’s preparedness in 2000 observed that ‘Slovakia has in place all 
the necessary administrative capacity to handle CFSP’ (European Commission, 2000b). 
Furthermore, the 2001 and 2002 reports pointed out that the MFA is well staffed and 
functioning (European Commission, 2001b, 2002b). The rapid reaction of the Slovak 
government to comply with the EU demands fits well with the overall approach of 
‘catching-up’ with the Visegrad countries, invited to open the accession talks earlier.    
During the summer of 2003, the year before accession, the European expertise in the 
MFA was concentrated in two inter-related units, namely the Section of Bilateral 
                                                
57 With the accession to the EU, Ján Fige+ became the first Slovak European Commissioner between 2004 
and 2009.  
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Cooperation and the Section of European Affairs.58 The difference between the two is that 
the former dealt with individual European countries on a territorial basis, while the latter 
with the EU as a whole (Bátora, 2003: 275). In turn, the difference between agendas and 
visions negatively affected the quality of the policy output and effectiveness of the 
coordination process (Bátora, 2003: 275). The intention at that moment was that after 
accession the MFA would play the main coordinator role in relation to other state agencies 
responsible for dealing with the EU. However, such expectations might have been 
criticized on the ground that they reflect a Realpolitik approach to external relations, one 
which plays down the fact that after accession the EU processes and policies became an 
integral part of domestic politics, not merely an issue of external relations (Bátora, 2003: 
276).   
Therefore, in the aftermath of accession, the system of coordination in the Slovak 
Republic remained centred on the DEI within the office of the government, even if the role 
of the MFA became more important in contrast to the previous years, especially in 
operational terms. Following the formal accession in April 2004, the role of the MFA was 
further strengthened. This was because the coordination centred on the deputy prime 
minister did not work very well (Interview, Eduard Kukan, Bratislava, 2008). For instance, 
if during 1998-9 the number of staff in the Department of European Integration within the 
Office of the Government was around ten, as of 2008 it is five, while the corresponding 
number of expert personnel in the MFA grew from ten before 1999 to around 50 as of 
2008. The increase in the number of staff accompanied the change in the organizational 
structure. The Section of European Integration established in 1999 was divided after 
accession into two departments, one dealing with common sectoral policies and 
institutional affairs, the other with foreign and security policy. 
                                                
58 This is the inheritor of the Section of European Integration, created in 1999.  
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iii) Romania (1999-2008) 
Romania received the invitation to open the accession talks from the European 
Council in December 1999. The invitation found Romania’s politics in turmoil due to an 
internal political crisis that led eventually to governmental reshuffling. The newly 
appointed technocratic prime minister, Mugur Is!rescu, the head of the Central Bank,59 
decided to reorganize the governmental office by moving the DIE to the MFA. The 
position of the minister delegate for European integration and head of the DIE, occupied 
by Alexandru Herlea since 1996, was also removed. These decisions were the result of 
political bargaining with regard to the distribution of portfolios between political parties 
making up the governing coalition. The consequence was that the MFA was placed for the 
first time in the strongest position with regard to the management of European integration. 
The new foreign minister in Is!rescu’s cabinet and chairman of the Democratic Party was 
Petre Roman, the first prime minister of post-communist Romania. The political clout of 
the new foreign minister may also explain the decision to attribute the key role in European 
affairs to the MFA. It would have been hardly acceptable for a political character of this 
calibre to accept that the management of European integration was the responsibility of a 
simple department within the Prime Minister’s Office.  
The general elections in the autumn of 2000, won comfortably by the Social 
Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), caused a change of government and brought about 
a new approach of how the management of European affairs should be organized. The 
social-democrat government headed by the Prime Minister Adrian N!stase put forward a 
governmental configuration that included a completely new Ministry of European 
Integration. The design of a dedicated ministry for European integration was not a very 
                                                
59 Mugur Is!rescu returned as head the National Bank of Romania following the ending of his prime 
ministerial mandate in December 2000. 
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popular option in other candidate states, though some similar arrangements came about 
(Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007: 975). Such a decision might be seen as an attempt by the 
new Romanian cabinet to demonstrate its bona fide credentials and determination, given 
the poor record of the country among other candidates (Vachudova, 2005). At the end of 
December 2000, other candidate countries, invited to open the accession talks at the same 
time, were well ahead of Romania with regard to the status of negotiations. For instance, 
while Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia had presented position papers for all 31 chapters of 
negotiations by the end of 2000, Romania did the same for only 13 (Orban, 2006: 82). In 
addition, many Western capitals and Brussels viewed the return to power of the party 
responsible for the sluggish reforms in the early 1990s with scepticism.60  
The intention behind this decision was to overcome two problems by creating a 
special ministry in charge of European integration. One problem is linked to the fact that 
the scope of MFA’s activity is broader, covering other aspects of foreign relations of the 
country; therefore, the European integration might not always be the top priority. On the 
other hand, a minister has a greater political influence over other colleagues in the cabinet 
than a simple secretary of state. Hence, it might push the agenda and put pressure on 
his/her colleagues in the government (interview, Vasile Pu&ca&, Cluj-Napoca 2008). That 
was also the intention in 1996 when a delegate minister was appointed as head of the DIE. 
However, in contrast to a simple department, a minister has greater resources and prestige.  
This is also an illustration of the fact that, although all political actors accepted the 
European integration as a strategic national objective, the existence of political consensus 
on this matter was not enough to achieve effective results; it required the political weight 
                                                
60 European Report, January 27, 2001, ‘EU/Romania: N!stase brings wishes and promises.’ 
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of a senior member of the cabinet as a means to put pressure on other ministries and 
departments.   
At the same time, the Negotiation Delegation for European integration was also set 
up within the newly created Ministry of European Integration. The position of Chief 
Negotiator and Head of the Negotiation Delegation was entrusted to Vasile Pu&ca&, having 
the rank of Minister-Delegate. In this way, the objective of European integration was 
supposed to be represented and promoted by two ministerial figures within the cabinet. 
This arrangement might have also created a certain degree of overlap and competition both 
within the MIE and between MIE and MFA. The fact that the holders of the portfolio of 
minister of European integration were close allies of the president within their respective 
political parties might mean that the president wanted to be able to influence the policy 
process. Apparently, the first minister of European integration, Hildegard Puwak, was a 
close ally of the president Ion Iliescu, coming from the same grouping within the Social 
Democratic Party. Similarly, Anca Boagiu, the new minister after the general elections, 
was a political ally of the president Traian Basescu within the Democratic Party. For some 
observers, the influence of the strong presidential institution in the Romanian political 
system is reflected in the greater fragmentation at the top level of the executive and the 
existence of two ministries dealing with European affairs, one apparently defending the 
president’s views and interests (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007: 978). 
Throughout the period between 2001 and 2007, the main role in the management and 
coordination of European affairs belonged to the MIE, even if the general elections in 2004 
replaced the government of the Social Democratic Party with a centre-right coalition.61 In 
this case, the change of government and majority in the Parliament did not lead to a new 
                                                
61 Following the result of the parliamentary elections in 2004, the cabinet was formed by a coalition of the 
Justice and Truth Alliance (made up of the National Liberal Party and the Democrat Party) and the 
organization of the Hungarian minority (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania). 
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reorganization of the system of coordination. This was due to the timing more than 
anything else, given the fact that the negotiations talks were about to be completed in few 
months time. However, role of the Ministry of European Integration was questioned even 
before accession to the EU on 1st January 2007, and against the background of a protracted 
political crisis that would determine eventually the break-up of the governmental coalition.  
A first step was the creation in December 2006 of a Department of European Affairs 
within the Office of the Prime Minister. The new department was designed to take over 
most of the responsibilities of the defunct MIE. The new department is directly 
subordinated to the prime minister and is responsible, jointly with the MFA, for 
coordinating European affairs. The second step was the formal disintegration of MIE, 
which became a ministry in charge of regional development. Part of the staff was 
transferred to the MFA (interview, MFA, Bucharest, 2008). In fact, the post-accession re-
organization of the system of coordination of European affairs was a return to the pre-
accession period, where the coordination was centred on a department within the Prime 
Minister’s Office. From this point of view, the system centred on the Ministry of European 
Integration might be seen as an intermezzo designed to respond to the needs of conducting 
and concluding the accession talks and not as a long-term solution to the daunting task of 
coordinating European affairs. 
However, the MFA remained the primary institutional actor in charge of the CFSP, 
similar to the situation in other candidates or member states. The difference was that in 
some countries the MFA had an integrative and comprehensive role in the management of 
European affairs, while in other countries this role was mainly limited to foreign policy. In 
Hungary for instance, the MFA became the major actor in charge of both community and 
intergovernmental type of European affairs. In Romania the allocation of responsibilities 
followed a conception whereby the CFSP/ESDP are dealt with by the MFA while the first 
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pillar or community affairs are mainly the responsibility of a different institutional actor 
(either a department within the cabinet or a dedicated ministry).  
The EU External Relations Directorate deals with the CFSP and ESDP matters 
within the General Directorate European Union. The other units are the directorates for EU 
policies, General Affairs (dealing also with inter-institutional relations), Development Aid, 
and Western Europe (the management of bilateral relations with EU member states and 
Turkey). This structure has not suffered major changes in contrast to the pre-accession 
period. The major change was the setting-up of the Development Aid unit, non-existent 
before accession, and the split of the previous Directorate for Policy and Institutional 
Affairs into two distinct units, namely the EU Policies and General Affairs (interview, 
MFA, Bucharest, 2008). Therefore, while Europeanization might be seen as responsible for 
the setting-up of the Development Aid unit, domestic considerations provide a more 
consistent explanation of the clear continuity with regard to the design and functions of 
operational units within the MFA.  
Although various institutional adjustments at the level of domestic coordination and 
management of European affairs were implemented in all three countries during the post-
accession period, these continued to be the result of political competition within the 
governmental coalitions or the inter-institutional struggle for resources and influence, 
rather than reactive measures to EU demands.  
 
5.5. The changing role of the Permanent Representations to the EU 
Apart from the institutional adjustment at the domestic level, the formal accession to 
the EU required extensive changes at the European level, in other words at the level of 
diplomatic missions of the new members states in Brussels. The national embassies to the 
EU were the institutional actors that gained the most with accession. At the domestic level, 
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the framework of coordination and management of European affairs was already in place. 
The functionality and effectiveness of different national arrangements, while tested during 
the accession talks, faced the challenge of full participation at all levels of EU policy 
making only after accession. 
The formal title of the embassy of a third state or candidate to the EU is ‘Permanent 
Mission’. Once it becomes a full member, the title changes to ‘Permanent Representation’ 
(henceforth PermRep). Before accession, the permanent missions in Brussels performed a 
traditional diplomatic role of representation and channels of communication. However, 
during the transition period from accession to full membership these embassies 
experienced far-reaching transformations. Measures such as the numerical augmentation of 
personnel, organizational and functional diversification reflected this type of change.  
The setting-up of diplomatic offices to the EC by the CEE countries followed the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in the late 1980s-early 1990s. The CEE governments 
began planning the transformation of the diplomatic missions in Brussels in the years 
before finalising the accession talks. Both the problem of size and internal organizational 
structure had to be addressed. The main criteria for deciding the number of staff and 
internal organization were the compatibility with the structure of the Council’s formations, 
the indicative needs of various ministries in the capital and the models offered by other 
member states similar in demographic terms.    
The size of the PermReps reflects both the need to answer the requirements of 
participating in the EU activities and the reality of a country’s physical characteristics. The 
experience of other members was a source of inspiration in deciding the appropriate 
design. In all cases, the number of staff was gradually but significantly increased during 
the period spent as an active observer, when the organizational structures were adapted to 
the anticipated needs arising from membership. For instance, the size of the Hungarian 
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PermRep was foreseen at around 60 national experts and diplomats out of about one 
hundred overall staff, in contrast to 20 personnel in 2003 and even fewer before. In case of 
the Slovak PermRep, the foreseen size was smaller, around 50 diplomats out of the total 
staff.  
At the same time, both Hungary and Slovakia have drawn inspiration from the 
Austrian, Finnish, and Danish models. In a way, these models reflect more the interest and 
cultural affinity of Hungarian and Slovak policy-makers with the central European and 
Nordic political systems, rather than a ideal functional match. Austria for instance is a 
federal state and the federative structure of the country is also reflected in the design of the 
Austrian Permanent Representation to the EU. For instance, in 2005 only 17 out of a total 
staff of 72 are from the MFA, the remaining personnel representing other ministries, and 
most important, non-ministerial organizations such as the Länder, the National Bank, 
cities, and local communities, as well as the major interest groups (see Müller, 2001: 231-
2, Neuhold, 2005: 51-2). This is hardly similar to the Hungarian or Slovak centralised 
political systems, dominated by a strong executive. Hence, the size of a country is only a 
partial indicator, offering an indicative figure with regard to the number of staff; it does not 
necessarily provide adaptable models of internal organization, due to different national 
circumstances. 
Romania fits uneasily somewhere in between the larger member state of the EU and 
the medium and small-sized ones. With about 22 million people, it is the country with the 
seventh largest population, between the Netherlands with sixteen million and Poland with 
thirty-eight. It is perhaps a feeling of self-importance that prompted some policy-makers to 
look at Poland rather than the Netherlands as a source of inspiration with regard to what 
would be the appropriate number of staff based on the correlation between the size of the 
country and the functional-operational requirements of participating in the Council’s 
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meetings. Therefore, the number of 70 seconded experts and diplomats, similar to the 
existing number of the Polish Permanent Representation in 2006, was considered 
appropriate for covering all the functional needs (interview, Rom PermRep, Brussels, 
2007). This figure changed upwards in the two years after accession.62 As of early 2009, 
around 85 staff made up the Permanent Representation to the EU of Romania, excluding 
auxiliary personnel. The positive correlation between the number of staff and the 
demographic size of the country was also highlighted by other studies (Kassim and Peters, 
2001: 300-1); the figures presented here provide additional support for this observation.63  
As a general feature, the initial nucleus of people working in the diplomatic missions 
in Brussels came from the MFA, but with the increase in the number of staff, experts from 
all other ministries were seconded to the PermReps. However, the MFA maintains its key 
role in CFSP and external relations matters. Except for the military staff representing 
national positions in the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and one or two staff from 
ministries of defence participating in the Political and Military Group (PMG), all other 
personnel involved in foreign and security policy matters come from ministries of foreign 
affairs. The ratio of CFSP staff is similar across PermReps, around a quarter of the total. 
Even if the absolute figures differ, the relatively similar percentage of people assigned for 
foreign and security policy matters reflect a need to balance the effective functioning 
within the EU Council with available resources.  
Several aspects had to be taken into consideration with regard to the internal 
organization. In general, the way in which the Permanent Missions were organized before 
accession reflected the functional need to deal with the European Commission, since the 
                                                
62 The number of staff has increased in all three Permanent Representations of Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Romania since the time of collecting data in 2007. The increase in the number of staff is a phenomenon 
affecting all Permanent Representations to the EU, reflecting the ever-expanding scope of EU activity.  
63 However, the PermRep of Greece contradicts this trend by having one of the most numerous staff among 
other representations in Brussels, despite the limited population of the country. 
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accession talks were conducted with the representatives of the Commission. The difference 
is that after accession the PermRep had to represent the country in the EU Council of 
Ministers. The shift to dealing with the EU Council instead of the European Commission 
represents a completely different logic and implies different organizational arrangements 
(interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008). Even if formally the Council is a single body, 
for practical reasons, national ministers meet in no less than nine specialized council 
formations.64 Accordingly, there is a functional need for the member states to replicate the 
EU Council’s structure at the level of the PermReps.  
Another challenge, which originated back in the capitals this time, was the question 
of hierarchical subordination and payments of people coming from different ministries. For 
instance, both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice have to deal with Justice 
and Home Affairs matters. Similarly, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have responsibilities in representing the national positions in the PMG or Political 
and Security Committee (interviews, Brussels, 2007).  
The organizational structure in the field of foreign and security policy mirrors the 
vertical and horizontal configuration of the EU Council. The representative in the 
COREPER II is the head of the PermRep in all three situations having the highest 
diplomatic rank. Down the hierarchical line come the representatives in the PSC, having 
high diplomatic rank as well. They get expert support from specialized units from within 
the representations. While these units should perform similar tasks, they are organized in 
different ways. In the Hungarian PermRep an external policy unit is responsible for 
                                                
64 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the functions previously performed by the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council has been split between two new formations, namely the General 
Affairs Council and External Relations Council. Consequently, from 2010 there are ten formations in which 
national ministers meet are as follow: 1) General Affairs; 2) External Relations; 3) Economic and Financial 
Affairs; 4) Justice and Home Affairs: 5) Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; 6) 
Competitiveness; 7) Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; 8) Agriculture and Fisheries; 9) 
Environment; and 10) Education, Youth and Culture. 
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territorial groups and control of armaments related matters; also, a security and defence 
unit deals with political and military aspects of military and civilian crisis management, 
capabilities development, NATO-EU relations, as well as with the African geographical 
group.  
The Romanian PermRep has two specialised units as well, although having different 
functional responsibilities. The Political Affairs Unit includes geographical, non-
proliferation, and arms control tasks (like in the Hungarian case), but also relations with 
the European Parliament, human rights issues, and Enlargement (these aspects are dealt 
with separately in both the Hungarian and Slovak PermReps). The ESDP unit has a similar 
scope as the one in the Hungarian PermRep. There are also differences with regard to the 
hierarchical chain of command. The external affairs and ESDP divisions have different 
heads of unit in the Hungarian PermRep, both answering to the PSC ambassador; instead, 
the same diplomat is the head of both units in the Romanian PermRep.  
The organization of the Slovak PermRep differs in the sense that both the External 
Relations and the Security divisions belong to the same functional unit, answerable to the 
PSC ambassador. In all three cases, the unit of military representatives is distinct in the 
structure of the PermReps. They participate in the military working groups and committees 
of the EU Council and provide military advice and recommendations to the PSC 
ambassadors.  
The three PermReps examined here show how similar functional requirements are 
served by different organizational configurations. This is hardly a surprise given the 
diversity of national organizational arrangements and organizational cultures in place at 
European level. It reflects neither simple convergence to a unique model nor continued 
divergence (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 325), but a logic of institutional reasoning. There are 
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inherent differences because of the absence of a unique European administrative model, 
and administrative idiosyncrasies or domestic political interests. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the issue of institutional change of foreign policy-making and 
coordination of European affairs in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania in the context of 
European integration. Observing the diversity of institutional models adopted in the three 
countries, the question was why, given the fact that Europeanization exerts similar 
pressures on the candidate countries and later on full member states, do different countries 
respond to Europeanization in different ways? In order to answer this puzzle, the chapter 
investigated the role of governmental politics, which was assumed to have both a 
mediating and independent effect on the way in which the systems of management and 
coordination affairs were framed.  
The historical institutionalist approach used throughout the chapter proved useful as 
a heuristic device for separating the two distinct stages characterizing the institutional 
development of the system of national coordination of European integration/affairs. This 
approach has also limitations. A certain pattern of institutional change does not always fit 
easily into the straitjacket of historical chronology. For instance, numerous institutional 
changes occurred in the Slovak system of coordination before the integration stage. More 
appropriate is to link those institutional developments with the change of the leading 
governmental coalition at the end of 1998 and its endeavour to catch up with the other 
Visegrad countries. Some other examples may be identified throughout the chapter. 
Therefore, the point should be made that the change in the status of the relationships 
between the EC/EU and the candidate countries is not necessarily associated with 
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institutional change. In other words, different stages of Europeanization do not cause 
domestic institutional change automatically.  
This point has also consequences for the ‘external shock’ explanation of institutional 
change, previously mentioned in the theoretical chapter (see p. 57). The external shock 
explanation of institutional change suggests that domestic processes of institutional 
reproduction and permanence may be disturbed by exogenous factors, breaking the 
institutional reproduction cycle and creating opportunities for institutional transformation. 
If European integration is seen as the external opportunity creating the incentive for 
internal transformation, the question is why the system of coordination kept changing in 
some cases even after formal accession. The second explanation of institutional change 
provided in the previous chapter refers to the idea of dysfunctional and sub-optimal 
outcomes of an institutional arrangement (see pp. 57-8). A good example is the process of 
institution building in Slovakia, specifically the setting up of a new foreign ministry. The 
role of the Slovak MFA in the coordination and management of European affairs was 
limited during the first years of its existence due to the fact the ministry was the subject of 
a process of internal consolidation. For this scenario, the institutionalist theory claims that 
political actors take strategic decision in order to address the dysfunctional institutions. In 
this case, the strategic decision was to assign the responsibility for European coordination 
directly to the Office of the Prime Minister. As the chapter illustrated, there are other 
situations when the institutional change was the result of the dynamic of governmental 
politics or/and the intra-coalition conflict between political parties. The inter-ministerial 
competition and conflict for resources and power is important as well. Perhaps the most 
illustrative example is the competition between the economic and foreign policy branches 
within the Hungarian government.  
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At the European level, Europeanization had a more uniform effect on the manner in 
which the national embassies to the EU were reorganized. Here, the sub-optimal outcome 
thesis of institutional change means that the structure of the former permanent mission was 
not adapted to answering the functional requirements of dealing with the EU Council, and 
was therefore unable to operate effectively in the new context. The way to address this gap 
was to redesign the internal organization of the permanent representation by mirroring the 
internal structure of the EU Council and emulating existing models in other member states 
to satisfy the new operational demands. At the same time, the isomorphic transformation 
thesis of institutional change contends that institutions in a similar domain tend to look 
alike. In this case, the permanent representations are more similar to each other than with a 
traditional embassy or even other permanent missions to international organizations such 
UN, OSCE, or NATO.  
To sum up, despite the fact that European integration provided the incentive for 
transformation, the structural domestic change was shaped less by Europeanization 
pressures than by political and inter-institutional competition and emulation of existing 
models in like-minded member states. The primacy of domestic constituencies explains 
both the limits of Europeanization and the differentiated impact of European integration 
across countries. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided empirical evidence supporting the argument that 
Europeanization affected the institutional framework of policy making in CEE countries in 
different ways. It also illustrated that the inputs of domestic politics or the emulation of 
existing models from other European countries played a more important role in this regard. 
Instead, this chapter moves the focus away from the EU impact on polity to the more 
elusive ideational dimension of Europeanization. The general question here is whether 
Europeanization altered in any way the self-identification and perception of national 
identity by the national policy-makers.  
The concept of national identity itself is defined and approached in various, 
sometimes competing ways. This concept has, however, an inherent temporal dimension. It 
was argued that the existence of historical territory or homeland, common myths and 
historical memories, alongside mass public culture, shared legal rights and duties for all 
members of national community and a common economy with territorial mobility for 
members are the constitutive elements that give substance to any national identity (Smith, 
1991: 11). Geography and historical experiences play a key role in the definition of who 
are the members of a national community and what is the glue keeping them together. The 
national identity, however, is not static, but is created and recreated through the active use 
of the past by entrepreneurial elites. The fact that this process is highly selective, willingly 
overlooking or preferring to forget some things while highlighting others, was a fact 
remarked long ago as crucial for nation building (see Renan, 1983: 40). 
To reiterate a point already made, arguably, the three countries examined in this 
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thesis, as part of the CEE region, are more similar to each other than to Western European 
states from the point of view of the nation building process. Anthony Smith argued that the 
Western model of nation, what he coined ‘the civic’ model, is built on a legal-political 
conception of community, legal political equality of its members, and common civic 
culture and ideology; by way of contrast, a non-Western model, characterizing the nation 
building process in Eastern Europe and Asia, is based on an ethnic conception of nation, a 
view which privileges the community of birth and native culture, genealogy and presumed 
descent ties, vernacular languages, customs and traditions (Smith, 1991: 11-15).  
This so-called ‘ethnic’ Eastern model to which the three countries discussed in this 
thesis allegedly belong has, however, a strong Germanic influence, dominated by a 
Romantic, 19th Century, cultural and organic view of the linkage between state, nation and 
ethnicity. Germany, for instance, a country belonging to the Western model of nation 
building, has until recently defined65 the link between nationhood and citizenship 
according to the ethnic-cultural conception different from the French view (which indeed 
may be the archetypal example of the Smith’s model of nation-building) (for a 
comprehensive discussion about the differences between the French and German views on 
citizenship and nationhood, see Brubaker, 1992: 1-20). 
Hence, even in Western European countries, including Germany, the membership of 
the national community as defined by the citizenship laws used to be traditionally 
determined in almost all continental European countries according to the ius sanguis 
(citizenship inherited from parents). Only relatively recently did the citizenship laws begin 
including legal provisions derived from the ius soli (birthright citizenship) alongside ius 
                                                
65 In 1999, the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) passed the Nationality Act (entered into force in 1 
January 2000), which includes more generous provisions on the granting of citizenship see 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/en/WillkommeninD/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht.html, viewed online 
January 2010.  
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sanguis (Bauböck, 2008). In this sense, it may be argued that the dichotomy between 
Western and Eastern Europe is too Manichean and simplistic.   
However, while a sharp Western-Eastern dichotomy opposing an ethnic versus a 
civic path to nation building is controversial, this does not obscure the major role played 
by the ethnic view in the definition of nationhood in the three countries examined here. 
This understanding had significant consequences with regard to the way in which the 
national political community defines its role in relation to neighbours, the region, and the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, it pre-determines the spectrum of choices that the political 
elite can make in the realm of foreign policy. The range of choices is constrained by other 
factors too, such as military capabilities, economic strength or the configuration of 
alliances with other states, to put it in a neorealist terminology. However, even neorealist 
thinkers accept that the interpretation given by statesmen to historical and geographical 
experiences matters in the formation of their own political perspectives of the future (see 
Hoffmann, 1995: 99-100). Hence, what matters more is the political thinking giving sense 
and direction to military strength and economic power as well as to defining the range of 
preferences with regard to the type of international system and the pattern of amity/enmity 
with other countries.  
Political choice in foreign policy is, therefore, constrained by both material and 
ideational factors (Hudson, 2005: 3). Although this fact is nothing new, it is worth 
recalling it since this chapter pays attention to the latter type of factors and the way they 
influence foreign policy choices. Even if CEE countries are far from being military or 
economic powers, the choices they make in foreign policy matters have implications for 
the European system as a whole. The ethno-nationalistic wars in the former Yugoslavia are 
powerful examples of what is the consequence of using the past and stirring up popular 
feelings of national pride and fear. The fact that other countries in the region, such as the 
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three cases examined here, did not follow the same path poses interesting questions with 
regard to the role that national identity factors played in the formulation of political 
choices.    
Another important aspect is the tension between structure and agency. The very 
notion of national identity implies the existence of unity and coherence, structuring and 
pre-determining choices. In other words, there is not too much room for alternative, 
competing political projects. In reality, the spectrum of political forces in any given 
country is structured along a continuum from extreme left to extreme right. Who the 
members of the political community are, what they stand for and what they want to 
achieve is a matter of healthy political debate in any democratic polity. This brings into the 
equation the role-played by coalition and governmental politics as intervening variables 
between the external influences of the Europeanization process and foreign policy choices. 
For a political party or coalition of parties to be in government is instrumental to projecting 
its own political vision. Being outside the governmental game or, even worse, not being 
represented in the parliament at all hinders the reason for the very existence of any political 
party, namely that of expressing and pursuing a political agenda. While this fact is also 
well known, it is important to recall it as a justification for the way in which this thesis 
makes sense of the dependent and independent variables.   
In terms of structure, this chapter has three parts. The first two sections look at the 
way in which political discourse in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania defines the nation in 
the broader context provided by European integration. The focus is mainly on the ethnic 
dimension of the political discourse, although other components are important as well, 
such as religion or culture. It does so because ethno-national politics frequently troubles 
bilateral relations between the three countries. As Vladimir Tism!neanu remarked (1998: 
154), ethno-nationalism was the most ostentatious expression of the post-communist moral 
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crisis characterized by collective anxiety, disorientation and disenchantment, which created 
a fertile ground for myths and fantasises of all kinds. Besides, as the post-EU accession 
political developments in Slovakia demonstrate, European integration is far from being a 
panacea for nationalism. Against this background, the third section examines the more 
specific topic of the socialization of foreign policy elite, especially policy-makers most 
immediately involved in dealing with European affairs, namely diplomats in Brussels and 
in the ministries of foreign affairs in national capitals and it traces the limits of the 
socialization process. It also approaches the question of how the perception of the 
distribution of power within the EU affects the process of socialization of national political 
elites (see also the methodological chapter).  
 
6.2. The Politics of National Identity 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania are both geographically and historically 
interconnected and this was one important reason for their selection as case studies. 
Throughout history, the fate of the Magyars, Slovaks, and Romanians (especially 
Romanians from Transylvania) was intertwined in a minority-majority and political and 
administrative domination-subordination relationships (see Map 1). 
It is not the point here to make an incursion into history, but it is important to recall 
the fact that the completion of the Romanian national state and the creation of 
Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the First World War coincided with the disintegration 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a classical example of realist international politics 
where the gain of one country results in the loss of other country. 
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Map 1. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, 191166 
 
 
Due to historical circumstance, but also as a result of a political agenda wilfully 
pursued by national elites, the process of nation building in the three countries presents 
important differences. Before the First World War, Hungary was politically centralized and 
ruled by a fiercely nationalist and almost exclusive Magyar elite, although the Hungarian 
population was only about half of the total population (Macartney 1937: 22-26, Taylor, 
1948: 185, cited in Brubaker, 1995: 195). The fact that Hungary was reduced to one third 
of territory and two-fifths of its population in favour of neighbouring countries (Brubaker, 
1995: 195) by the terms of the Treaty of Trianon (see Map 2) was deeply resented by all 
Hungarians as the most devastating tragedy in their history (Lendvai, 2003: 373). 
 
                                                
66The Map of Austria and Hungary in 1911 from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas at Austin, online http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/austria_hungary_1911.jpg  
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Map 2. Hungary Before and After the Treaty of Trianon (The Paris Peace Treaty, 1920)67  
 
 
At the same time, for the first time in history, Hungary became a more homogenous 
state, overwhelmingly inhabited by Magyars (see Map 3 for a contemporary map of CEE). 
In contrast, the ethnic composition of both Romania and Czechoslovakia became even 
more diverse than was the case before the war. The nationalistic policies pursued in both 
countries aimed to keep the newly acquired ethnic minorities down.68 These policies 
became truly effective only after the Second World War with the installation of communist 
regimes, greatly helped by the Soviet Union and the presence of the Red Army.  
The communist regimes attempted to replace the ideology of nation with the 
                                                
67 From Magyar Elektronikus Konyvtar, available online 
http://www.zum.de/whkmla/histatlas/eceurope/haxhungary.html, accessed on January 2010.  
68 In the case of Czechoslovakia the expulsion of Germans (mainly), but also Hungarians and others as a 
consequence of the Bene$ Decrees by striping them of citizenships and confiscating their properties was a 
peculiar expression of national policy in action. 
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ideology of a trans-national classless society. To a certain extent, the shift away from the 
politics of national identity was more salient in Hungary than in Romania or 
Czechoslovakia. As László Deme (1998: 307) explains, the political vision of Hungarian 
communists played down the importance of territory and the nationalism of the past was 
rejected in favour of good relations with the neighbouring socialist countries. This line of 
thinking is close to that characterizing the post-communist approach to foreign policy 
pursued by the Hungarian Socialist Party of Gyula Horn, Peter Medgyessy and Ferenc 
Gyurcsány. There is a certain degree of continuity between the approach of the Hungarian 
communist party and that of its predecessor, the Socialist Party.    
At the same time, the communists in Romania and Czechoslovakia were more 
inclined to pursue further the nationalist policies of the inter-war and pre-war periods as a 
mean of national consolidation. Katherine Verdery (1991) made an eloquent demonstration 
of the fact that the nationalist policy of the communist elite in Romania had deep 
intellectual roots dating back to the 17th Century. She argued (1991: 3: 100) that, far from 
getting rid of the national idea, national ideology was appropriated by the communist 
regime as a way of securing greater legitimacy (see also Chirot, 2005: 154). One important 
component of the idiosyncratic brand of Ceause&cu’s national Communism was the ethno-
nationalist rhetoric, directed primarily at the country’s Hungarian minority combined with 
a highly popular emphasis on foreign policy independence (Pop-Eleche!, 2008: 470). The 
national discourse was and still is accepted by almost all Romanians, therefore benefiting 
from a strong legitimacy (Verdery, 1991: 11). Nationalism is embedded into the ideologies 
of all political parties in various degrees and expressed with variable intensity (Pop, 2006: 
127). 
The situation in Czechoslovakia was even more complicated due to the nature of the 
relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations. The ideology of Czechoslovakism 
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implied the acceptance by the Slovaks of Czech priorities and values while the Slovak 
agenda played only a secondary role for the decision-makers in Prague (Shepherd, 2000: 
135). The Slovak identity was built not only against the Hungarians, but against the Czechs 
as well insofar as the Slovaks expected Czechoslovakia to be a common state for both 
Czechs and Slovaks while the Czechs saw it only as a Czech state (Auer, 2004: 143). For 
some authors, the official doctrine of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakism, had a truly 
hegemonic nature preventing Slovaks from asserting their own national identity and 
enjoying an equal role with the Czechs (Balzova, 1994).  
The short-lived Slovak state created during the Second World War (1939-1945) 
turned out to be seen by nationalist historians, mainly historians from the Diaspora, as the 
first independent Slovak state in modern times, a fact that would justify in itself a more 
relaxed attitude with regard to the accusations that it was only a puppet state of the Nazi 
regime in Germany (Findor, 2002: 195). This controversy surrounding Slovak 
historiography acquired more contending tonalities after the fall of communist regimes in 
CEE.  
The political regime of Vladimir Me"iar made extensive use of the nationalist 
interpretation of history, being repeatedly accused of abusing and distorting the past as a 
way of enhancing his political legitimacy. The first years of the newly born Slovak 
republic were characterized not only by state- and nation-building endeavours, but also by 
governmental-sponsored nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism (see Bútora et al., 
2003: 52, Carpenter, 1997: 212, Vachudova, 2005). However, as Stefan Auer pointed out 
(2004: 149), the arguments about the past reflected primarily the political aspiration of 
political elites with respect to the nation and the state in other CEE countries as well, such 
as Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and others. Again, it is not the aim of this thesis 
to map and discuss the controversies in the field of historiography in CEE, but it considers 
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that it is important to contextualise, even briefly, the political discourse with regard to the 
politics of national identity in the three countries.  
Map 3. Central and Eastern Europe in 200169 
 
 
The absence of the theme of national identity from the political discourse of 
Hungarian communist party was replaced in early 1990s by a vocal affirmation of it. In 
fact, the political discourse on national identity reflected two distinct political visions. One, 
                                                
69 The Map of Central Europe in 2001 from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas at Austin, online http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/central_europe_pol01.jpg  
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outspoken and assertive, was that of the right-wing political forces, mainly represented by 
politicians like József Antall and Victor Orbán. The other, resembling more the reluctant 
approach to the national question of the communist regime, was that promoted by the 
Socialist Party.  
The right-wing governments of József Antall and Péter Boross until 1994, and Viktor 
Orbán, between 1998 and 2002, were more interested in the fate of Hungarians living 
abroad, to a certain extent detrimental to the objective of good relations with the 
neighbourhood countries. This approach stirred up concerns among Hungary’s neighbours 
about the ‘hostile’ intentions of Budapest. Famous statements such as that at a rally of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, on 15th December 1990, when he declared that although he 
considered himself to be the Prime Minister of 10 million Hungarians, in spirit he wished 
to be the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians,70 could do nothing but to provoke 
angry reactions from Bucharest and Bratislava (as well as Belgrade). In fact, as Antall’s 
foreign minister Jeszenszky tried to make clear later on, these declarations had only 
paraphrased the provision of the Hungarian Constitution, which states under Art. 6(3) that  
‘the Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians 
living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with 
Hungary’71 (Jeszenszky, 2006, see also in Solyom and Brunner, 2000).  
 
Moreover, the Constitution also provides under Art 6(1) that  
‘The Republic of Hungary renounces war as a mean of solving disputes between 
nations and shall refrain from the use of force and the threat thereof against the 
independence or territorial integrity of other states.’72  
 
Even so, all attempts to provide assurances that Hungary would never seek to modify 
frontiers by force (Cottey, 1995, Kun, 1993, Schöpflin, 1993, Tism!neanu, 1993) were 
                                                
70 MTI Econews, December 15, 1990, ‘HDF National Rally - Antall's Speech’. 
71 The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Act XX of 1949 as revised and restated by Act XXXI of 
1989 as of 1 December 1989, presented as Annex in László Sólyom and Georg Brunner (2000) 
‘Constitutional judiciary in a new democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court’, Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
72 Ibid. 
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interpreted as implicit submission to the fact that, in extremis, the borders might be 
changed without recourse to force. Although this approach might suggest a sense of 
vulnerability in Bratislava and Bucharest vis-à-vis Budapest, the real target was the 
domestic audience. The nationalist parties in government in both Slovakia and Romania 
were encouraged by the pressures of Hungarian nationalists in their policy of national 
cohesion building (Dunay, 2004: 201). The nationalist forces needed each other; they 
needed a nationalist counterpart in a neighbourhood country as a way of self-identification 
through opposition with the ‘Other’. They exploited the ill-fated declarations coming from 
Hungary in order to secure internal popular support and to pursue their anti-minorities 
agendas while depicting the Hungarian ethnic minorities as a Trojan horse or fifth 
columnists (see also Haughton, 2005: 36). The pursuit of the ethno-nationalist agenda even 
led to an outburst of inter-ethnic violence in the Transylvanian city of Târgu Mure&, in 
March 1990.  
In contrast, the politics of national identity pursued by the left-wing government of 
Gyula Horn, in power between 1994 and 1998, emphasized the theme of good neighbourly 
relations  
‘...our foreign policy's most urgent task is to begin to eliminate the tensions which 
burden the relationship between Hungary and some of its neighbours (...). Without 
improving our relationship with our neighbours, we do not have a chance of 
promoting an improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minority living there or 
of promoting an assertion of their rights.’73  
 
The change of approach bore fruit; in March 1995 the basic treaty with Slovakia and 
in September 1996 with Romania were signed. 
The Hungarian Status Law promoted in 2001 by the FIDESZ government soured 
again the bilateral relations with neighbouring countries (Pittaway, 2003: 70, Waterbury, 
2006: 484). For many observers, the leaning of the right–wing Federation of Young 
                                                
73 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 16, 1994, ‘New Government Programme; Horn presents his 
government programme’. 
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Democrats coalition towards explicit nationalism was motivated more by populist 
domestic considerations rather than an intrinsic belief in and desire to support Hungarians 
living abroad (Vachudova, 2005: 151, Waterbury, 2006). For instance, on the eve of 
parliamentary elections in 2002, the then incumbent Prime Minister Orbán employed an 
identity-centred discourse, claiming that  
‘Fifty-four people out of one hundred say they are very proud to be Hungarian (…) 
Thirty-six out of one hundred say they are quite proud. Of course, there are those 
who say they are not proud to be Hungarian, but they will vote for another party.’74  
 
The competing perspectives on the national question, differentiated along ideological 
lines, confirm therefore the relevance of national political cleavages. However, in the case 
of Slovakia any discussion about the overlap between ideological cleavages and political 
visions of mainstream political parties has to take into account the newly acquired 
statehood of Slovakia and the obvious need to consolidate the state structure and the nation 
irrespective of the redistributive, neoliberal or conservative ideologies of these parties. 
Given this specific context, the main split on the national question is, on the one hand, that 
between the nationalist/radical nationalist parties and the moderate ones, and on the other 
hand, between the Slovak parties and that of the ethnic Hungarian minority. The relevance 
of the latter cleavage is best illustrated by the stance on Kosovo declaration of 
independence, discussed in the next chapter.  
The former cleavage is visible in the pattern of coalition government formation. The 
nationalist-populist parties formed the government for most of the time before 1998. The 
parliamentary elections on June 2006, led to the replacement of the centre-right coalition 
government of Mikulá$ Dzurinda with a new government formed around a new political 
party, Direction-Social Democracy (SMER-SD, Smer–sociálna demokracia), created by 
Robert Fico, who became the Prime Minister. The new cabinet also included the .S-
                                                
74 The New York Times, April 7, 2002, Premier Plays to Hungarian Pride, and Far Right. 
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HZDS75 and the SNS, both governing political parties during the Me"iar era. Their return 
as governing parties was received with concern in Europe, as well as in Hungary, worried 
about the fortunes of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.76 
The return of the SNS, as a partner in the coalition government, offered a more 
visible platform for the SNS leaders to express offensive political statements targeting the 
Hungarian minority and often the Hungarian government itself. It pitted the SNS against 
the Hungarian Coalition Party, the two organizations which were created to respond to 
national and ethnic concerns (Malová and U"e', 2007). This situation was aggravated by 
the reservation of Prime Minister Fico to distance himself and the government from the 
radical views expressed by Ján Slota, the chairman of the SNS or other members of the 
party. Moreover, the attitude of the Prime Minister himself suggested on various occasions 
that he does not disagree with the positions expressed by his coalition partners, even if this 
might have been a political calculation aimed at preserving the coalition’s stability 
(Malova and U"e', 2009: 1103). This situation was a continuous source of tension 
affecting the bilateral relations between the two countries and reinforcing the extremists’ 
camps both in Slovakia and Hungary.  
This cleavage is also relevant in the case of Romanian politics, although the radical 
nationalist parties lost ground during the last few years. According to Pop-Eleche& (2008: 
471), the quest for greater domestic and external credibility led PDSR to avoid a costly 
political alliance with the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM, Partidul România 
Mare) and to govern between 2000-2004 with the parliamentary support of the Democratic 
                                                
75 In March 2000, HZDS changed its name into the 'People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia' 
(.S-HZDS, .udová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko). 
76 The association of SMER with SNS led the Party of European Socialists to decide in October 2006, a few 
months after the inauguration of the new cabinet in Bratislava, to provisionally suspend SMER’s 
membership on the grounds of breaking the PES’s code regarding respect for human rights, especially the 
rights of ethnic minorities, and commitments to democracy. See PES, October 2006, ‘SMER suspended from 
PES political family’, online http://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family, viewed in 
July 2009.   
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Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. Although the PRM, the main extreme right party, 
recorded a historic peak in the previous years, being the second largest political party in 
the Parliament in the legislature in 2000-2004 and the third between 2004 and 2008 (in 
both cases it was an opposition party), it failed to get enough votes to pass the 5% 
threshold in the 2008 Parliamentary elections.77 This may also suggest the erosion of the 
electoral appeal of the nationalist discourse. In fact, not the fading away of the nationalist 
appeal is the main reason, but the fact that other political actors, such as the incumbent 
president Traian B!sescu, appropriated themes of the moderate nationalist discourse 
weakening the radical nationalist forces.  
At the same time, the fact that the political organization of ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania became directly involved or indirectly supporting the coalition cabinets of the 
last decade, as well the erosion of the electoral base of autochthonous nationalist parties 
and their marginalisation towards the fringes of the political spectrum, greatly contributed 
to the emergence of a convenient modus vivendi between the Romanian majority and 
Hungarian minority. The UDMR played a constructive role in the political process, either 
supporting the cabinet in the Parliament or directly participating in the coalition 
governments with political parties of both left and right ideological orientation (with the 
exceptions of radical right). It was certainly helped by its ideological flexibility, interested 
first and foremost in its ethnic agenda. The fact that politicians of the ethnic Hungarian 
party became a mundane presence closely associated with the government had the effect of 
diminishing the perception that UDMR is a threatening and hostile force posing a 
significant risk to Romanian national identity.  
In all three countries examined in this thesis, historical experiences are reflected in 
the way in which the discourse about national identity is framed. Although the 
                                                
77 PRM polled 19.48% of the votes in 2000, representing 126 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate 
and 12.92% in 2004, representing 45 deputies and senators.  
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interpretation of the past is a highly subjective experience contingent on the individual who 
contemplates upon it, historical facts themselves have a constraining effect over the range 
of options available. The multi-ethnic character of the Romanian and Czechoslovak states 
after the First World War was associated with a nationalist discourse, motivated by the 
need to strengthen the state. This type of discourse used history as a mean to legitimise the 
status quo and was a powerful political tool of mass mobilization and electoral support. It 
was successively employed by the inter-war governments, as well as the communist78 and 
post-communist governments, irrespective of the very different ideological backgrounds 
and historical contexts.  
In Hungary by contrast, the presence of kin-Magyar peoples in the neighbourhood 
countries was the incentive for a twofold discourse and distinct foreign policy priorities 
(see also the next chapter). The conservatives have appropriated the idea of the need for a 
more assertive national policy towards the neighbours (trying to press for greater minority 
rights). The socialists embraced a more ‘European’ approach, centred on the idea of 
compromise and conciliation.   
The manner in which the national discourse is used in the domestic political 
competition is a mixture of instrumental reasons (e.g. as a way of seeking electoral 
support) and genuine belief. The important role that political socialization plays in shaping 
the popular feelings and attitudes towards the nation, state or the political regime in the 
CEE region is well documented; it is not the aim of this thesis to examine this aspect in 
particular. However, what is worth pointing out is the fact that the process of European 
integration is also a process of re-socialization into the rules and norms of a new political 
community. Insofar as most exposed to these norms and rules is the political and 
administrative elite most immediately interacting with the EU, the latest section of this 
                                                
78 A different opinion is that the communist regime in Czechoslovakia had pursued a rather flexible policy 
towards the Hungarians minority (Batt, 1996: 19) 
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chapter examines in more detail the process of socialization. Before that, however, the next 
section briefly explores how the national discourses captured and reflected the issue of 
European identity.   
 
6.3. The European Identity Discourse 
In all three countries examined in this thesis, the discursive identification with 
Europe was a constitutive element of the overall strategy of European integration. The 
‘discursive identification’ does not refer to public opinion in a broader sense or to popular 
self-perception, but to the official position as expressed by high-level political actors. This 
does not mean that the two are disconnected; on the contrary, the official political 
discourse targets public opinion or specific target groups seeking greater legitimacy. It is a 
powerful tool giving voice to diffuse fears and concerns.   
The discourse on Europe might be seen from two distinct points of view. One 
perspective treats the accession from a rationalist and instrumental point of view, where 
the EU is seen merely as the common market providing economic advantages to its 
members. The other viewpoint sees the EU as much more than an economic project; it is 
about a political community based on shared norms and values. As Adam Michnik (2001) 
pointed out, this discourse contained an idealisation of both the practice and theoretical 
foundation of the EU, one that portrayed Europe in opposition with the Communist past, 
‘…freedom instead of servitude, open borders and legality instead of the Berlin Wall and 
preventive censorship’. 
The identification with Europe in the official discourse had two major functions. One 
function was to legitimate the claims of the CEE countries that they have the right to be 
members of Western organizations (see also Hosu, 2002: 8, Schimmelfennig, 2001: 68-9). 
This function suggests an instrumental use of the discourse, one designed to bring about 
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tangible benefits. The other function was to map the geography of belongings and 
exclusions; Central and Eastern European countries are Europeans, belong to Europe and 
are different from the non-European Other (irrespective of which entity or idea embodied 
the image of the Other).  
During the 1990s, the main themes revolved around the attempts to prove 
Europeanness, a shared heritage of culture and history, a common destiny and faith. This 
type of discourse had some inherent inconsistencies and contradictions. Emphasis is placed 
upon the historical continuity of the nation in Europe. Implicit in this type of discourse is 
the fact that continuity and temporality renders any supplementary claim about innate 
Europenness obsolete. Yet, the insecurity that marked the pre-accession period proved an 
important incentive in favour of a discourse centred on the linkage between the present and 
the past.  
In the words of Victor Orbán,  
‘For in Hungary it was exactly 103 years ago in 1896 that we first had a millennium. 
This was when we Hungarians celebrated the thousandth anniversary of our settling 
down in Europe after a long migration westward.79  
 
In the case of Slovakia, the heritage of the past is evoked in the very Prologue of the 
Constitution:  
‘Bearing in mind the political and cultural heritage of our predecessors, the 
experience gained through centuries of struggle for our national existence, and 
statehood…Mindful of the spiritual bequest of Cyril and Methodius, and the 
historical legacy of Great Moravia…’.  
 
The Europeanness of Romania is proved with reference to the idea that Romanians 
are the descendants of the Roman legions and Dacian tribes (for a discussion on the 
Latiness of Romania, see Boia, 2001b: 28-58); hence, their Latinness proves their 
Europeanness (see former Foreign Minister Mele&canu, 1995: 5, quoted in Hosu, 2002: 9).  
                                                
79 Speech of Prime Minister Victor Orbán, ‘Hungary at the turn of the Millennium’, 29 October 1999.  
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The continuity in Europe is one of the main arguments, although not the only one, 
for the Europeanness of these countries, justifying their right of membership to Western 
European organizations. Another one is the theme of ‘sacrifice’. A recurrent argument in 
CEE countries is that these countries protected Western Europe from the threats coming 
from the East, such as the Ottoman Empire. This topic is also associated with the self-
perception of these countries as borders, belonging to Europe and separate from non-
Europe. Again, as the former Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán put it,  
‘We spent a large part of the past 1,000 years defending Western Europe from the 
Turkish Ottoman Empire's westward expansion. The Turks never got to Europe. 
Hungary on the contrary suffered Turkish rule for 150 years’.80  
 
However, on the idea of borders, the vision of the socialist Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány departs significantly, he making the case that: 
’Hungary’s borders are not required to be defended either in the east or in the west, 
because as a result of historical changes since the end of the cold war all direct 
external threats have been eliminated. Therefore, modern security policy is not about 
protecting our borders but about protecting our national interests in the broader 
sense. And these latter must be represented far away from our borders many 
times.’81 
 
Similarly, in the case of Romania, the national imagery represented Romanians as 
defenders of Europe against the Turks, suffering and being held back by this struggle to 
protect the West. The West, therefore, was conceived as having a debt to pay to Romania; 
Western organizations had to accept Romania as a member due to this historical liability 
(Boia, 2001a: 155-6). 
At the same time, the discourse on Europe changed as the distance between the 
hopeful candidates and their accession target shrank. The justificatory and idealistic 
themes characterizing the pre-accession period were replaced with a discourse dominated 
by the topic of the search for direction and redefinition of identity coupled with the more 
                                                
80 Ibid.  
81 The Abridged Version of the Annual Foreign Policy Review by the Prime Minister, March 2007. 
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pragmatic topic of the need to augment the benefits of European integration. The search for 
a new identity was well summarized by the former Prime Minister Orbán when he spoke 
about the need for change:  
‘The following picture emerges all the same: Hungary is inhabited by a small nation 
belonging to East-Central Europe. The Hungarian people are hardworking (…) 
provided it does its homework, as it has been doing up to now, by the way, it might 
even graduate to become a member of the European Union…Although it is somewhat 
better than the image of goulash Communism, it is still nothing to be particularly 
proud of, and it rarely touches the soul. I believe that, before accession to the 
European Union, it would be good to create an image of Hungary which not only has 
more life to it, but which is also positively vibrant with life’ (Prime Minister Orbán 
quoted in Kosztolányi, 2001). 
 
Arguably, the return to the topic of national interest came to compensate for the lack 
of vision of what is or should be the contemporary national identity within the European 
context. Although there is no longer a need to build bridges over time to prove the fact of 
belonging to Europe, the past still features high on the political discourse. Perhaps the most 
visible example is the negotiation tactic of the Polish government with regard to the voting 
weight in the EU Council during the German Presidency of the EU. The use of the 
counterfactual reasoning about the potential demographic size of Poland in the absence of 
the losses suffered during the Second World War was shocking for other policy-makers in 
the EU and highlighted a lack of understanding (willingly or not) about the culture of 
compromise that characterizes European diplomacy. For some diplomats this behaviour 
goes directly against the model of historical reconciliation between France and Germany 
that is fundamental for the European integration project (Swoboda, 2008: 15). The use of 
negative historical experience in contemporary politics is so damaging and dangerous that 
is should be banned:  
‘so, you should forget, you should close the past saying that our accession date is 
year zero and we start a new life. And we forget all bad things back in the past’ 
(interview Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008). 
 
However, this type of discourse is directed towards a secondary audience, namely the 
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national community. In fact, this audience is more important for political parties competing 
in national elections than the international audience. While the topic of Europeanness 
faded away, the themes of national politics still feature high in the competing political 
discourses. As some observers pointed out, post-accession developments in the new 
member states from CEE is a return to populism (Swoboda, 2008: 11) which is closely 
linked to questions of national identity. 
The political discourse on Europe in the CEE countries was dominated during the 
last two decades by a major theme, the so-called ‘return to Europe’. The fact is that this 
political discourse is in itself a manifestation of identity redefinition and reassertion in 
CEE countries. In some cases, this discourse was also the expression of an identity crisis, 
manifested in the difficulty of balancing the burden of the past, the pressing constraints and 
opportunities of the present, and the search for a project for the future. One may argue that 
the difficulties of the present were overcome by the promise of a prosperous future, the 
future being defined in terms of reintegration in the Western political, economic and 
security structures. The question is whether economic prosperity is enough to give 
direction to ‘the search for a usable past’ or to the aspiration to make sense of historical 
experiences in manners that unify rather than separate, by including triumph alongside 
failure and fulfilment alongside frustration.82  
The next section moves the focus from the broad discussion on the politics of 
national and European identity to the more specific topic of how the experience of dealing 
directly with the EU affected group identity and self-perception of the community of 
foreign policy-makers.   
 
 
                                                
82 This formulation is inspired by the programme of the Carnegie Council conference "The Search for a 
Usable Past’, October 10, 2001, online http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/716.html.  
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6.4. Socialization, learning, and power 
The assumption of this chapter is that the Europeanization of identities and interests 
might result in a normative shift from a traditional intergovernmental logic of defending 
and promoting the interests of the state to a post-national understanding that the national 
interest is better served by a cooperative and consensus-seeking approach to foreign policy. 
In order to see whether this is the case, this section looks at the extent to which the experts 
and diplomats from the Permanent Representations hold different views on the aims and 
means of EU foreign policy from those in the capitals.  
The two indicators of this normative shift are: a) the way in which policy-makers 
perceive and act according to the EU procedural norms and rules; and b) the supranational 
versus intergovernmental preferences of national policy-makers. In other words, the more 
positive the views the national officials have on the norms of compromise, consensus 
seeking, avoidance of hard bargaining and respect for other member states’ domaines 
réservés, the more socialised they are. Likewise, the preference for collective action at 
European level instead of foreign policy action conducted mainly in national terms or 
outside EU channels is an indicator of socialization. 
The mechanism whereby national representatives learn the norms and rules 
characterizing the EU foreign policy culture is social learning. The indicator of the 
successful process of socialization is the internalisation by domestic actors of new norms 
and beliefs, which lead them to redefine their interests and identities, shifting their pattern 
of behaviour (Börzel and Cichowski, 2003: 12). In other words, their preferences and 
behaviour are being Europeanized.  
The process of the transfer of norms and rules is mediated by the existence of the so-
called norm entrepreneurs who are agents having a strong sense of appropriate behaviour 
in their community (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58-9, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896, 
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Sedelmeier, 2006: 13). The norm entrepreneurs are those policy-makers directly involved 
and the most exposed to EU norms and rules, such as the experts and diplomats from the 
permanent representations in Brussels (PermReps), as well as those from the relevant 
European departments in the MFA.  
Apart from the question of whether socialization follows an appropriation or 
instrumental path, another question relates to the fact that Europeanization as socialization 
depends to an important extent on the way in which the foreign policy elite perceives the 
distribution of power within the EU. From a formal point of view, full EU membership 
grants an equal right to all members. In reality, the views from CEE, as well as from other 
old but small member states, may highlight a different picture, one in which the large old 
member states are still more influential in the political process and in the design and 
conduct of any given policy. The perception of inequality may well impact upon the 
socialization of policy makers from the new member states. The internalization of the 
norms of compromise and consensus seeking might well be undermined if the perception 
of the national representatives is that the policy-making process reflects the balance of 
power among the member states. In this case, their policy preferences would mirror the 
instrumental view of how power is exercised (see also the previous chapter, p. 98 and 113). 
 
i) Learning  
The process of learning is discussed here with regard to two aspects: temporality and 
scope. Temporality refers to the starting point or period since when the national officials 
became part of the learning environment and were exposed to learning conditions. The 
scope of learning refers to the range of learning issues and addresses three aspects: a) 
learning policy issues; b) learning the formal rules and c) learning informal norms 
regulating the conduct of national officials in the Council of the EU. 
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With regard to the first aspect, the process of learning characterized the first contacts 
between national officials and the EU. The learning process started before the formal 
accession, during the period when the candidates were observers to the EU institutions. 
The status of ‘active observer’ is granted to the future members covering the period 
between the signing and ratification of the accession treaties. Hungary and Slovakia were 
observers for one year, between April 2003 and May 2004. For Romania, this was over 
one and a half years, between April 2005 and December 2006. As observers, the soon-to-
be members had the right to participate in all working groups and committees at the EU 
Council level, to observe and familiarize themselves with working procedures. The term 
‘active’ means that the new national representatives were allowed to express views and 
comments without having formal decision-making rights.  
The experience accumulated by experts from different ministries during the 
accession talks allowed them to grasp a good understanding of negotiations practices with 
representatives of the European Commission and of the acquis communautaire (or 
political) in their specific sectors of expertise. These people were the first choice for 
appointment by national ministries to the PermReps, because of this experience. However, 
since the PermRep deals mainly with the Council, they came across a completely different 
working style and organizational culture (interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest 2008). For 
some national officials, this experience recalled past memories from school and the 
endeavour to learn new things (interview, Brussels, December 2007). This view is shared, 
in one way or another, by most people that had participated, even on a sporadic basis, in 
the meetings within the Council, either being from the PermRep or the MFA at either 
senior or junior diplomatic level.  
The shared perception of the national officials from the new member states is mostly 
positive with regard to their insertion into the new environment. Asked about this aspect, 
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most interviewees expressed positive statements, the environment in the Council being 
described by terms such as ‘family’, ‘friendly’, or ‘good company’. As an interviewee in 
Brussels recalled, ‘…it is a class-like atmosphere, like school children, we are sometimes 
joking…’. The general feeling is that the representatives of the old member states were 
very helpful in accommodating the newcomers in the new setting. Besides the warm 
reception from the old member states, another facilitating factor for the easy adaptation 
was the presence of fellow negotiators from other new member states, with whom they had 
been in contact during the years of accession talks (interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 
2008).  
At the same time, it seems that the views on the new environment depend to a certain 
extent on previous diplomatic or professional experience. The national officials formerly 
posted in embassies in different countries and those seconded directly from the capital to 
the EU have a more appreciative view with regard to the operational environment within 
various working groups and committees of the EU Council. Conversely, for diplomats 
previously posted to positions in other international organizations, the EU is not so 
different in terms of working style and ambiance. For instance, one diplomat who had been 
posted to the OSCE in Vienna, having the experience of dealing with both organizations, 
did not find that the environment differs significantly. At the same time, he remarked that 
what makes the EU different is the community of values such as liberal democracy and 
rule of law shared by all participant countries and their national representatives. By 
contrast, this is not the case in an organization like the OSCE, where national officials 
representing liberal democracies are working together with those from authoritarian or 
illiberal political regimes. In this case, it may be argued that the novelty of the new 
environment is a facilitating factor for the socialization of the national officials as indicated 
by their positive versus neutral or negative views on this matter. 
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Learning the policy 
With regard to the scope of learning, this refers mainly to three aspects: the policy 
itself, the procedural issues, and the informal practices. What makes the first aspect 
peculiar is that, at first sight, it is rather counter-intuitive. Why is learning the policy a 
matter that some of the interviewees considered important to highlight? Common sense 
would indicate that knowing the policy is crucial. Officials designated to represent their 
national governments in the headquarters of international organizations should be well 
acquainted with the policy area they are expected to deal with. They should have come 
from home with the homework done.  
Instead, a learning-by-doing process unfolded. The starting point is that, as one 
diplomat pointed out,  
‘… you have to learn the policy of these regions, the EU’s policy towards Latin 
America, and your country policy towards Latin America’ (Interview, Brussels, 
December 2007).  
 
One possible explanation is that during the observer stage, due to the limited number 
of staff, national representatives were given multiple responsibilities at the same time, 
facing difficulties in familiarizing and keeping-up-date to all these new policy areas. One 
diplomat recalled that being one of the first to arrive in June 2003, he had to attend 
different geographical working groups, and only once some other colleagues arrived from 
capital he was able to focus on specific issues (interview, Brussels, 2007). The learning 
process involved the self-analysis of the country’s own priorities and positions within the 
EU framework; also, what level of representation in terms of diplomatic rank and 
experience best serves the interests of the country across the priority areas. 
Another aspects that might explain why EU-specific policies had to be learned is the 
lack of interest towards areas outside the traditional remit of national foreign policy. The 
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limited interest does not translate only into a lack of awareness towards these regions, but 
also about EU objectives and instruments. Even for diplomats familiar with the political 
and economic dynamic in these regions due to previous postings in embassies overseas for 
instance, the EU’s way of doing business was difficult to grasp at first. As one national 
official commented,  
‘…it involves a lot of learning, it is a very difficult time. You also have to be very 
flexible and when you are completely new, you do not know where they are talking 
about what’ (Interview, Brussels, 2007).  
 
At the same time, the process of learning is rewarding, in the sense that ‘it is like 
achieving the degree at the university’ (interview, Brussels, December 2007).  
 
Learning the formal rules of conduct  
Apart from learning the substance of policy itself, the rules of the games were the 
subject of the learning process. On the one hand, it is about the formal norms regulating 
the conduct of national officials within the EU Council. This type of formal rules refers to 
the working methods and standard operating procedures within the Council. Historically, 
these rules have been subject to numerous reviews and amendments in order to reflect both 
the pressures coming from the expansion of the EU scope of activity as well as the 
enlargement (Best and Pierpaolo, 2008: 42).  
While it is not the aim of this chapter to provide an overview of these rules (for 
further details, see Best et al., 2008, also Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, Nedergaard, 
2007: 139-80, Sherrington, 2000, Spence, 2005: 18-37), it is important to highlight the 
difference between the formal and informal norms regulating the conduct of national 
officials in the EU Council. The formal rules were laid out in the Council’s Rules of 
Procedures adopted on September 2006 (Council of the European Union, 2006), which 
incorporated the amended ‘Working methods for an enlarged Council. Code of Conduct’ 
(henceforth the Code), drafted in March 2003, on the eve of Eastern Enlargement (Council 
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of the European Union, 2003). These rules target the preparation for and conduct of 
Council’s meetings.  
With regard to the preparation of meetings, the Code recommended that only those 
positions having a reasonable prospect of progress be submitted to the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) (art. 1). It also proposed that the rotating 
Presidency should advance the work between meetings by consulting the national 
delegations and asking them to set up positions in written form in advance of forthcoming 
meetings (art. 2-3). Likewise, there is the rule that COREPER shall avoid going over 
ground already covered in the preparation of its proceedings (art. 4).  
With the aim of rationalising the conduct of meetings, the Code proposed several 
rules concerning agenda management, the role of the presidency and the behaviour of 
delegates. For instance, the Code recommended against placing items on the agenda for 
information or presentation purposes (art. 6-7). In order to balance the ‘increased demand 
for speaking time from delegations’ with the limited ‘supply of meeting time’, the Code put 
forward four rules to keep the length of meetings manageable by focusing on the conduct 
of national officials in the meeting. The four behavioural rules are as follows: a) 
eliminating full table rounds (art. 13); b) like-minded delegations should hold consultations 
in view of presenting a single, common position (art. 14); c) expressing concrete drafting 
proposal rather than simply disagreeing with particular proposals (art. 15); and d) not 
repeating points already made in the meeting (art. 17) (Council of the European Union, 
2003).  
The formal norms were purposefully designed to streamline the decision-making 
process. While the norm of prior consultation was already included in the formal 
requirements regulating the conduct of national representatives, the norms of consensus-
seeking, trust, reciprocity, mutual responsiveness, respect for other member states’ 
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domaines réservés and the prohibition against hard bargaining emerged as unintended 
consequences of previous decades of interaction and cooperation in the foreign policy 
field. These informal norms have given substance to what was coined as the EU’s ‘culture 
of compromise’.  
 
Learning the informal norms of EU’s ‘culture of compromise’  
The practical use of the norms of compromise and consensus seeking was grasped by 
the representatives of new member states for instance in working group meetings 
discussing, paragraph-by-paragraph, various documents. As one senior official recalled,  
‘particularly when there is a text that has to be adopted at the end of the day then 
has to be a debate and some time there is a long, long debate about the wording or 
the text, whether it be Council’s conclusions or European Council’s conclusions. 
These are very tough debates’ (interview, Hungarian MFA, Budapest, 2008).  
 
The high density of meetings at different levels facilitated the process of learning. 
For instance, COREPER83 meets regularly once a week, the PSC holds meetings twice a 
week and various other working groups have similar frequency of meetings (for detailed 
accounts, see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006, Nugent, 2006).  
The outcome is a relative increase in the level of mutual trust. In this context, mutual 
trust is not an absolute concept; it refers to the expectations that representatives of other 
member states play according to the same rules. To know what is the position of other 
member states on specific issues is directly connected to the process of consultation and of 
mutual responsiveness. Regular telephone contacts with other national representatives in 
Brussels became part of the day-to-day working methods of new member states as well. 
Likewise, the policy of alliance formations was another issue to learn. It is a common 
                                                
83 In fact COREPER meets in two formations. The COREPER 1 consists of deputy ambassadors of the 
member states in Brussels and deals with the issues under the first pillar. The COREPER 2 consists of the 
ambassadors of the Permanent Representations in Brussels and deals with political affairs, institutional 
affairs and foreign and security matters. 
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feature in the Council diplomacy that member states try to secure the support of other 
countries in presenting their own position as an expression of common European interest. 
In fact, this practice prompted some scholars to claim that a national position is 
‘Europeanised’ by being inserted to the Council’s agenda and transformed into a European 
matter.84 New member states were soon asked to give their support to one initiative or 
another, or at least not to oppose it. It also soon became evident that with the exception of 
a few strategic issues, there was no clear pattern of coalition formation, which tended to be 
temporary and topic based. 
In terms of the areas of special concern or domaines réservées, the remarks of the 
interviewee quoted above with regard to the EU’s and his own country policy towards 
Latin America is relevant in this context too. This example was not used accidentally. 
Latin America is not a top priority for CEE states although it is an area of greater concern 
for the Iberian-Lusitanian countries for instance. As the following chapter discusses, the 
primary concern for the CEE countries is mostly regional in scope (e.g. Western Balkans 
or the EU Eastern vicinity), although their involvement in the US-led war on terror 
expanded the remit of foreign policy to Afghanistan and Iraq, far away from the traditional 
zones of interest. On the other hand, as suggested by some interviewees, the limited scope 
of foreign policy implies specialisation and niche expertise. The narrow specialisation is 
equated in this context with added value; a significant contribution of the CEE states to EU 
foreign policy resides in this local or regional expertise. This view is often expressed in 
high-level political speeches regarding the relationship between the national foreign 
policies and the European foreign policy. This aspect is examined in more detail in the 
next chapter.  
To defend the national position at expert working group level refers for instance to 
                                                
84 As previously mentioned, this thesis does not adhere to this bottom-up view of Europeanization. 
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negotiate the content of a document that is proposed for adoption by the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council and eventually endorsed by the European Council. Usually, 
a document or proposal goes through hierarchical layers of expertise and decision and 
suffers substantive interventions at a lower level of policy-making. At the working group 
level, the discussions have a technical character and revolved often around language and 
the way ideas are formulated. This is a time-consuming process, leading to many hours or 
repeated meetings dedicated to the same document. The document proposed by the 
Council General Secretariat for instance is read paragraph by paragraph, each member 
states expressing its view – or abstaining in case of agreement with the proposed 
formulation. The implication of spending many hours discussing the formal language in a 
document is that once it is adopted by the Council it becomes ‘agreed language’ and, as in 
a feed-back-loop, it will be evoked when negotiating other documents or proposals at the 
working group level. Hence, the importance of acting at initial stages (Kassim and Peters, 
2001: 314). 
At the same time, although attending long meetings in the Justus Lipsius building 
(the headquarter of the Council of Ministers) facilitated the learning process, this does not 
automatically imply that the new national delegates have a positive view on the working 
style in the Council. Too long and unnecessary talks, lasting for half a day and sometimes 
going late into the night were perceived as completely ineffective, a waste of time which 
could hardly be afforded in a meeting of a national cabinet (interview, Eduard Kukan, 
Bratislava, 2008). Not only the length of meetings, but also the content of the items on the 
agenda was a matter of discontent. As a senior national official summed up,  
‘we are working every day with such small details, invisible for normal citizens … is 
complicated, insane … we are discussing such small points that have no real 
influence to the real world and we don’t have time for philosophical discussion 
about the future of the European Union’ (interview, Brussels, December 2007). 
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Occasionally, the coming of a minister from the capital in order to attend a Council 
meeting may result in utter disappointment in the sense that most policy issues were 
already sorted out at COREPER level. Although usually there are sensitive political 
matters left for national ministers to address, on which the ambassadors could not agree in 
COREPER, it is also common that these matters are more important for some countries 
than for others. In such a scenario, for many ministers pressed by more urgent businesses 
back home, to attend a long meeting in Brussels is simply considered a waste of time 
(Interview, Peter Balázs, Budapest, 2008).  
The fact that in many cases the length of a meeting is the result of the competing 
views and preferences of only a limited number of participants is negatively resented by 
those less interested but nevertheless obliged to take part in the meeting. It is not surprising 
that facing this type of situation, some national representatives are simply adopting various 
self-defence mechanisms: writing up reports during the meeting, reading other documents, 
adopting passive attitudes, even getting drowsy. Therefore, the view that in a Union with 
27 member states the house-keeping rules are necessary and beneficial is widely shared. 
The fact that the too time-consuming and ineffective practice of the tour de table was 
scrapped and replaced by the rule of speaking up only when one disagrees or wants to 
amend a proposal and to keep the time of intervention as short as possible is considered 
beneficial (various interviews, 2007-2008).  
However, these situations have the effect of rendering the national representatives 
irrelevant with potential long-term negative implications for the legitimacy and 
acceptability of Council’s decisions. As Stephan Keukeleire remarked (2007: 10), there is 
a psychological effect on the national foreign ministries since the foreign ministers are not 
used to and do not like to feel irrelevant. The possible implication is that the member states 
might seek alternative fora to promote their foreign policy goals such as other international 
167 
organizations or ad-hoc like-minded groups of countries (Keukeleire, 2007: 6). 
 
ii) Norm entrepreneurs or merely agents of national interest? 
Learning is an ongoing process, although its most visible component is acquiring 
new knowledge. The previous section illustrated that several years of interaction within the 
framework of EU policy and decision-making in Brussels had certainly produced the 
outcome of learning formal rules and the norms of EU culture of compromise. At the same 
time, there is a mixed picture with regard to whether the new national representatives were 
socialised according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ or they have simply learnt the new 
norms and rules and behave in an instrumental, rational manner, according to the ‘logic of 
consequentiality’. 
The distinction between the two types of socialization of national officials has 
important consequences with regard to their role as norms entrepreneurs. In order to play 
this role, the national representatives in Brussels need to be genuinely committed to 
pressing their colleagues in the foreign affairs ministries to adopt this new normative 
agenda (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 914). However, the distinction between the two 
groups of officials, those in Brussels and those in the three capitals, is not a clear-cut one. 
The assumption of this chapter was that there is a qualitative difference between the 
national officials in Brussels and their colleagues back home with regard to the depth of 
the socialization process. In fact, the group boundaries are blurred due to the rotation of 
staff between the ministries of foreign affairs and the PermReps.  
Some of the diplomats who worked at the PermReps in Brussels in the early stages 
had already retuned home while their place was being taken by newcomers. The direct 
experience of dealing with the Council’s working groups and committees and interacting 
routinely with other national representatives is different from that of the senior or junior 
168 
officials coming only occasionally from national capitals to Brussels. The fact that the 
diplomatic teams of PermReps have a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of 
the developments in Brussels is widely accepted in their respective capital cities. Their 
return at the end of the mandate represents a valuable transfer of knowledge, skills, and 
understandings back home. 
In all three PermReps examined, only a few diplomats or national officials with 
equivalent ranks are still part of the staff. Most of them returned in the MFA or were 
detached to other international organizations (IOs) or embassies abroad. While the number 
of staff dealing with external relations and security issues witnessed an overall increase 
during the last few years, only a few of them were part of the team when their countries 
became formal members of the EU. The practice of rotation of diplomatic personnel is a 
regular convention in most countries, being designed to avoid narrow specialization. At the 
same time, the long term exposure is a facilitating factor in the process of gradually 
adopting norms and values specific to the national or international location where the 
diplomats are stationed (Beyers, 2007: 100).  It is not at all clear whether the length of time 
spent in Brussels was enough for the national officials already re-deployed elsewhere or 
returned home to genuinely adopt the norms of the EU culture of compromise and 
consensus–seeking. 
Looking at both the PermReps and the MFAs, more similarities than differences can 
be noticed with regard to the perception of EU norms. Although the importance of these 
norms is accepted, the manner in which the national officials in the capitals as well as in 
Brussels acquiesce to this fact reflects a certain degree of scepticism. As illustrated above, 
the working style in the Council is an object of criticism. The consultation is important 
insofar as the exchange of information helps formulating policy positions in a constructive 
way, likely to be accepted by the rest of the countries.  
169 
Similarly, the norm of compromise is not seen as inherently positive, but as a 
necessary tool in order to avoid a stalemate of the policy and political process. Some 
interviewees converge in pointing out that  
‘You always have to keep in mind that there isn’t just the national position that you 
have to think about, but of course there is the overall position or the overall interest 
of the community that you are member of’ (interview, Budapest, June 2008).  
 
However, the other side of the coin is that compromising in Brussels may incur 
undesired costs and sanctions back home. The opposition parties are scrutinizing carefully 
the activity of the incumbent government and are eager to use any chance to criticize the 
cabinet for not defending strongly enough the national interest in Brussels. The same is 
true for other domestic actors, such as mass media, industry, and so on.  
At the same time, the norm of respecting other member states’ domaines réservées 
does not stir up too much enthusiasm either. To a certain extent even, this norm is 
perceived as a reflection of the distribution of power within the EU and as a way of 
guarding national key interests. Instead of a genuine support, the norm of domaines 
réservées is rather perceived in terms of bargaining and trade-off. Although there is also 
the informal norm of prohibition against hard bargaining, the everyday practice shows that 
soft forms of bargaining are used alongside consultation and compromise.    
There is a tacit understanding of the fact that member states have different interests 
in different regions and that it is legitimate to pursue these interests. However, the support 
is conditioned, although not in an outspoken manner. The trade-off rests on the mutual 
support lent by member states to each other in order to further their own sets of objectives 
as part of the wide umbrella of EU foreign policy. For the southern countries, the 
Mediterranean is of major interest, for the Scandinavian countries the Baltic Sea and 
Russia is important and so on. The UK and France are probably the only two EU member 
states still harbouring global ambitions, owing to their colonial past. One diplomat 
170 
summarised this idea as follows: 
‘Now we have Eufor Chad85… maybe starting mid January and then during the 
Portuguese, we’ll be aware that Guinea Bissau is very important … so you see that 
ex-colonies are showing up as potential EU missions, and of course this is fine, we 
understand it is fine, we would like to help them, but we would like to help also our 
neighbours and our priority countries (interview, Brussels, 2007). 
 
The preponderant instrumental perception of EU norms makes the national 
representatives in Brussels unlikely candidates for performing the role of norms 
entrepreneurs in relation to their colleagues in the foreign affairs ministries and other 
officials responsible for the management and coordination of European affairs. This does 
not mean, however, that they do not exercise a significant influence over the formulation 
of policy in the capital. The important role played by PermReps is widely accepted by 
experts in the capital, especially those in the MFA (various interviews, Budapest, 
Bratislava, Bucharest 2008). Due to their specific position, the national representatives in 
Brussels had simultaneously to defend the national interests at the EU level and to mediate 
between the EU and the capital, in a two-level-game logic (Putnam, 1988).  
In a study concerning the national coordination of European affairs by the EU 
member states in Brussels, Kassim (2001: 34-6) identified a list of what he coined as 
‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ functions the PermReps usually perform. The upstream 
functions refer to the influence of the formulation of EU policy by the national 
representatives in Brussels. The downstream functions refer to the channels whereby the 
national representatives might influence the formulation of national policy process at 
domestic level. Only the latter category is of interest for the aim of this study, insofar as it 
concerns the question of whether the national representatives in Brussels behave like norm 
entrepreneurs or not. The three downstream channels of influence identified by Kassim are 
                                                
85 EUFOR Chad was a military bridging operation in Eastern Chad and in the North East of the Central 
African Republic. Eufor Chad was deployed between January 2008 and March 2009. For details, see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1369&lang=EN.     
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to report back to the appropriate national bodies, advise the capital, and participate in 
domestic coordination (Kassim, 2001: 36).  
The reporting channel of influence refers to informing the national capital about the 
developments within the EU Council, what are the policy preferences of the other member 
states, what are the chances of a proposal to be adopted and in which form. The main 
source of information-gathering is the participation in Council meetings at various levels 
and affiliated bodies, or in informal meetings with counterparts. As one official in Brussels 
explained the relationship with the experts in the capital  
‘I must say that I am influencing a lot because I am actually pointing out some parts 
of the document, of course they are reading the document, but they do not have the 
same reading as I do from here, because I do have also discussions here, in margins 
with my colleagues whereas I see in the document many other things than my 
colleagues’ (interview, Brussels, 2007).  
 
The informal norms of consultation, mutual responsiveness, and reciprocity are key 
in explaining the close interaction with other national representatives. An important asset 
that national representatives in Brussels bring to the capital is that they have a 
comprehensive understanding of the EU’s policy and politics; they interact directly with 
counterparts from other member states as well as European officials. In addition, national 
representatives know when a particular position is unsustainable. In such a case, to carry 
on with the national mandate received from the capital may eventually lead to isolation in 
the group. Therefore, they may convince colleagues in the capital that it is not realistic to 
go on and that a change of the national position is required (interviews, Brussels, 2007). In 
turn, this provides an invaluable source of information, indispensible for the aim of 
reporting accurately.  
Besides reporting, the national representatives are expected to advise. The advisory 
channel of influence is closely linked with that of reporting and information, because all 
reports and telegrams sent back home include suggestions and recommendations. The 
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advisory function of national representatives is of particular importance in policy 
formulation and definition of national position. As one senior official highlighted,  
‘when we put something down on paper or when we discuss it even with political 
decision-makers, we try to influence them.. I think that is also our duty to give a 
realist picture to the decision-makers of what they can expect... and it is up to the 
decision-makers whether they take the risk or not.’ (interview, MFA, Budapest, 
2008). 
  
Hence, the recommendations sent back home are usually used as foundations for 
formulating national mandates on specific policy issues. The process is circular in the 
sense that the policy recommendations by the national representatives in Brussels are, in 
many cases, taken as such by the experts in the ministries of foreign affairs in the capitals 
and translated into national mandates which are sent back to Brussels as the official 
position. In this way, the national representatives in Brussels are in fact the real authors of 
the national mandate they have to defend in the Council. At the same time, there is a 
common negotiating tactic in the Council to pretend that insofar as the mandate was 
authored in the capital, it cannot be easily altered or by-passed by the national 
representatives in Brussels even if they have a greater awareness of the sensibilities of 
other member states. However, this argument goes on, nothing can be done since all major 
decisions are taken in the capital and the national representatives are simply the voice of 
the central government in Brussels.    
The fact that the national representatives in Brussels have an important influence 
over the formulation of national positions in the capital is facilitated by the absence of 
immediate interest for issues outside the core national interests. In general, the adherence 
to EU statements or actions towards remote parts of the world is a formality, especially as 
long as it requires only political endorsements and not budgetary allocations or deployment 
of military or civilian personnel in crisis management operations. As one diplomat 
explained,  
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‘many times you have general positions and these general positions are that we are 
supporting for example the good cooperation and programmatic approach of the EU 
and NATO where you don’t need to have certain specific instructions’ (interview, 
Brussels, 2007).  
 
Another factor that contributes to the influence of the national representatives in 
Brussels is the speed of the decision-making process since  
‘sometimes it is so fast that actually they have a crucial influence on what would be 
our position on this or that’ (interview, Slovak MFA, Bratislava, 2008).  
 
However, the situation changes when vital interests are at stake. Then, the national 
representatives in Brussels  
‘can never take over the responsibilities of a government, which is in contact with 
political parties, NGOs, media, so it is back home that such decision should be 
taken’ (interview, Péter Balázs, Budapest, 2008)  
 
In this case, the decisions are taken in the capital at the highest political level of the 
executive. The role of norm entrepreneurs of the national representatives in Brussels in 
relation to the MFA or other institutional actors at domestic level takes the limited form of 
a more balanced discourse with regard to contested foreign policy issues. The role of the 
PermRep is dominant especially in routine foreign policy-making. One view was that this 
dominant role is as significant as  
‘…90%, in 90% of cases they (PermRep) have the greatest influence, that’s for sure, 
I have no doubt about it ... and usually it’s so specific that only who deal with on a 
daily basis know what is going on’ (interview, Bratislava, 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, when it comes to sensitive issues, touching upon the national interest, 
other political actors became involved and the issue is open to wide contestation. This 
point confirms the observation of Kal Holsti (1995: 267) that: 
‘…on routine and non-vital matters (...), the experts and lower officials of policy-
making organizations define specific objectives in the light of their own values, 
needs, and traditions, often through informal alliances with bureaucrats in other 
countries. (...) In a crisis, where decisions of great consequences have to be made 
rapidly, the effect of bureaucratic processes may be reduced considerably.’ 
 
This was the case with the issue of Kosovo declaration of independence in February 
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2008 for instance, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The role of  
PermReps in all three cases was limited and the MFAs attempted to soften the political 
stances coming from the national executives. In Slovakia, for instance, the political 
mandate issued by the National Council came to be the official position of the executive, 
constraining and changing the initial position of the MFA, which was obliged to defend 
this mandate at the level of the GAERC (interviews, Brussels, 2007; see also the next 
chapter). 
 
6.5. Conclusions 
The assumption that the internalization of new norms and rules follows the logic of 
appropriateness, namely that those EU norms are internalized by individual officials 
because they are good and right in their own, is not sufficiently backed by empirical 
evidence. Even if some diplomats or national experts show a genuine appreciation of the 
way the EU works, most of them have a more instrumental view of the process. There is a 
constant attempt to balance between the constraints of defending the national position and 
accommodating the positions of other countries. 
As pointed out in this chapter (see pp. 167-8), the rotation of staff is a common 
practice in most foreign services, aiming to avoid the narrow specialization of the 
diplomatic personnel. The biographical background of the majority of diplomats 
interviewed in Brussels or in the capitals indicated a diversity of previous secondments in 
various embassies or other international organizations. The other side of the coin is that 
staff rotation blurs the group boundaries and makes the comparison increasingly difficult. 
We do not have any longer two distinct groups that can be reliably compared, but 
individuals moving back and forth between the two groups. While this mechanism 
facilitates the transfer of norms and good practices, it also raises questions about the 
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primary allegiance which is mainly towards the home institution and unlikely to change 
significantly because of the secondment for a few years in Brussels or elsewhere.  
The norms of compromise, consensus, consultation, and mutual understanding are 
necessary given the very design of the EU. In order to have a functional EU foreign policy, 
the participants must behave according to these norms; otherwise, the entire process enters 
into paralysis with negative consequences for all. Moreover, in many cases, the view of the 
Council is that of a structure where even if the voices of all are listened, there is a great 
diversity of interests and some countries are more influential than others. 
The sociological institutionalist assumption that the socialization of national 
representatives causes a change of collective understandings and identities is rather weak. 
There is strong evidence that the new national representatives have learnt new norms and 
rules. However, as Smith pointed out (Smith, 2000: 619), it is too much to assume that 
national officials give up their national loyalties in favour of a common European interest. 
Instead, the indicators of the socialization effect might be found in the fact that national 
elites are increasingly familiar with each other’s positions and preferences. In addition, 
national officials learn that national foreign policy is strengthened by political cooperation, 
not weakened (Smith, 2000: 619). 
The learning process is part of the accommodation into the new policy-making 
setting. In the initial stage, the national officials have learnt the rule of the games. In the 
second stage, they have started playing the game, assessing the implications of a particular 
position in the balance between national and European interest. The collective adherence 
of national representatives to the procedural norms of compromise, consensus-seeking, 
avoidance of hard-bargaining do not obscure the instrumental way in which these norms 
are perceived. 
Even if the national officials have a more flexible approach, this is because they 
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know that within the EU framework a foreign policy position is not formulated in isolation 
but in consultation and cooperation with others. These norms are not necessarily seen as 
right on their own, but as means of avoiding a stalemate and overcoming differences of 
interest inherent in a Union of 27. Therefore, the role of the PermReps or MFA in the 
dissemination of EU’s norms and rules at domestic level is limited. The highly normatively 
institutionalized setting of EU foreign policy-making has a constraining effect on the 
behaviour of national officials. As Schimmelfennig pointed out, the national 
representatives behave as rational actors conforming to these norms and rules in order to 
avoid the costs of illegitimate action, while at the same time calculating when conformity 
is worth the cost of complying and when not (Schimmelfennig, 2000).  
The perception of power relations within the EU embodies both the view that the 
larger member states exert a greater influence on the policy process and the acceptance of 
the fact that EU membership enhances the standing of a small member. There is a general 
agreement that different countries, large or small, have competing national interests and 
the common European interest does not always prevail. However, the membership is 
perceived as allowing a country to pursue more ambitious foreign policy objectives. EU 
membership has offered a new platform to defend the national interest, backed by the 
political and economic weight of the EU. In this case, the power nature of Europeanization 
is the ‘power to’, or Europeanization as empowerment. The EU member states have greater 
access to information, resources, and decisions than their own capabilities would allow 
(Jørgensen, 2004: 48-50). A country is no longer simply country x or y, it is a member of 
the EU (this is also true for NATO membership for instance). Besides, the EU membership 
offers a stronger standing on the international stage for a member state. Alongside this 
logic, small member states from Central and Eastern Europe might benefit from EU 
membership more than they might lose. Either way, the agreement on the existence of a 
177 
power dimension affects the process of socialization. The socialization stands for learning 
of new norms and rules and their instrumental use.   
The primary instrumental view of the EU procedural norms and rules by the national 
representatives has some wider implications. One aspect is that the primary allegiance of 
national officials is towards the national interest (as defined in the capital). This is the most 
visible in situations where vital national interests are at stake. Among other striking 
examples, it is enough to recall the split within the EU caused by the United States’ 
military intervention in Iraq in 2003, or the division of EU member states on the issue of 
Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008. Another aspect is that the national foreign 
policy is more influential with accession than before. Before accession, the EU 
membership was the first foreign policy priority of a CEE candidate. Once this 
fundamental goal was achieved, the order of priorities of the national foreign policy 
changed as well.  
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CHAPTER 7 
EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY CONDUCT 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter turns the focus of analysis from institutions and identity to the conduct 
of foreign policy. As discussed in the conceptual chapter, Europeanization is the input (or 
set of inputs) originating at the EU level and affecting the national system of policy-
making, either in terms of demands (constraints and pressures) or supports (opportunities) 
and requires the system to respond. This chapter examines the extent to which the national 
system of policy-making reacts to inputs coming from the external environment by looking 
at official discourse and policy conduct. Hence, as stated in the theoretical chapter, the two 
research questions this chapter examines are:  
a) To what extent do the officially stated foreign policy priorities and commitments, 
interests and the means to achieve them reflect a more salient European dimension 
after accession? and  
b) To what extent does the conduct of foreign policy reflect a preference for EU 
channels rather than using other national/international tools?  
The discursive dimension refers to the way in which the national interest is defined 
in the official discourse, including both statements and speeches of policy-makers and 
official documents, such as governing programmes, security strategies and the like. In 
other words, the question is to what extent and how the definition of national interest 
changed over time (i.e throughout the period covering the two decades since the fall of 
communist regimes in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, including the integration into 
NATO and the EU). It is important to examine the issue of interest since it is closely 
connected to national sovereignty and statehood. One of the fundamental interests of all 
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states is the preservation of their very statehood. Traditionally, foreign policy was the main 
device whereby the state promoted and defended the national interest (Jackson and 
Sørensen, 2007: 60). At the same time, the national interest itself is historically contingent 
and its definition changes over time. Insofar as European integration is the process 
whereby large chunks of national sovereignty are surrendered to a supranational entity, the 
definition of national interest is changing as well. What is the meaning given to the 
national interest by the new member states, which regained their independence only 
recently after decades of Soviet control? For the Czech Republic or Poland for instance, 
the Lisbon Treaty is perceived by certain high-level political figures as threatening and 
constraining the state’s independence. In contrast, further integration towards a political 
union is seen by Hungary as a desired outcome. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
manner whereby the official discourse defines the relationship between national and 
common European interest, national and European foreign policy, the EU as a foreign 
policy actor and the preference for the EU over other international tools of conducting 
foreign policy.  
The second research question is concerned with the practical conduct of the policy, 
the way in which various officially stated foreign policy priorities are pursued (e.g. what 
instruments and resources are employed and how). Since the discourse itself is a form of 
action, the distinction between the two is not a clear-cut one. To issue a foreign policy 
statement of approval or criticism means to act, to situate oneself, as a national decision-
making body, in relation to others, to take a position; foreign policy action is the follow-up 
to discourse. The two aspects – discourse and action – should be linked for the sake of 
policy’s internal coherence. On the contrary, to agree in the official discourse with, for 
instance, the need for stronger, better-integrated European-level institutions while at the 
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same time circumventing this aim by unilateral action suggests either inconsistency or 
malevolence.  
I argue that with EU accession, the definition of national interest began to reflect a 
greater awareness of historical experiences than was the case before. This does not mean 
that historical experiences were forgotten before accession; it is simply the case that 
European integration overshadowed other policy objectives. The Europeanization process 
was more visible before than after accession. The institutional transformation was an 
important part of preparing the national administration to be fully able to assume the 
obligations of full membership. With accession, the institutional adjustments reflected 
even more the salience of internal politics. The ratification of the long delayed Lisbon 
Treaty already requires further institutional adjustments in the new member states, 
especially with regard to the setting-up at the EU level of the new European External 
Action Service (EEAS). On the other hand, the conduct of foreign policy was in general 
supportive with regard to the European foreign policy, but it ran occasionally against it 
when a choice had to be made between CFSP and the objective of NATO integration and 
support for US foreign policy. The chapter examines in more detail how the tension 
between the two sets of national objectives affected the conduct of foreign policy.    
The first section of this chapter provides a general overview of the main features, 
choices and developments in the three countries throughout the period after the fall of the 
communist regimes. Historically, the CFSP evolved as a way to address the gap between 
the economic power of the EC/EU and its political weakness. The paradox is that a 
politically strong EU means further delegation of powers from the national to the 
supranational level that began to be perceived as constraining the room for manoeuvre of 
the member states. Hence, this chapter also examines the issue of whether the EU as a 
foreign policy actor is perceived in the new member states as either empowering or 
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weakening the state (or a mixture of both). This section also examines the issue of how the 
global reach of EU foreign policy fits with the mainly regional scope of foreign policy of 
the new member states. 
The second section examines the shifting conception with regard to the objectives of 
foreign policy during the post-accession period. The major argument of this chapter is that 
after accession the foreign policy of the new member states has become more confident 
and focused on the pursuit of national interest, irrespective of the manner in which the 
national interest was perceived and defined. At the same time, the domestic political 
interests and demands represent key factors shaping national foreign policies and defining 
the contours and nature of European foreign policy itself. The definition of what is the 
national interest and how the foreign policy should promote it is a function of the political 
orientation of the governing coalition or party. The state bureaucracy provides the 
continuity in defining and implementing foreign policy, but it might be constrained by 
administrative reorganization and available resources. The combination of these two 
factors provides different pictures across countries, which are discussed in more detail 
throughout this chapter.  
The third and fourth sections examine the three governments’ positioning with 
regard to three critical events, which tested the extent to which EU was preferred over 
other foreign policy options. Hence, the third section looks at the issue of transatlantic 
relations, including the relationship between the EU and NATO. The reason for examining 
these two issues is due to the significance that NATO (and the US) has for the new 
member states. The future of the relationship between NATO and the EU is still a matter 
open to debate, not only in the new member states, but on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Similarly, the relationship between the United States and the EU is still a testing ground 
with regard to the Europeanness of the new member states. The transatlantic divide over 
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the war in Iraq was the most visible illustration with regard to the distinct preferences 
European countries hold, but the list of contentious issues is longer.    
The fourth section examines the issue of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. It 
starts with a discussion about the NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 
position of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania on this matter followed by an analysis of how 
the three countries reacted to the moment of Kosovo’s declaring independence in 2008 and 
the implications of the EU attempts to forge a unified position. The Kosovo crisis is 
important for at least two reasons. First, it took place both before and after accession. It 
was, in fact, a continuum, spanning almost a decade. Hence, it provides a good opportunity 
to examine the foreign policy of the new member states (aspirants and candidates before) 
and their interaction with European foreign policy. Secondly, it was an important matter, 
stirring up political debate and testing the foreign policy capabilities of the new member 
states. The last section concludes and sums up the key findings.  
 
7.2. Early foreign policy choices. Continuity and change of foreign policy before 
EU accession 
The CEE countries made different foreign policy choices in the early 1990s, despite 
the fact that the external environment (i.e the end of the Cold War and the fall of the 
communist regimes) provided similar challenges and opportunities for all of them. Some 
countries, such as Hungary or Poland, chose to reform the state along the Western model 
of democracy and the free market, and sought assiduously integration into Western 
organizations. Other countries succumbed to the heavy burden of ethno-nationalism, like 
Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia fell also victim to nationalist tendencies, especially Slovak 
nationalism, but differently from Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union; the separation of the 
Czech and Slovak republics took place in a smooth and amicable manner. After 
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independence, Slovakia has extensively relied upon the ethno-nationalist discourse and 
practices as part of the nation and state-building process. In other cases, such as Romania, 
the post-communist political forces were particularly concerned with internal political 
stability and consolidation of their own political position. The diversity of situations 
reflected the salience of domestic political conditions and circumstances over the external 
environment. The same diversity of local circumstances is visible in the way foreign policy 
was defined in the early 1990s.  
In Hungary, three foreign policy objectives were initiated in 1990 by the right-wing 
coalition government centred on the MDF86 enjoying large support across the entire 
political spectrum and remaining virtually unchanged on the agenda of all Hungarian 
governments since then (for a historical-comparative analysis of successive governmental 
programmes, see Varga, 2000). The first was the full integration into the Western 
European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, i.e. the EC/EU and NATO. The second priority 
area was a policy of good neighbourliness and regional cooperation. The third objective 
was to support ethnic Hungarians living abroad (interviews, Budapest; see also Póti and 
Tálas, 2004: 44, Rácz, 2005: 545, Rósza, 2003: 6, Tör/, 2001: 129, Varga, 2000: 117). 
Even if the three priorities remained unchanged until accession, this does not mean that 
they really had the same weight under different administrations. While the objective of 
Euro-Atlantic integration enjoyed the equally strong support of the major political forces, 
the other two priorities reflected more the tension between the ideological preferences of 
the right versus left-wing parties (Magyarics, (2004: 217) (for more details, see the 
subsequent section).  
                                                
86 Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKFPP), and Christian 
Democratic Peoples’ Party (KDNP, Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt) formed the centre-right coalition that 
won the election in 1990 and governed until 1994. 
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For Slovakia, as a newborn state, lacking a tradition of statehood, the major issue 
after the ‘Velvet Divorce’ was defining itself as a state with its own national interests, 
distinct from the interests of the former Czechoslovakia (Bitu$íková, 2002: 41). The pro-
West orientation was widely accepted as necessary, as well as a regional approach, 
concerned with building good relations with neighbourhood countries (Bombik and 
Samson, 1996: 152-3).87 Even if Slovakia applied for NATO and EU membership in 1994 
and 1995, the realignment with Western Europe’s political, economic and security 
organizations was only a rhetorical tool, not backed by appropriate policies (Bátora, 2004, 
Kukan, 2000). The governmental-sponsored nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism 
(see Bútora, et al., 2003: 52, Carpenter, 1997: 212, Vachudova, 2005) were severely 
criticised by international actors88 and proved an insurmountable obstacle on Slovakia’s 
path towards NATO and the EU. Only with the change of ruling coalition in 1998, 
replacing the Me"iar led coalition cabinet with that of Mikulá$ Dzurinda (see also the 
chapter five, pp. 107-8), the objectives of European and Euro-Atlantic integration began to 
be pursued in a more determined manner, leading eventually to integration into NATO and 
the EU in 2004.  
In Romania, the early foreign policy choices reflected the ideological preferences of 
the new political leadership. During 1990-1991, the foreign policy agenda of the National 
Salvation Front (FSN) was limited to two main aspects: relationships with the 
neighbouring countries and the fate of the Warsaw Pact. However, regional developments 
                                                
87 In the early 1990s, several other directions of foreign policy were discussed. The first one overplayed the 
card of geopolitical location, Slovakia being portrayed as a ‘bridge between East and West’. The second 
alternative was neutrality. The third choice referred to a ‘buffer zone’ Slovakia between Russia and Ukraine 
in the East and West European countries in the West. 
88 EU issued critical diplomatic statements, the so-called démarches, against Slovakia in November 1994 and 
again in October 1995. The European Parliament issued critical resolutions as well, in November 1995, 
December 1996 and October 1997, with regard to the misuse and abuse of power by the Me"iar regime, and 
calling on the government to respect human rights and the rule of law (European Commission, 1997b). The 
worsening record of the government was the subject of criticism of the US administration and other 
international bodies too.  
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proved crucial to a change of foreign policy orientation. One external development was the 
significant progress towards integration into NATO and the EU made by other countries in 
the region, leaving Romania in an undesirable position of exclusion.89 Other critical factor 
was the conflict in the Western Balkans, which demonstrated that playing the ethno-
nationalist card is anything but a recipe for disaster. The reorientation of foreign policy in 
the early 1990s towards the West was undertaken in a gradual and controlled manner so as 
not to jeopardize the fragile domestic equilibrium (Linden, 1992: 213). Although hesitant 
and sluggish, the change of Romanian foreign policy was marked by the signing of the 
Europe Agreement, the official application for NATO membership, in September 1993, 
and accession to the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1993.90 In January 1994, Romania was 
the first of the CEE countries to enter the NATO Partnership for Peace programme, and in 
June 1995 became the third CEE country (after Hungary and Poland) to officially submit 
its application to join the EU.91 Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007.  
The three countries examined here provide strong evidence with regard to the 
importance of domestic politics and preferences of competing political forces. In Hungary 
the objective of European and Euro-Atlantic integration was a source of cohesion binding 
together the major political parties. Instead, in Slovakia and Romania, under the leadership 
of Vladimir Me"iar and Ion Iliescu, this objective lacked genuine commitment, in spite of 
the official rhetoric and some formal decisions of changing the course of foreign policy.  
The differences may be partially explained by looking at the ‘initial conditions’. The 
importance of the initial conditions (e.g. the legacy of 40 years of socialism) in shaping the 
post-communist transition of CEE in a completely different way to that of the states that 
                                                
89 This situation was similar to Slovakia, but the argument holds for Bulgaria too. 
90 Romania became a member of the Council of Europe later than the other Central European countries and 
in contrast to the Hungarian, Polish or Czechoslovak fast-track applications and admissions, without 
enjoying a full support of the members of CoE. 
91 Agence France Presse, June 22, 1995, ‘Romania officially seeks EU membership.’ 
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joined in the enlargements of 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995 is well documented (see also 
Copsey and Haughton, 2009: 281-2).  
The ‘initial condition’ approach also suggests that there is a direct link between the 
extent to which political competition was experienced during the final years of 
communism and the type of post-communist regime. Hungary had the most liberal regime, 
allowing for limited political debate and contestation, Czechoslovakia experienced a hard 
line regime, and Romania was an example of totalitarian regime, attempting to suppress 
any form of opposition. The result of these different contexts was that in Hungary, the 
political forces coming to power after the fall of the communist regime represented the 
democratic opposition, while in the case of Romania the new ruling elite was simply a 
dissident faction within the communist party, still sympathetic to the Soviet creed and 
semi-authoritarian rule. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the manner in which the two 
constituent republics chose to ‘divorce’, in the absence of a democratic pact between 
political elite and electorate, negatively affected the process of democratic consolidation in 
the independent Slovak Republic (Samson, 2001: 361). 
Although this explanation does not provide the full picture, it still offers a starting 
point in understanding why there were differences between post-communist countries with 
regard to the direction of their foreign policies. At this stage, domestic politics played a 
more important role than the external factors. The way in which the ruling political forces 
understood the past, and perceived and interpreted the challenges and opportunities of the 
external environment had a decisive impact upon the early foreign policy choices. 
However, the balance between the influence of the domestic politics and the external 
factors changed during the integration process. The system of conditionality associated 
with the integration process limited the room for manoeuvre of national governments.  
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7.3. CFSP and national foreign policies 
As discussed in the first empirical chapter, the Europe Agreements institutionalized 
political dialogue in foreign policy matters. Since 1995, the EU began inviting the 
associated countries to align their positions to those adopted by the Union. The scope of 
European foreign policy is wider than the traditional area of interest of the CEE countries. 
In fact, among the diplomats from CEE countries, the opinion that the scope of European 
foreign policy mirrors the interests of the former European colonial powers, mainly France 
and the UK, is rather common (various interviews, 2007-8; see also the previous chapter, 
pp. 169-70). The majority of the other member states have more limited interests, usually 
having a regional focus.92 However, the scope of national foreign policy of CEE countries 
widened since they ended up taking positions on remote matters, which previously had 
little or no direct significance for them, such as the EU statements on the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear tests, the embargo concerning the supplying of weapons and military 
equipment to Ethiopia and Eritrea, or visa restrictions for the members of the military junta 
from Burma/Myanmar.  
During the Europe agreements period (i.e. before opening of the accession talks), 
cooperation in foreign policy matters was, in general, limited to the endorsement by the 
associated countries of the EU’s political declarations, common positions, and joint 
actions. The endorsement of EU positions was voluntary before the opening of the 
accession talks, since there was no formal mandatory requirement under the provisions of 
Europe agreements. However, the refusal to respond positively to an invitation from the 
                                                
92 A good illustration of this point is the development of various projects of regional cooperation initiated by 
groups of member states within the EU framework: Southern members promoted the Barcelona Process, 
Scandinavian and Baltic countries pushed for Nordic and Baltic Sea projects, Poland and Sweden for a 
Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Romania and Bulgaria for a Black Sea 
strategy.  
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EU might have incurred undesirable political costs. This arrangement was convenient for 
both sides in the sense that the associated countries could prove their commitment to 
European foreign policy and the political support of CEE countries enhanced the 
legitimacy of EU external action. With the opening of the accession talks, the candidate 
countries formally committed themselves to upholding EU foreign policy (see European 
Commission, 1997a, b, c). Before this moment, the alignment with EU positions was based 
on invitations addressed by the EU. By agreeing ‘to participate fully and actively in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (European Commission 1997a), the associated 
countries committed to behave like full-members without having yet this status.  
The support was mainly political, without including the allocation of direct financial, 
material or human resources. As a Hungarian diplomat pointed out  
‘...if you are asking whether the EU’s Burma policy has became also Hungary’s 
Burma policy, I would say yes. But if you ask what our contribution was, there was 
no contribution’ (interview, Brussels, 2007).  
 
However, some of the restrictive measures adopted by the EU had indirect negative 
economic consequences, such as the oil embargo imposed against Yugoslavia. Romania 
and Hungary, as neighbouring countries affected, but also Slovakia, acted against their 
direct economic interest by upholding the EU position. Yet, the EU stance was in line with 
the UN sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia since 1991.93 All three countries endorsed the 
UN resolutions on Yugoslavia in spite of the economic costs. The support for the EU 
position was the logical continuation of the endorsement of UN resolutions. With regard to 
the support of UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, the interest of CEE countries was the 
endorsement of international law. For small states or less influential countries, advancing 
the norms of the UN Charter is a key component of foreign policy. Therefore, not only the 
high importance allocated to the objective of European integration explains the trade-off 
                                                
93 Various resolutions of the UN Security Council between 1991 and 1996. 
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between the economic losses and the support for the EU position on Yugoslavia, but also 
the preferences for a stronger role of the United Nations and the upholding of the 
international law. The EU stance was seen as legitimate because it furthered and enforced 
the UN resolutions.  
The formal opening and conduct of negotiation talks in the area of foreign policy was 
one of the easiest parts of the entire package of negotiations. All candidate countries, 
invited to join the EU in 1997 and 1999, provisionally concluded this chapter 
simultaneously, during the first half of 2000, during the Portuguese rotating presidency of 
the EU.94 The peculiarity of the CFSP chapter (chapter 27)95 rested on the fact that there is 
no legal instrument of the kind of directives or regulations, which make up the bulk of the 
proper acquis communautaire; there are only instruments belonging to the area of 
intergovernmental cooperation, such as joint actions, common positions, statements and 
declarations, the conclusions of the European Council and the Council of Ministers as well 
as temporary negative measures, in the form of sanctions for instance. In other words, in 
the field of foreign policy the opening of the accession talks represented only a 
continuation of the political dialogue and cooperation that had started with the Europe 
agreements. The smooth conclusion of this chapter was therefore facilitated by the 
previous experience that the associated countries had in dealing with the CFSP.  
The setting up of the new European Security and Defence Policy, following the joint 
French-UK summit at St. Malo in December 1999, a key moment for the ESDP, was 
supposed to provide the long-awaited and badly-needed hard-power instruments to give 
substance to the CFSP. At the same time, the launch of the ESDP created a different type 
                                                
94  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_
romania/chapters/chap_27_en.htm, viewed online 20th June 2009.  
95 There were 31 chapters corresponding to various areas of the European Community legislation that had to 
be transposed into national law by the candidate countries.  
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of challenge for policy planners in CEE capitals. Paradoxically, the challenge rested less 
on the fact that the support for ESDP ought to be material, in terms of military capabilities 
and troops, and not only political. The real challenge was related to the impact of this new 
policy on NATO and the role of the United States of America in Europe.  
The reason why the material component of supporting the ESDP was less 
challenging (without saying that it was unimportant) than the political tension between the 
development of independent European military capabilities and the role of NATO in 
Europe, was because sending troops in peacekeeping missions abroad was nothing new for 
CEE countries. All three countries had the experience of sending military or civilian 
personnel under the UN, NATO, or OSCE aegis to the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Africa, 
the Middle East, or Asia-Pacific. Hungary sent troops from the early 1990s to the UN and 
OSCE missions in the Middle East, Africa, or the Caucasus. After independence, Slovakia 
found that participation in multinational missions increased its visibility on the 
international stage. For a new and small state, not yet benefiting from security guarantees 
of a military alliance such as NATO, the involvement in international missions in areas 
like the Balkans, Africa, or the Middle East was a way to express support for the norms of 
international law and order. Likewise, Romania had the experience of participating in 
international missions since April 1991, in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans. 
Certainly, the level of contribution is less important than the perception and understanding 
of how significant the role of international institutions is in preserving and enforcing the 
international law.  
At the same time, the wide diversity of places where Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania contributed troops to multinational missions does not mean that these countries 
had immediate interests in all those areas. Certainly, the resolution of conflicts in the 
Balkans or frozen conflicts in Eastern Europe is of greater interest for the three countries 
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than Somalia, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Liberia. However, by participating in 
multinational peacekeeping missions outside their area of immediate concern the objective 
was to prove their commitment to international law and to present themselves as 
responsible actors of the international order. From this perspective, the involvement in the 
ESDP was seen by the candidate countries as a logical continuation of their existing 
commitment to participating in multinational missions under the UN or OSCE aegis.  
Since ESDP became operational in 2003, all three countries have contributed forces 
to EU civilian and military operations in the Balkans, such as the EU Police Mission and 
Eufor Althea in Bosnia (since December 2004), or the military mission ‘Concordia’ and 
the police operation ‘Proxima’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is worth 
mentioning that Slovakia was the only associate country from CEE to contribute to the 
European Community Monitoring Mission in Western Balkans, as early as from January 
1993. In operational terms, the ESDP has expanded significantly since 2003, in both 
numbers of missions, geographical coverage and diversity of instruments deployed, as well 
as the involvement of the new member states. The point here is not to provide a 
comprehensive account of the involvement of the three countries within the ESDP (for an 
overview of Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian contribution to the ESDP before the EU 
accession, see Rózsa, 2002, Bil"ík, 2002, C!lin, 2002), The aim is to illustrate the fact that 
the contribution of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania to the development of the ESDP was 
part of a broader process of assuming international responsibilities, either in terms of 
sending troops to peacekeeping operations or observers in monitoring missions. This 
experience, as well as the process of preparation for NATO membership, facilitated the 
decision to support the development of the ESDP, as long as it did not duplicate NATO.  
The relationship between the EU and NATO was in fact the main challenge for 
policy makers in CEE capitals with regard to the position towards the evolving ESDP. At 
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the strategic level, the question was whether the ESDP was going to undermine the role of 
NATO as the main security provider in Europe or to push the US out of Europe. At the 
operational level, the controversy revolved around the problem of how the existing military 
capabilities are to be allocated in order to match the commitments made to both 
organizations. The position shared by all CEE countries was that in favour of 
complementarity between the two organizations and avoidance of parallelisms and 
duplications.96 The fact that this view was also shared by some of the old member states, 
such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy or Spain makes the distinction between 
old and new members problematic. With regard to NATO-ESDP relations, what mattered 
was not the length of membership, but the national preferences in the field of foreign and 
security policy. Insofar as a strong NATO is associated with a strong involvement of the 
United States, the support for the US was seen as key for the promotion of the objective of 
accession in NATO and the maintenance of a strong NATO. Therefore, when the US 
decided to invade Iraq in 2003, the CEE countries found themselves in a difficult position, 
apparently being expected to choose between the US and Europe. This aspect is discussed 
in the next section of this chapter.  
Insofar as NATO was seen as the primary guarantor of its members’ security, the 
CEE countries considered any development of a competing European alternative to NATO 
unacceptable. According to the National Security Strategy of Hungary adopted in March 
2004, right before accession,  
‘Hungary has a fundamental interest in NATO remaining the primary forum of 
transatlantic security policy dialogue and co-operation’ and ‘the main guarantee of 
the country’s military security is provided by allied co-operation taking place in the 
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty’ (Hungarian National Security Strategy, 
2004).  
 
                                                
96 This position was in fact advocated by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a widely quoted 
article featured in the Financial Times in December 1998. She argued that the decoupling (of NATO and EU 
actions), duplication (of capabilities) and discrimination (of non-EU NATO members) had to be avoided.  
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On the other hand, the same document characterized the CFSP simply as an 
‘important framework’ of Hungarian foreign policy. The semantic distinction between 
‘fundamental’ and ‘important’ reflected the degree to which NATO was preferred over the 
ESDP. For Slovakia, the preferences at the helm of the cabinet were best captured by 
foreign minister Kukan, who summarised the view that  
‘What Europe needs is not an independent defence policy for Europe, but a strong 
European defence as part of a strong North Atlantic Alliance’ (Kukan, 2005: 88).  
 
Romania’s position was similar to that of Hungary or Slovakia, although it was more 
salient, being closer to Poland’s strong pro-US approach, than Hungary’s soft-Atlanticism 
(for Hungary, see Póti and Tálas, 2004). The National Security Strategy adopted in 2007, 
the year of Romania’s accession to the EU, maintained the pre-eminence of NATO over 
the EU, the North Atlantic Alliance being defined as the fundamental provider of 
collective security for its members.  
 
7.4. The redefinition of the national interest after EU accession  
The accession of CEE countries in the EU completed a historical cycle throughout 
which the achievement of membership in Western organizations, especially NATO and the 
EU, was the fundamental foreign policy priority. However, the accession did not represent 
a sharp break with the past. Most of previous foreign policy priorities remained the same, 
although the means of achieving them changed. The shared perception and understanding 
by the political elite of the new status changed too. This phenomenon was not completely 
new, a similar cognitive transformation occurring in the aftermath of NATO accession. 
The long-sought NATO membership did not only offer formal security guarantees and a 
sense of belonging, but the perception of importance and respectability, as well as 
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responsibility towards the allies, partners and the projection of the organization’s 
objectives in the world. EU accession augmented these feelings.   
At the same time, the accession released the burden of conditionality characterizing 
the pre-accession period. Beforehand, the policy-makers from the candidate countries 
knew that there was only a thin line between the rewards for compliance with the external 
conditionality and the punishment for disobedience. The cases such as the transatlantic rift 
over the Iraq war made the line vague, difficult to decide how to behave in order to satisfy 
the expectations of both the US administration and the EU. Had a candidate sided with one 
party against the other, it would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of the other party 
when crossing the line. This was the case of the decision of Romanian authorities to side 
with the US on the issue of non-surrender of military personnel to the ICC. The 
problematic transatlantic relationship or the dynamic of conjunctural, issue-based alliances 
of member states within the EU posed similar challenges after accession. This happened 
fairly frequently and the new member states had to take sides according to their own (self-
perceived) interests, on issues such as Kosovo’s declaration of independence, external 
energy policy and so on. The difference from the previous period, however, is that the 
room for manoeuvre was greater and the concern was no longer about the danger that the 
accession process might be delayed or derailed, but about what was the best or a fair deal 
for the country and for the other member states.  
In Hungary, after the parliamentary election in 2002, political power was held by the 
socialist-liberal coalition (MSzP plus SzDSz). The direct consequence was that the 
ideological preferences were consistent throughout the last seven years, even if three 
changes of the position of prime minister and four at the foreign ministry helm occurred 
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during this period.97 Against this background, the post-accession thinking on foreign policy 
matters was derived from the political directions drawn up during 2002-2004, under the 
guidance of the foreign minister László Kovács. Two factors may explain why this 
happened. On the one hand, it was the political stature of László Kovács and his 
experience in foreign policy matters. He was chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party 
during 1998-2004 and foreign minister during 1994-1998. At the same time, Prime 
Minister Medgyessy was not a member of the party, his influence being limited in this 
respect. On the other hand, Ferenc Gyurcsány, the new prime minister appointed from the 
party’s ranks in 2004 to replace Medgyessy, had even more limited experience in foreign 
policy matters. Besides, Ferenc Somogyi, the new foreign minister in Gyurcsány’s cabinet, 
was proposed for this position by the outgoing minister,98 who went to Brussels as 
Hungarian European Commissioner for Taxation during 2004-2009. At the time of the 
cabinet investiture, Gyurcsány declared that ‘Continuity will be the decisive factor of 
foreign and security policies in coming years’ while being highly appreciative about what 
has been done under Kovács's leadership.99  
During the post-accession period, the previous foreign policy priorities as well as the 
balance between NATO and the EU in Hungary’s foreign policy were revised. The new 
conceptual approach is reflected in the new ‘Hungary’s External Relations Strategy’100 
adopted by the cabinet in 2008. The document was completed four years after EU 
accession; it may seem a long incubation period, even if the timing dedicated to the 
                                                
97 In terms of changes of the position of prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány took over in 2004 from Peter 
Medgyessy, and Gordon Bajnai in 2009 from Gyurcsány. In terms of foreign minister, the four incumbent 
were László Kovács (2002 –2004), Ferenc Somogyi (2004-.2006), Kinga Göncz (2006 -2009) and Péter 
Balázs between April 2009 and May 2010.  
98 BBC Monitoring Europe, November 5, 2004, ‘Hungary's new foreign minister outlines policy changes’. 
99 Hungarian News Agency (MTI), September 2, 2004, ‘PM-designate advocates continuity in foreign and 
security policy’. 
100 Hungary’s External Relations Strategy, online 
http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/external_relations_strategy/, accessed on May 
2008..  
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elaboration of the document, including a wide-ranging reconciliation process, lasted about 
a year.101 As Péter Balázs put it, during the first years after accession, not only Hungary 
but other new member states as well experienced the syndrome of losing direction and the 
purpose of foreign policy (interview, Budapest, 2008). It was difficult to move from an 
understanding whereby the European and Euro-Atlantic integration were key objectives of 
foreign policy to realizing that, once a full EU member, it is increasingly difficult to clearly 
separate foreign and domestic politics and policies. Nonetheless, the new strategy placed 
greater emphasis on the EU, underlining the fact that  
‘The European Union is the most important framework for Hungarian policy and 
action’ and that the ‘EU external relations are also Hungary’s external relations’ 
(Hungary’s External Relations Strategy’, 2008).  
 
This understanding departs significantly from the formulation of the 2004 Security 
Strategy, and it establishes a direct link between the EU and Hungary’s foreign affairs. 
When it comes to the role of NATO, the emphasis is placed on EU-NATO cooperation, 
although the role of the Alliance as a security guarantor in terms of traditional military 
threats is made evident.  
During the post-accession stage, the new strategic objectives of foreign policy, as 
highlighted in the Hungarian External Relations Strategy of 2008, envisaged the creation 
of a ‘competitive Hungary in the EU’, ‘successful within the region’ and ‘responsible in 
the world.’ The main framework for achieving these strategic objectives is provided by EU 
membership. There are significant differences between these strategic goals and the 
previous triad of policy objectives characterizing Hungarian foreign policy during the post-
communist period until after EU accession, namely European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, good neighbourliness and regional cooperation and the support of ethnic 
                                                
101 Topics of the press conference following the government session on 27 February 2008: Foreign relations 
strategy proposal before government, online 
http://www.meh.hu/english/activities/briefing/an_20080228.html, accessed July 2009. 
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Hungarians living abroad. The goal of creating a competitive Hungary within the EU 
replaced the overarching aim of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The goal of a 
successful Hungary in the region superseded the previous objectives of good neighbourly 
relations and the support for Hungarian minorities abroad. Finally, the objective of creating 
a Hungary responsible in the world took the place and expanded the previous objective of 
regional cooperation. In other words, four years after joining the EU, the fact that the EU is 
defined as the main framework for the conduct of Hungary’s foreign policy reflects the 
ever-growing salience of European affairs at the domestic level and corresponds to a more 
Europeanized set of foreign policy preferences. 
In Slovakia, the major foreign policy priorities of the second Dzurinda cabinet 
(2002-2006)102 were, initially, the finalisation of the accession process to NATO and the 
EU. After accession, however, according to premier Dzurinda, the foreign policy priorities 
of Slovakia should concentrate at the regional level (the Balkans, Ukraine, Russia) as well 
as the Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian regions (Dzurinda, 2003). It is not surprising 
that Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries were declared foreign policy priorities of 
Slovakia after EU accession, and that Slovakia wanted to be the advocate of these states’ 
integration in NATO and the EU (Dzurinda, 2004).  
The new ruling coalition forming the government after the 2006 elections returned to 
power the .S-HDZS and SNS as junior partners of Robert Fico’s SMER. Inevitably, the 
ethnic-national ideological polarisation of political preferences that was so divisive during 
the elections played an important role after the cabinet was installed. The more 
nationalistic ideology of the new cabinet affected foreign policy too. While the long-term 
direction of foreign policy, already laid out by the outgoing cabinet (e.g. Western Balkans 
                                                
102 The second Dzurinda coalition cabinet entered into office in November 2002. It was composed of SDKÚ 
(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union), SMK (Party of Hungarian Coalition), KDH (Christian Democratic 
Movement) and ANO (New Citizen’s Alliance). 
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and Ukraine, accession to the Schengen area, and the adoption of the Euro) remained 
unchanged, other dimensions began to be approached from a different perspective (e.g. the 
bilateral relations with Hungary).  
Even if the major direction of foreign policy remained unchanged, the emphasis on 
national interest turned out to be more salient compared with the previous period. The 
political programme of the new government stressed the fact that ‘The foreign policy (...) 
shall proceed consequentially from the State interests…’ and with this aim in mind the 
government aimed to make full use of its membership of international organizations (EU, 
NATO, UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development-OECD). The shift is also visible in the newly adopted foreign policy 
strategy bearing the title ‘A Successful Slovakia in a Safe World. A Strategy of the Slovak 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, adopted in 2008.103 There is a reversal between the pre-
accession formulation, when the national interest itself was defined as the achievement of 
membership in these organizations, and post-accession, when the national interest is 
understood more narrowly and instrumentally. The government led by Robert Fico placed 
more emphasis on the national card and the pursuit of national interest within the EU (and 
other international fora). The government became more assertive, pragmatic and less open 
to external criticism. One visible illustration of the new approach was the stance Slovakia 
took within the EU and in relation to the US with regard to the Kosovo declaration of 
independence (see later this chapter). 
Romania joined the EU about two and a half years later than Hungary and Slovakia. 
Although the Romanian government considered accession on time as a tremendous 
success, the fact is that accession was uncertain until the last moment. The accession 
treaty, signed in Luxembourg on 25th April 2005, included a safeguard clause, which might 
                                                
103 A Successful Slovakia in a Safe World. A Strategy of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, online 
http://www.mzv.sk, accessed on May 2008. 
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have led to the postponement for up to one year of the date of accession in case Romania 
had been unable to address the shortcomings in several areas of the acquis.104 The 
European Commission published three more monitoring reports on Romania’s progress, 
even after the Accession treaty had been signed. Each of these reports had been a source of 
anxiety for the Romanian government, not least because the ratification process was 
underway and some member states were not convinced that Romania was fully prepared 
(see Phinnemore, 2010: 302-3).105 Moreover, the European Commission decided in 
December 2006, on the eve of Romania’s accession, to introduce a special ‘cooperation 
and verification mechanism’ (CVM) in order to improve the accountability and efficiency 
of the judicial system and law enforcement bodies (European Commission, 2006). At stake 
was the possibility that, unless Romania addressed the abovementioned shortcomings, the 
EU member states do not have to recognize and execute the judgments and judicial 
decisions issued by Romanian courts.  
The introduction of the mechanism theoretically had the potential to limit the full use 
of membership. Certainly, from a narrow, legal-formal, point of view, there was no direct 
link between the conduct of foreign policy and the monitoring by the European 
Commission of the Romanian government in the fields of judicial reform and fight against 
corruption (interview, Bucharest, 2008). In spite of this, the very existence of the 
mechanism placed Romania in the category of a second-class member, which negatively 
affected the prestige and credibility of the country. In general, the officials discourse did 
not refer to the mechanism as a constraining factor affecting Romania’s position within the 
                                                
104 The areas of the acquis concerned were related to competition, Schengen area and external borders, the 
reform police and judiciary, fight against corruption, state aid, and a steel restructuring programme. 
105 Germany, for instance, was the very last country to ratify the treaty, at the end of November 2006, after 
the last (favourable) report of the European Commission, issued in September 2006. 
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EU. Various statements of President B!sescu addressed to the Romanian diplomatic corps 
on several occasions made no connection between the two aspects.106  
On the contrary, with accession the tone of the official discourse became more 
assertive, despite the existence of the CVM. Even if no new major objective was 
introduced, the order of priorities changed and a stronger emphasis was placed on the 
strategic priorities of Romanian foreign policy. The change in emphasis was most visible 
on the following strategic objectives: the relationships with the Republic of Moldova, the 
policy towards the Black Sea, and the role of Romania itself on the European and 
international stage. What remained unchanged, however, was the reference to the key role 
of the US and NATO for European security.107  
 
7.5. The 2003 Iraq war: the first test case for the Europeanization of foreign 
policy of CEE countries  
As previously mentioned, the US decision to invade Iraq without the UN Security 
Council’s green light was a major instance when the countries aspiring to join NATO108 
and the EU found themselves in the awkward position of choosing between the US–led 
camp and the ‘core’ Europeans (i.e. France and Germany), to use the term coined by 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, in the famous rejoinder to Donald Rumsfeld’s 
distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe (Habermas and Derrida, 2003: 292).  
The context in which this decision was adopted is important. Although Hungary and 
Slovakia completed the accession talks in 2002, the Accession Treaty was yet to be ratified 
by the EU member states. In the case of Romania, the accession talks were still underway 
                                                
106  Various speeches of the President of Romania, Traian B!sescu at the meetings with Romanian diplomatic 
corps and the heads of foreign diplomatic missions in Bucharest (19 January and 3 September 2007, 23 
January 2008 and 21 January 2009), available online at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=.    
107 Romania's National Security Strategy, October 30, 2003 and The National Security Strategy of Romania 
of 2007. 
108 Except the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, already members of NATO. 
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and accession itself uncertain. There were voices in the French media according to which 
the CEE countries were said to be ‘unsuitable’ to enter the EU due to the their commitment 
to US foreign policy.109 Moreover, the harsh remarks of the French President, Jacques 
Chirac, criticizing the CEE countries for their overt Atlanticism could not do anything but 
contribute to the state of nervousness in the candidate countries’ capitals with regard to the 
possible negative consequences of siding with the US. At the same time, the rift between 
the old member states was a factor that offered more room for manoeuvre for the CEE 
countries. If a unified position opposing the war in Iraq had emerged at the EU level, the 
pro-US position of the candidate countries would have been more difficult to uphold. The 
fact that a consistent group of Western European countries were also in favour of US 
intentions made the stance of CEE countries more palatable, although not in France or 
Germany. On the other hand, while Hungary was already a full member of NATO, 
Slovakia and Romania received the invitation to join the Alliance only at the Prague 
Summit in November 2002. The visit of US president George Bush to Bucharest in 
November 2002, days after the NATO summit in Prague, was interpreted as recognition 
and reward for the loyalty of the Romanian government. Similar reasons seemed to have 
played an important role in the Slovak decision to side with the US as well. For Slovakia 
and Romania, as well as the other five countries invited to join the Alliance in 2004 
(Slovenia and the Baltic States), especially due to the US position within NATO, it would 
have been politically risky not to be part of the ‘coalition of the willing’ and support the 
US position.  
Although all three countries examined here found themselves embroiled in the 
transatlantic rift, the internal political debate reflected local peculiarities. In Hungary, the 
idea of having to chose between the US and Europe was distasteful for both the 
                                                
109 Czech News Agency, February 12, 2003, ‘Slovak Press Survey.’  
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government and the opposition, insofar as both were considered important for Hungarian 
interests. This situation resulted in an ambiguous position, trying both to offer satisfaction 
to the US and appease the Western countries opposed to war (Bugajski and Teleki, 2006: 
129). Following the official request from the British ambassador in Budapest,110 Hungarian 
Prime Minister Medgyessy joined the group of leaders from Poland, the Czech Republic, 
the UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark and signed a statement of support for the US 
intentions to attack Iraq, also known as the Letter of Eight, even without a UN Security 
Council resolution.111 On the other hand, foreign minister László Kovács tried to soothe 
Paris and Berlin by declaring that ‘more of Europe does not mean less of America’,112 as an 
assurance of Hungary’s commitment to European integration and further development of 
the EU’s foreign policy.   
The political decision to side with the pro-US camp was contested by the opposition 
parties in Hungary, with FIDESZ accusing the government of irresponsibility and 
servility.113 The dispute between the government and opposition revolved more around the 
issue of sending Hungarian soldiers to fight as part of the US ‘coalition of the willing’ in 
Iraq. FIDESZ insisted that without a UN resolution, Hungarian soldiers should not go to 
Iraq as combat forces, but only as peacekeeping, and that the government should not 
bypass the Parliament in this regard. Public disapproval in Hungary for US action in Iraq 
without a UN mandate was very high, with over 80% being against it (Gordon and 
Shapiro, 2004: 79). When the government asked for the Parliament’s approval to send 300 
troops to Iraq as a peacekeeping force, following Washington’s request in April 2003, 
FIDESZ blocked this request, although in other declarations the leaders of the Opposition 
                                                
110 InfoProd, February 3, 2003, ‘Hungarian premier defends European leaders’ letter on Iraq.’ 
111 Agence France Presse, January 30, 2003, ‘Verbatim text of letter from eight European states supporting 
US..  
112 European Report, April 18, 2003, ‘European Council: Enlarged Europe divided over institutional 
reforms.’ 
113 BBC Monitoring Europe, February 4, 2003, ‘Hungarian premier explains signing letter of "eight" on Iraq.’ 
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were in favour of fighting in the war against terror (Bugajski and Teleki, 2006: 145-6). 
Only after the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483, the Hungarian Parliament 
approved the deployment of 300 peacekeepers in Iraq as part of the international 
stabilisation force.114  
The Slovak government endorsed the US intention to intervene against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, in spite of the widely contested legitimacy of this decision. The Dzurinda 
government decided to allow overflights and landings of US aircrafts and to deploy a 
radiation, chemical and biological protection unit in Kuwait (Mese(nikov, 2004: 43). It 
also signed the common political declaration of support for the US military action in Iraq, 
the so-called Vilnius Letter, on 6th February, a few days after the Letter of Eight was made 
public. With ten more Central and East European countries115 siding with US, the 
European hopes for a unified position completely vanished. The choice to support the US 
was greatly helped by the pro-Atlantic views of the holders of key positions in the 
government, namely the prime minister, the foreign and defence ministers, all members of 
the SDKÚ, as well the support of the president (Samson, 2005: 229). Similar to Hungary, 
public disapproval of the government decision was high. According to opinion polls data, 
about 74% of the public considered that military action was wrong, 71% disliked the 
Slovak military presence in Iraq, 73% feared that the Iraq war would actually increased the 
terrorist threat, and 72% disapproved of the way in which the Bush administration handled 
international politics. At the same time, in terms of transatlantic relations, an 
overwhelming majority of the public considered the EU as more important for the vital 
Slovak interests and preferred it to the US; hence, the EU should became more 
                                                
114http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/security_policy/hungary_in_nato/hungary_role_in_iraq
/, accessed on July 2009. 
115 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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independent from the US (54%) and acquire more military power (66%)  (Institute for 
Public Affairs, 2004).  
The gap between the public perception and the preferences of the leading members 
of the governing coalition is symptomatic of the fact that pro-Atlantic foreign policy-
making in Slovakia was an elite-driven process, with little or no connection with the 
general preferences of the public, which tends to be more pro-European, including in terms 
of preferring the EU’s soft-power approach to foreign policy business. At the same time, 
foreign policy is generally not a matter of utmost importance for the general public (not 
only in Slovakia). As Robert Cooper (2004: 102-13) explained, what comes first is 
domestic politics, while usually foreign policy is the external reflection of domestic 
politics. The performance of the government is especially judged in terms of job creation, 
social security, and citizens’ welfare and less on foreign policy decisions. In the case of 
Slovakia, the causes of public apathy are due to the fact that foreign policy making during 
the first years after independence was a remote process from the citizens, not 
communicated and explained to the wider public enough (Gyárfá$ová and Vel$ic, 2000).  
In Slovakia, the foreign policy matter most likely to stir up greater public interest is 
linked to the dynamic of bilateral relations with Hungary, as the political controversy on 
the adoption in 2002 of the Hungarian Status Law demonstrated. Indeed, this is due to the 
substantive Magyar ethnic community in Slovakia, hence a domestic concern with external 
repercussions. Besides, in contrast to other European countries, the Slovak public tends in 
general to be more isolationist and distant from the outside world (Institute for Public 
Affairs, 2004: 6). Therefore, what seemed to be an unpopular decision was in fact less 
important for the everyday concerns of Slovaks than different survey findings may suggest. 
This situation, coupled with the determination of several key high-level decision-makers to 
support the US in the war in Iraq, explains why the government felt free to pursue an 
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apparently unpopular course of action. Besides, the Dzurinda government emerged from 
the parliamentary elections that had taken place a few months earlier with enough capital 
of legitimacy and public support to afford the political costs of this decision. Within the 
coalition cabinet, the preferences of only one party, the Christian Democratic Movement, 
differed, but not to such an extent as to prevent the government from pursuing the course it 
desired.   
In the case of Romania, the incumbent social-democrat government felt that 
integration in NATO might be helped by a more active pro-US approach. The war on 
terror started by the US, following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, was seen as an opportunity 
to further Romania’s foreign policy goals, especially given the fact that the geographical 
position of the country became an element of interest for the US Middle East strategy. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT, Consiliul Suprem de 
Ap!rare a -!rii), which is the higher authority in security and defence matters, decided to 
accept the US’s request and to deploy in the first instance 278 troops, including those 
specializing in nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination, de-mining, as well as 
military police and medical assistance.116 At the end of May 2003, the Romanian 
authorities decided to increase the contribution to the multinational force in Iraq up to 
about 700 troops in total. According to national legislation, both decisions had to be 
approved by the Parliament. In both cases, the Parliament endorsed the request of the 
government with an overwhelming majority. The only political party that opposed sending 
troops to Iraq was the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), which refused to 
participate in the vote in the Parliament. The support for the US position mirrored therefore 
the preference of both the governing party and the political parties in the Opposition. This 
                                                
116 Supreme Council of National Defence, Press Communiqué, 10th February 2003, online 
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3559&_PRID=arh, accessed on  July 2009; 
Associated Press Worldstream, February 12, 2003, ‘Romania to contribute troops to possible Iraq war.’ 
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fact explains why the change of government following the elections in 2004 did not alter 
the Romanian policy of supporting US policy in Iraq (and Afghanistan).   
In terms of public opinion, the attitude of the public was not overtly against 
supporting the US action even without a UN resolution. Besides, different from Slovakia, 
the support for participation in international peacekeeping missions is higher in Romania, 
up to about a half of those surveyed in 2005, although in terms of what objectives are to be 
achieved there is a greater support for providing food and medical assistance to war 
victims than to stop a civil war or to remove a dictator by military means (Voinescu and 
Dobre, 2005: 27). At the same time, public opinion in Romania (and this is not different 
from those in other European countries) does not attach too much importance to foreign 
policy. Domestic concerns prevail here as well as in other countries, a fact that increases 
the space for manoeuvre for the government.  
The pro-Atlantic position of Romania presents some differences from other CEE 
countries. Although all of them are, to varying degrees, pro-Atlanticist, probably Poland 
and Romania were, in the aftermath of Iraq crisis, seen as the most supportive of US 
foreign policy, due also to the level of their contribution to supporting US efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. However, the pro-US position of the Romanian government became even 
more obvious (and controversial) during the debate over the setting up of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The role and jurisdiction of the Court was a matter of overwhelming 
consensus amongst the member and candidate states, reflected in the adoption of several 
common positions117 and in the reference made to its importance in the European Security 
Strategy of 2003. The Romanian government’s decision to sign an agreement exempting 
                                                
117 See the Common Position 2001/443/CFSP on the International Criminal Court, reviewed and reinforced 
by Common Position 2002/474/CFSP, and Common Position 2003/444/CFSP. An Action Plan has been also 
adopted in February 2004 to implement the Common Positions. Accessed on July 2009, online 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=404&lang=en.  
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U.S. soldiers on its territory from the jurisdiction of the ICC fractured the united front of 
the EU and received harsh criticism by the EU. The European Commission stated that  
‘Regrettably, this decision was taken without adequate prior consultation with the 
EU. It does not comply with the guiding principles laid down by the Council on 30 
September 2002’ (European Commission, 2002c).  
 
It is true that all the other candidate countries, including Hungary and Slovakia, were 
facing the same dilemma: either to uphold the EU common position or to side with the US 
and to endanger military and economic aid, perhaps even the chance to join the Alliance 
(for those countries that were still seeking admission). These countries, including 
transatlanticist Poland, refused to grant special treatment to US personnel. Romania was 
explicitly asked to side with the EU common position 2003/444/CFSP. Caught between the 
EU and the US, Romania indefinitely postponed the agreement’s ratification by the 
parliament, until a compromise was reached between the EU and United States.118  
Referring to the differences in transatlantic relations, foreign minister Mircea Geoan! 
argued that the ICC is more about approach and tactics than substance and strategic vision. 
In other words, he downplayed the existence of any substantive difference between the 
position adopted by Romania and that of the other European countries. It may be true that 
the Romanian authorities tried to gain as much as possible from a ‘privileged’ relationship 
with the US, while attempting not to stir up too much trouble in Brussels. The result, 
however, was not the one expected, a fact made evident by the criticism in the European 
Commission’s reports. Besides, the suspension of military aid to Hungary and Slovakia 
(and the other countries which did not comply with the US request) was only temporary, 
and the accession of Slovakia to NATO was not jeopardized at all. On the other hand, the 
position adopted by the other CEE countries demonstrated that, in spite of their preference 
                                                
118  BBC Monitoring Europe, September 16, 2002, Statement of Romanian foreign minister, Mircea Geoan!.  
208 
for a strong US involvement in European security, they are also committed to the EU’s 
foreign policy.  
This approach compensated to a certain extent for the dissident stance during the Iraq 
war. On the other hand, Romania found itself isolated on this matter and suspected of a 
lack of commitment to European foreign policy. Moreover, the position of Romania 
showed inconsistency between the formally claimed support for the universal norms of 
international law and the exceptions from these norms in certain cases (based on strategic, 
instrumental or conjunctural reasons). It also illustrated the conditionality power of the EU, 
even in the case of the intergovernmental field of foreign policy, which compelled 
Romania to take a compromising position between the two sides and to avoid ratifying the 
bilateral agreements with the US, while formally upholding the EU common position.  
 
7.6. Kosovo independence: the second test-case for Europeanization of foreign 
policy of CEE countries 
This section examines the foreign policies of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania with 
regard to the Kosovo issue against the background of European integration. The first major 
challenge for the three countries with regard to Kosovo was in 1999, when they had to 
prove their commitment to the objective of NATO integration by providing support for the 
North Atlantic Alliance’s military action against Yugoslavia. At this stage, only Hungary 
was a (new) member of NATO, while Slovakia and Romania were still aspiring countries. 
From the point of view of their status in relation to the EU, only Hungary had been given 
the green light for opening the accession talks. The second major challenge occurred nine 
years later, when Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia. By this time, all 
three countries were full members of both NATO and the EU. The question is whether 
membership made any difference in the external behaviour of CEE states. The selection of 
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the two Kosovo-related events was justified by the fact that they occurred both before and 
after accession; hence, it allows for examining the foreign policy behaviour of CEE 
countries both as candidates and full-members and see whether the change in their status 
indicates a more Europeanized foreign policy.  
 
i) The 1999 NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia  
In all three countries examined here, the political forces in government were of 
centre-right orientation. In Hungary, the Orbán government came to power in May 1998, 
replacing the socialist government of Gyula Horn. The foreign political orientation did not 
change the previously defined three major objectives, namely European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, good neighbourly relations and the policy towards kin-Hungarians abroad, but 
it emphasised the third over the second objective. The relevance of the internal political 
context in Hungary is that the major concern for Hungarian government in 1999 was the 
fate of ethnic Hungarians living in Vojvodina rather than the nature of bilateral relations 
with its Southern neighbour.  
The launch of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999 overlapped with 
the date when Hungary became officially a member of the Alliance. Hungary was expected 
to behave like a full member, despite its reluctance to enter a state of war with a neighbour, 
which is also the host country of 300,000 ethnic Hungarians (in Vojvodina, northern 
Yugoslavia). The concerns were related, on the one hand, to the potential danger that the 
NATO bombardments might accidentally hit the areas inhabited by ethnic Hungarians in 
Vojvodina, and on the other hand, to the potential retaliatory actions by the Serb army 
against ethnic Hungarians (interviews Brussels and Budapest 2007-8). Besides, Hungary 
was the only NATO member to have a common border with Yugoslavia, a fact that made 
the position of the Hungarian government more complicated.  
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In spite of these concerns, the Hungarian Parliament approved the opening of air 
space and territory to NATO forces by an overwhelming majority.119 Several reasons 
explain why this decision was eventually taken. The ultranationalist policies pursued by 
the Milo$evi0 regime, targeting ethnic minorities, were seen with hostility in Hungary, not 
only due to the concern over the fate of Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, but because it 
was seen as an unacceptable policy when it comes to the issue of ethnic minority rights. 
Such a position reflects the sensitiveness of Hungarian politicians on this matter. The 
appalling record of the Slobodan Milo$evi0 regime was a strong argument that prompted 
the Hungarian government to support NATO action not against Yugoslavia, but against 
Milo$evi0 himself.  
At the same time, the position of the government converged with the views of public 
opinion that was highly supportive of this decision, with 60% in favour of NATO 
intervention. However, as the conflict advanced, there were growing fears about the danger 
of Hungary being sucked into an undesired war with its Southern neighbour. Two-thirds of 
the public was against launching attacks on Yugoslavia from Hungarian soil and even 
more opposed the use of Hungarian troops in ground offensives or peacekeeping 
missions.120 Even so, the Hungarian Parliament approved sending 350 troops to join the 
50,000 international peacekeeping force in Kosovo as of July 1999.  
In Slovakia, the parliamentary elections taking place in September 1998 were won 
by an anti-Me"iar and pro-Western coalition against the background of public discontent 
with the increased international isolation of Slovakia. The catching-up strategy of the new 
government meant that the most important objective was to make visible steps towards 
integration in NATO and the EU, even if the reform was unpopular. In other words, the 
                                                
119 BBC Monitoring Europe, March 30, 1999, ‘Hungary: Parliamentary parties, even far-right, back NATO 
action in Yugoslavia.’ 
120 http://www.gallup.hu/english.htm#EURB, accessed on July 2009.   
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main priority was to recover lost ground in the competition with the other Visegrad 
countries, which fared better with regard to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The 
catching-up strategy explains why the government was overtly supportive of NATO 
airstrikes in Yugoslavia despite the fact that its actions collided with popular feelings (as 
well as with the isolationist views of the opposition parties). The support to NATO action 
was even more politically costly due to the public opinion feelings concerning the 
Alliance. Different from the issue of European integration, which was less contentious, the 
question of NATO membership was more divisive for Slovak society. While in January 
1999, only few months after the elections, the question of NATO membership enjoyed 
almost similar levels of support and disapproval (42% in favour and 41% against), after the 
military intervention of the Alliance in Yugoslavia support dramatically dropped to 35% 
while the anti-integrationist camp peaked at 53% and remained higher until August 2000. 
At the same time, over 64% of the population considered that NATO’s action was wrong 
or completely wrong (Gyárfá$ová and Vel$ic, 2000: 6-7). 
Despite growing popular discontent, the government, backed by the Parliament, 
agreed to open up national airspace and territory for NATO forces. This position had 
domestic political consequences, since Vladimir Me"iar exploited the popular discontent 
with the governmental position on this matter during the presidential campaign against 
Rudolf Schuster, the candidate of the ruling coalition, in 1999. Although the prerogatives 
of the president are largely ceremonial, the direct vote provides the president with strong 
legitimacy and political stature (Malová and Ucen, 2000: 516). Hence, it may offer a 
platform for supporting or obstructing the pro-Western orientation of the government. 
Eventually, Rudolf Schuster, who secured 57% of the votes, won the election, in the 
second round, furthering the pro-Western agenda of the government. The position to 
support NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia, alongside all the other required preparation and 
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the operational contribution to NATO’s crisis management operations in the Western 
Balkans, eventually paid off. At the Alliance Summit in Prague, Slovakia was invited to 
join the organization in 2004.  
In Romania, the popularity of the centre-right coalition centred on the Democratic 
Convention of Romania,121 in power since late 1996, was already in decline. The 
unpopular measures of internal reform to advance the objective of European integration, 
coupled with the persistent inter-coalition conflict, corruption and political-administrative 
incoherence eroded the legitimacy and credibility of the government. Against this 
background, the decision to support NATO’s action in Yugoslavia was considered an 
important chance to demonstrate to the West European countries and the US that Romania 
was a credible and determined candidate to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.  
Since the early 1990s, when the breaking-up of the former Yugoslavia began, the 
war and international embargos over Yugoslavia had deep negative consequences for the 
Romanian economy. However, there was also a positive side: it presented Romania with 
the opportunity of assuming, in the official discourse, the role of the ‘island of stability’ 
and contributor to security in the region (Gallagher, 1997). In contrast to the conflict-torn 
Yugoslavia, Romania (as well as Bulgaria and Hungary) benefited from internal stability 
and was able and willing to contribute troops to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia 
and especially in 1999 during the military intervention against Serbia (Gallagher, 2005: 
213). Similar to Slovakia, Romania’s endorsement of NATO’s military operation, despite 
its unpopularity at the domestic level,122 was judged a key factor in the attempt of the 
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Union (USD, Uniunea Social Democrat!) and, for the first time, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in 
Romania (UDMR).  
122 Ziua, April 27, 1999, ‘56,9% dintre romani vor categoric in NATO.’ (56,9% of Romanians strongly wants 
in NATO) http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=23994&data=1999-04-27, viewed online August 2009. 
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centre-right governmental coalition to secure integration into the Alliance123 (Fawn, 2001, 
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 242-5). Even if the support 
for NATO’s air campaign against Serbia in 1999 did not lead to an immediate invitation to 
join the Alliance, it played a major role in the decision taken by the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999 to invite Romania to open accession talks for EU membership 
(Gallagher, 2005, Pridham, 2007: 356).  
Although all three countries supported NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia, 
there were striking differences between them. While in Hungary the governmental support 
for NATO’s intervention was a consequence of being a member of NATO and having to 
behave as such, Slovakia and Romania provided their support while expecting to be 
rewarded with an invitation to join the Alliance. Different from Hungary was also the fact 
that the decision went against the preferences of the general public, predominantly hostile 
to military action. The differences between the three countries were to became visible 
again a decade later on the occasion of Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence.   
 
ii) Kosovo’s independence in 2008 
The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia, in February 2008, 
was a significant external challenge, requiring a clear position by European governments. 
At the EU level, the expected moment of Kosovo’s declaration of independence was 
challenging for, again, it was a test for the CFSP and the EU’s ambition to play a 
significant external role. It is a commonplace idea that the CFSP came to life due to the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia and the inability of the EU to confront the crises unfolding 
in its own backyard. The fact that in 1999 it was NATO and the US, not the EU and 
Western governments of the EU, which played the major role in stopping the Serbian army 
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action against Kosovar Albanians illustrated the EU’s inability to take decisive action 
when both political means and military capabilities were needed. This is why the failure to 
act in 1999 was one of the key factors in the development of the ESDP, a fact made plain 
by the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana (for an overview, see Shepherd, 
2009: 515-6).  
When the negotiations on the final status of Kosovo failed, the EU member states 
faced the imminent challenge of having to decide how to respond to a likely unilateral 
declaration of independence of the Kosovo parliament. The UN Special Envoy, the former 
Finnish president Marti Ahtisaari, conducted the negotiations between the Serbian 
government and the Kosovar Albanians throughout 2006. The settlement plan proposed by 
Ahtisaari and backed by the US and most EU governments, without explicitly mentioning 
independence from Serbia, provided for internationally supervised statehood for Kosovo, 
including conditions for self-rule and the right to apply for membership in international 
organizations. However, the talks ended without a solution acceptable to both sides. Since 
it was not possible to get the Ahtisaari plan through the UN Security Council due to 
Russia’s opposition, the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians decided to move towards 
independence with or without full UN endorsement. The anticipated declaration of 
independence was seen differently by EU member states, even if most of them agreed with 
the Ahtisaari plan. Although the adoption of a common position on the recognition of 
independence per se became unlikely within the EU Council, there was a clear support by 
all states with regard to the need for the EU to assume the greatest role in Kosovo. It would 
have been politically unacceptable for the EU and EU member states to fail once again (as 
they did before) to address the problems of the Western Balkans.  
For Hungary, the declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia was once again 
linked to the issue of the sizeable Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The major concern 
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was related to the potential retaliatory measures that the Serbian authorities (or Serbian 
radical groups) might have taken against ethnic Hungarians in case Hungary supported the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo (interviews, Brussels and Budapest 
2007-8). No less important was the position of the Serbian authorities, according to which 
Belgrade would take diplomatic measures against any country recognizing Kosovo as a 
newly independent state (interview, Budapest 2008). As a neighbouring country, Hungary 
was keen to preserve positive bilateral relationships with Serbia (interview, Budapest, 
2008).  
Hungary’s position was expressed in a letter from Prime Minister Gyurcsány 
addressed to the German chancellor, Angela Merkel (Germany held the EU rotating 
presidency in the first half of 2007). According to the letter, Hungary was favourable to the 
Ahtisaari Plan. Gyurcsány highlighted the fact that it was in Hungary's best interest that the 
decision on Kosovo should guarantee sustained stability in the region and that all parties 
involved be allowed to expound their position within reasonable time limits, in a genuine 
manner.124 However, as foreign minister Kinga Göncz explained, for Hungary what 
mattered most were the provisions on the autonomy and the rights of Kosovo’s 
communities. The emphasis placed on the issue of minorities’ rights differs from the one 
on the respect for international law and order dominating the discourse in Slovakia and 
Romania and stemmed from the way in which the national interest is defined in each of the 
three capitals.  
The internal political debate in Hungary was limited to the question of how 
Hungarian foreign policy should respond to this challenge. The Hungarian government 
preferred a strategy of wait and see, in general supportive of a common European position. 
The main opposition party, FIDESZ, after criticising the indecision of the government, 
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eventually adopted a similar standpoint. According to Zsolt Németh, the chairman of the 
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, the position of Hungary should be derived from 
the national interest, defined as the stability of the Western Balkans. To this end, Hungary 
should support the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence, alongside other 
EU member states like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, since the prolongation 
of the state of uncertainty would definitely increase instability in the region. Németh 
rejected the position of those states opposing Kosovo’s independence and accused them of 
having as the starting point their own internal problems instead of being focused on the 
settlement of the problem at hand. His remarks targeted especially the position of Russia 
with regard to the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, Slovakia and Romania on their 
concerns about their ethnic minorities, as well as Greece, Cyprus, and Spain on their own 
minorities.125 The remarks targeting the position of Slovakia and Romania were not 
unusual, being a symptom of the more confrontational conception of FIDESZ when it 
comes to issues such as ethnic minorities and collective rights. The Orbán government 
during 1998-2002 had a more nationalistic orientation, which to a certain extent was 
detrimental to the objective of good neighbourly relations. Besides, as the main opposition 
party in Hungary after 2002, FIDESZ’s leaders expressed on various occasions more 
critical views regarding the governments in Bratislava and Bucharest.  
The government, however, adopted a more cautious approach. Even after Kosovo’s 
Assembly issued the declaration of independence, on 17th February 2008, the statement of 
the Hungarian foreign minister was that Hungary would wait until after the meeting of EU 
foreign ministers in Brussels before adopting an official position on this matter. The 
disunity among the EU member states was evident even before this moment. The formal 
meeting of foreign ministers had to agree the obvious, namely that a common position 
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could not be reached and the member states should address the question of independence 
on a bilateral basis, while at the same time trying to make the Kosovo case a ‘sui generis’ 
one (Council of the European Union, 2008). It was easier to agree on the deployment of 
the European Union Police and Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX), even by the 
member states which opposed the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. This was 
possible since EULEX’s mandate, as defined by the Joint Action adopted by the Council 
on 4th February 2008, was to assist Kosovo’s institutions and judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in developing and strengthening a multi-ethnic justice and police 
system. The key point was that Kosovo’s institutions were defined on the basis of UN 
resolution 1244 and not as the new organs of a recently established state with uncertain 
international legitimacy.126 For the member states reluctant to accept independence, such 
as Slovakia and Romania, it was perfectly legitimate to endorse and participate in the 
EULEX mission since it was based on a UN resolution.  
In Hungary, the decision to participate in the EULEX mission was agreed long 
before knowing the position on the declaration of independence. Following the GAERC 
meeting, however, foreign minister Göncz proposed that the government start the 
procedure for officially recognising the independence of Kosovo. The cabinet meeting on 
19th March formally decided that the Republic of Hungary recognises the independence of 
Kosovo. That it was an uneasy and delicate choice is proved by the fact that the 
government of Hungary decided to issue the declaration as a joint statement together with 
Bulgaria and Croatia, two other countries directly neighbouring Serbia, the first a full 
member state, the other a candidate state (interview, Budapest 2008). The ground for the 
joint declaration was prepared in early February by a joint call of Hungary and Bulgaria for 
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a common EU position on the status of the breakaway Serbian province of Kosovo.127 This 
issue-based ad-hoc alliance was due to the fact that Hungary and Bulgaria were the only 
two direct EU neighbours of Serbia likely to follow the position of the majority of EU 
member states on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Romania, the other EU state 
directly neighbouring Serbia, made clear its position that it does not intend to recognise 
Kosovo’s independence. A common position adopted at the EU level would have allowed 
the two countries to avoid the need to take individual decisions with critical consequences 
for their bilateral relations with Serbia. In a way, EU unity would have provided the two 
countries with a protective umbrella. However, as long as a common position was not 
achieved, Hungary opted for the solution of issuing the joint declaration with Bulgaria and 
Croatia. The declaration was formulated in an extremely cautious way, trying to play down 
the objections of the Serbian government. The reaction of the Serbian MFA came, 
however, immediately, harshly accusing the recognition of breakaway Kosovo and 
threatening to take diplomatic measures.128  
In the case of Slovakia, the prospect that Kosovo would soon declare unilaterally its 
independence from Serbia pressed the Slovak authorities to agree a common position on 
this matter. The position of Slovakia was complicated by the fact that Slovakia was at that 
time a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, hence directly involved in the 
decision on the future status of Kosovo, based on the recommendations submitted by 
Ahtisaari in early March. As an EU member state, Slovakia was expected to uphold the 
common position of the Council on this matter, despite its reluctance. Moreover, the US 
and most of the EU’s governments supported the independence of Kosovo.  
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128 Associated Press Worldstream, March 19, 2008, ‘Croatia and Hungary recognize Kosovo, drawing 
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Slovakia’s unenthusiastic view on the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo had 
roots in history and pan-Slavic linguistic identity (interview, Brussels and Bratislava, 
2007-8). However, the pan-Slavic feelings of shared identity seem to be more salient in 
Slovakia than in other Slavic European countries, like the Czech Republic or Poland. To a 
certain extent, this might be due to the presence of a Slovak ethnic minority group living in 
Vojvodina, which is considered a bridge linking Serbia and Slovakia (interview, 
Bratislava, 2008). More than anything else, the reluctance of the Slovak political elite (and 
general public) to accept the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo is rooted in the 
perception that this case might be interpreted as a precedent for similar future claims 
elsewhere. The underlying concern was that ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia might feel 
encouraged by this precedent and, one day, follow a similar path (this view was most 
vocally expressed by Ján Slota, the leader of the SNS).129 
According to the constitutional law adopted in June 2004, the Slovak National 
Council has the power to issue binding resolutions on the government and its individual 
members. Based on this law, the Slovak National Council decided the official position of 
the Slovak Republic on 28th March 2007. The resolution, backed by the governing 
coalition and the majority of the opposition’s members of parliament, wanted Serbia’s 
demands to be respected and stated that ‘Full and unlimited independence of the province 
Kosovo is not in the interest of the region’. Even the fervent Atlanticist policy-makers 
contended that the US position on this matter was wrong (interviews, Bratislava, 2008). 
Those who supported NATO’s air strikes against the Milo$evi0 regime in 1999 considered 
the US and EU support for Kosovo independence as an external imposition, as an unjust 
punishment, since post-1999 Serbia is a democratic country, holding fair elections and 
electing democratic representatives (interview, Bratislava, 2008).       
                                                
129 BBC Monitoring Europe, February 17, 2008, ‘Slovakia not to recognize Kosovo independence.’ 
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The only political party in the Parliament that abstained from the vote on the 
resolution was the organization of ethnic Hungarians (similar in this matter to the situation 
in Romania). According to the leader of the Hungarian Coalition Party, Pál Csáky, as long 
as the US and most European governments supported Kosovo, the rejection of 
independence would be unsustainable in the long run. Besides, he argued, pan-Slavic and 
pan-Russian feelings would bring Slovakia under Russia’s sphere of influence, which 
would be a step in the wrong direction.130 There was an obvious split between the positions 
advocated by Slovak political parties, both in government and opposition (although there 
were nuances, the overall standpoint was against the unilateral independence) and the 
solution advocated by the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) in Slovakia (very similar to 
what happened in Romania on the same matter).  
The resolution of the Slovak Parliament went against the preferences of the Foreign 
Ministry that had previously backed the Ahtisaari plan. Within the Slovak Permanent 
Representation in Brussels and the MFA in Bratislava there was a greater degree of 
flexibility in terms of the future status of Kosovo, a greater awareness of the mainstream 
position of other countries and the risk for Slovakia to see itself isolated. The space for 
manoeuvre of the MFA was constrained by the resolution of the political forces in the 
Parliament and the MFA had to stick with this position. Within the GAERC meeting held 
in Bremen, in March 2007, during the German EU presidency, foreign minister Kubi$ had 
to present the binding resolution of the Slovak National Council to the other foreign 
ministers in the EU Council, some of whom were astonished by it.131 The Slovak foreign 
minister had also refused to make clear whether the position of the Slovak National 
Council corresponds to his own opinions, which he considered as irrelevant in this 
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context.132 The political pressure came not only from the capital, but also from European 
leaders themselves, pressing Slovak diplomacy to feel responsible for the EU’s failure to 
reach a common position. Kubi$ voiced annoyance over the fact that ‘our EU partners see 
Slovakia's position as...[contributing] to the feeling that unity has been disrupted.’133  
However, similar positions on the future of Kosovo came from several other EU 
countries like Romania (see later this chapter), Spain, Greece and Cyprus. The fact that 
there were several countries sharing a similar position on this matter prevented Slovakia 
from being completely isolated in the Council. The other side of the coin is that the other 
EU foreign ministers had to accept that a common position, backed by all member states, is 
not feasible and a formula of compromise had to be found in order to salvage the image of 
the EU’s unity.    
At the time of the formal declaration of independence, on 17th February 2008, the 
official position of Slovak foreign policy was that for the time being Kosovo would not be 
recognised as an independent state. Foreign minister Kubi$ made the point that Slovakia 
will decide on any further move only after evaluating the situation in Kosovo and the steps 
undertaken by the international community, while at the same time supporting the 
activities of the UN, EU, NATO and other international organizations present in the 
region, especially by means of Slovak participation in NATO’s (KFOR) and the EU 
(EULEX) missions based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).134 The decision 
to contribute personnel and participate in the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, which 
aimed to support local authorities in the field of police, judiciary and customs capacity 
building, while at the same time not recognising the very entity which is the target of the 
                                                
132 Ibidem. 
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EU mission, might be seen as paradoxical and contradictory (the same is also true in the 
case of Romania). However, this is a good example of the complexity of EU membership 
and the difficulty of balancing the multiplicity of commitments with the protection of 
domaines réservés. On the one hand, it was a commitment to the development of the CFSP 
and ESDP, to enhancing the European prospects for the Western Balkan countries and to 
upholding international law. On the other hand, it was the different perception of what is 
the national interest, reflecting divergent preferences from the mainstream preferences of 
EU member states, which undermined the objective of European unity and coherence in 
the foreign policy field. Hence, what appears at first sight as incoherence is in fact the need 
to balance between constraints and commitments.  
In Romania, the political scene was deeply divided on questions of internal politics, 
resulting in the collapse of the coalition government that had won the elections in late 2004 
and brought Romania into the EU in 2007. Following the general elections in November 
2004, the left-wing government was replaced by a governmental coalition built around the 
centre-right Truth and Justice Alliance,135 also including the party of ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania. At the same time, Traian B!sescu, the candidate of the Truth and Justice 
Alliance, won the presidential competition. The divergent preferences emerged 
immediately after accession, as if the glue keeping together the coalition government 
melted as soon as the common objective of European integration had been achieved. The 
political conflict within the governing coalition led to its breaking down and the formation 
of a minority government of liberals and the ethnic Hungarian party, informally supported 
by the social democrats in opposition. Even worse, the internal political conflict 
culminated in the Parliament voting for the impeachment of the president for 
unconstitutional behaviour and suspending him. The referendum organized according to 
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the constitutional requirements resulted in a clear vote against the impeachment (three 
quarters of the 44% voter turnout).  
Despite the internal political conflict, on the matter of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, which was high on the international agenda throughout 2007 and early 
2008, the preferences of Romanian political parties, both in government and opposition, 
coincided in a remarkable way. Like Slovakia, Romania was part of the club of dissident 
countries with regard to the support of a united EU front on Kosovo. The position of 
Romania in 2006, while the negotiations conducted by UN Special Envoy were underway, 
was that it supported a large degree of autonomy for Kosovo, but it could not agree with an 
approach targeting statehood and the existing borders; a large degree of autonomy is both a 
European approach and does not create any dangerous precedent.136 There was a clear 
awareness of the fact that there was little chance to turn round a position that seemed to 
represent the will of the majority of the member states (not only the largest and most 
powerful members, such as the UK, France and Germany, but also smaller yet influential 
countries like the Netherlands). During 2006, at a time when Romania was not yet a full 
member of the EU, bilateral consultations had been also conducted with Slovakia and 
Greece, where the question of Kosovo’s status was discussed. It became clear that 
Romania, as a future member, shared the objection to unilateral solutions on Kosovo with 
other member states.  
The mandate given by the Supreme Council of National Defence to the foreign 
minister on the eve of the GAERC meeting in March 2007 was based on this standpoint, 
which has been reiterated throughout 2007, both within the EU framework and in bilateral 
meetings, such as the meeting of foreign minister Cioroianu with Serbian ambassadors in 
Belgrade, in December 2007: ‘any solution of the status of Kosovo should be in line with 
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the international law in force and should be accepted by both parties. We support a 
negotiated settlement, endorsed by the UN Security Council’.137 At the same time, again in 
the same fashion to Slovakia, Romanian officials expressed from an early stage (i.e. early 
2007) that Bucharest intends to support EU efforts in Kosovo in the post-conflict stage.138 
In January 2008, the concrete nature of the support was defined: Romania was ready to 
send a contingent of 175 policemen as contribution to the EULEX mission.139     
In the view of the Romanian president expressed on several occasions, the unilateral 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence might fuel conflicts elsewhere. He pointed to the 
frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, especially the separatist pro-Russian regime in 
Transdniester region in the Republic of Moldova. When the war in Georgia over the 
separatist region of South Ossetia broke out in the summer of 2008, president B!sescu did 
not hesitate to blame the ‘great powers’ and to say that this was the direct consequence of 
the decision on Kosovo. The position of Romanian officials was linked by various media 
observers with the concern that the ethnic Hungarians in Romania might invoke Kosovo as 
a precedent for similar demands. Yet, Romanian officials made it explicit on numerous 
occasions that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence cannot be interpreted as 
the existence in international law of provisions for collective rights for national minorities 
or granting them the right of secession.140  
There was, practically, no controversy with regard to how Romania should react to 
the unilateral declaration of independence, with the notable exception of the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) (similar to Slovakia). The vote in the 
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Romanian Parliament, on 19th February 2008, on the recognition or not of the new entity 
was overwhelmingly against independence (357 against, 27 in favour). Markó Béla, the 
moderate leader of the UDMR, employed the same arguments used by the representatives 
of the ethnic Hungarian party in Slovakia. He declared in a press conference that ‘Sooner 
or later Romania, as a member state of the European Union, will have to recognize Kosovo 
as a new independent state’141. On the other hand, he argued that the only precedent to be 
drawn from the Kosovo case is in terms of the need for international actors to get involved 
in strengthening the rights of ethnic minorities.142  
Even if this was a moderate position, not shared by the more radical representatives 
of the community of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, it stirred up angry reactions by 
Romanian political parties. At stake was the fact that UDMR was a member of the 
governing coalition, alongside the liberal party. This created a different situation from the 
political context in Slovakia, which was otherwise very similar. The position adopted 
raised, therefore, the suspicions that the official stance of the Romanian government was 
not coherent. Unsurprisingly, there were voices asking for the UDMR to step down from 
the government.  
 
7.7. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the extent of change in the way in which the 
national foreign policy has been formulated and conducted in Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania before and after EU accession. The main questions were whether a more salient 
European dimension turned out to characterize the post-accession foreign policy thinking 
and formulation in the new member states and whether the conduct of foreign policy 
reflected a greater preference for EU channels rather than other means. These two aspects 
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were considered indicators of the extent to which national foreign policy were 
Europeanized. The chapter attempted to demonstrate that governmental politics and the 
politics of national identity played a key role in the definition of national preferences and 
that after accession the new member states placed a greater emphasis on the pursuit of the 
national interest. 
Before accession, the CEE countries had to compromise over some of their domaines 
réservés, such as the conclusion of bilateral treaties between Hungary and Slovakia and 
Hungary and Romania, equally contested but also needed in order to comply with the 
external demands and to further progress on the integration path. After accession, the fact 
that the foreign policy of the new member states placed a ‘greater emphasis on the pursuit 
of the national interest’ did not mean that the defence and projection of national interest 
was absent before accession. That European integration was the main strategic priority of 
foreign policy in the CEE countries meant that all other objectives have been subsumed to 
it. Once the accession was achieved, foreign policy of the new member states needed to 
redefine new priorities and reorder them according to their (perceived) importance. This 
was an inward looking process, an inventory of state’s interests. The balance between 
international commitments and national interests was reconsidered in all three countries. 
Likewise, the transatlantic link and the key role of the USA in Europe remained 
fundamental in their foreign policy preferences, as well as the stress on NATO as the main 
security provider in Europe. At the same time, there was an ever-growing awareness of the 
need to strengthen the CFSP and ESDP and the commitment to do so characterized the 
practical conduct of foreign policy in all three countries (although with some notable 
exceptions). They all support further enlargement of the EU, although each of them has a 
favourite country for which they have assumed the role of advocate within the EU. For 
instance, Hungary is an advocate of Croatia, Slovakia of Serbia and Romania of the 
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Republic of Moldova. Broadening the geographical scope, all CEE candidate countries 
share these similar features. Poland is a supporter of Ukraine’s European prospects. The 
Atlanticism is a common tenet of foreign policy of all new member states, although in 
various degrees.  
As clarified at the beginning of this chapter, the definition of state’s interests is a 
function of the ideological orientation and political preferences of political parties in 
government and opposition. Although there are interests which transcend domestic 
politics, such as territorial integrity, the formulation of national interests reflect the 
inherent contradictions of any democratic polity. With accession, the internal political 
debate turned on to the question of how the interests of the state are to be defended and 
projected within the EU. The accent placed on the pursuit of national interest was therefore 
a direct consequence of the understanding that pre-accession conditionally no longer 
constrained the state’s actions, that it was legitimate to defend own interests and that the 
existence of domaines réservés was perfectly acceptable.  
There are, certainly, differences in the manner to which European integration 
affected the foreign policy of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. Perhaps the most important 
is that the reaffirmation of national interest is given different meanings. For Hungary, it is 
a matter of national interest to further its national policy through the channels available 
within the EU and to reunite the Hungarian nation within a borderless Europe. For 
Slovakia and Romania, it is a matter of national interest to oppose the introduction of 
collective rights for national minorities. The different formulation of national interests 
reflects the way in which domestic politics filters historical experiences and transpose 
them into policy objectives. In all three cases, the European Union provides the 
institutional framework and platform to further these objectives. Before accession, the 
rhetoric about their innate Europeanness, shared norms and values, common heritage and 
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sense of belonging had obscured, to a certain extent, the emphasis on local specificities and 
unique historical experiences. In a region where history was a zero-sum experience, where 
the gains of one country meant necessarily a loss for other country in terms of borders and 
populations, the perception of what is the national interest is deeply rooted in the past. If 
before accession, the national interest was defined more in terms of self-identification with 
Europe and Euro-Atlantic values, the formal accession had removed the previous qualms 
in regard to the reiteration of a uniqueness that has to be preserved within the European 
melting pot. One of the most visible expressions of these differences in the understanding 
of what is the national interest and how it has to be defended within the EU was the case of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Despite the search for a common position within 
the EU and the commitment to the development of the CFSP, the eventual stance was 
dictated by national idiosyncrasies.  
Other examples of determination to pursue what was perceived as in the national 
interest by the governments, irrespective of international concerns, are the Slovak 
Language Law of Robert Fico’s cabinet, the Hungarian dual citizenship law, and the 
Romanian policy of granting Romanian passports to the citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova. While each of these cases deserves a more detailed discussion, it was not the aim 
of this research to focus on them (not least because these are recent events, unfolding at the 
time of writing up this thesis). Yet, these developments support the argument of this 
chapter that the governments of the new member states fell less constrained than before 
accession to pursue the course of action they deem appropriate. 
There are potential implications for the future of the EU’s foreign and security policy 
and EU ability to speak with a single voice. The EU’s unity has been shattered on various 
key occasions by the member states themselves, despite their previous commitments to act 
in unison. The lesson learned for the new member states was that internal disunity is a 
229 
factor that might help sometimes. In the case of the US military invasion of Iraq, it helped 
because there was no EU common position. The challenge was to choose between the 
‘core’ Europeans (i.e. France and Germany) and the rest in an attempt to choose the camp 
most likely to provide the greatest benefits and, perhaps, to inflict a lesser degree of 
damage.  
The distinction between old and new member states is not a workable one. All too 
often, the split within the EU was not between old and new member states, but between 
groups of states with different policy preferences. The support for NATO and the US’s role 
in Europe is shared by both West and CEE countries. The war in Iraq demonstrated that 
Europe is not divided between a Western and an Eastern half, but that the West was 
fractured in two competing camps. Similarly, the Kosovo declaration of independence was 
opposed by countries from both the group of old (Greece and Spain) and new member 
states (Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus). It is therefore unrealistic to expect that a greater 
Europeanization of foreign policies of the new member states would help the aim of EU 
unity and coherence in foreign policy. The contradictions within the EU are deeply rooted 
and unlikely to disappear soon.   
The diversity of preferences in EU-15 and its potential to compromise the ambitious 
goal of unity is a proven fact. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU proved that the 
trend of further diversification proceeds with an increased awareness of the national 
interest among the new member states. There is hardly any reluctance of the new member 
states to oppose what they perceive as touching upon the national interest, no matter how 
the national interest is defined. This trend is likely to challenge further the EU’s ambitions 
to act as a unitary actor.  
However, the diversity of preferences in an enlarged EU has a beneficial side for the 
CFSP. Although the CFSP has a dynamic of its own, driven by the ever-growing 
230 
institutionalization of foreign policy, it also represents a collection of policy preferences of 
the member states. The diversity of preferences enriches the CFSP, by adding new policy 
initiatives and projects. It is worth pointing out that while the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) was designed in the aftermath of the 2004 Enlargement, the Eastern 
Partnership was established in 2009 because of the pressures of CEE countries. Their aim 
was to give more coherence to the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, by 
separating them from the group of Mediterranean neighbours of the EU. Another example 
is the Black Sea Synergy, the EU initiative aiming to increase cooperation among and 
between the countries surrounding the Black Sea, which was the result of the pressures 
from the two most recent members of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania. The list of examples 
is longer and is not the aim here to provide an exhaustive account, but to illustrate the point 
that the diversity of preferences contributes to the diversity of policy instruments of the 
CFSP. The concluding chapter examines in more detail the way in which the enlargement 
and the diversification of preferences is likely to affect the development of EU foreign 
policy.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has examined the impact of European integration on the foreign policy of 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, three of the new member states of the EU from CEE. The 
aim was to answer three principal and several subsidiary research questions. The three 
principal questions were as follows: a) what is the impact of European integration on the 
foreign policy of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe?; b) whether 
and to what extent there is convergence or/divergence of national responses to 
Europeanization pressures? And c) why there is divergence of national responses? 
In order to answer these principal questions, a systemic analytical framework has 
been designed to examine the top-down Europeanization of: a) the institutional basis of 
foreign policy-making and coordination of European affairs; b) the national identity 
reconstruction through the process of elite socialization; and c) the practical content of 
foreign policy, its values, aims and means. The subsidiary six research questions 
correspond to the three dimensions on which the analytical framework is built (see section 
2 of this chapter for a review and discussion of how the empirical findings answered the 
six research questions).  
This last chapter has four major sections. The first one discusses whether the 
systemic analytical framework delivered on the initial expectations. The second one takes 
stock of this thesis’s findings against the background of the initial research questions and 
assumptions. The third section examines the limitations of the research. Taking a critical 
approach, it underscores the limits with regard to the initial objectives of the research. The 
final section examines how this research project contributes to the literature on the 
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Europeanization of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. It also considers the 
question of whether the empirical findings of this thesis can be generalized beyond the 
three countries selected as case studies for this research project.  
 
8.2. To what extent did the systemic analytical framework deliver on the initial 
expectations? 
The reason why the systemic framework was chosen for the objectives of this 
research was detailed at length in the analytical chapter. It is worth reiterating the key 
aspects of the systemic framework used by this thesis. The model suggested that the EU (a 
political system in its own right) may be seen as the source of a set of inputs of demands 
(the acquis communautaire and politique, conditionality, formal or informal norms and 
rules etc) or support (institutional and normative models, political allies etc) which affect 
the policy-making, elite socialization and formal content and conduct of foreign policy (the 
outputs of Europeanization) (see p. 51 and pp. 56-67). For reasons explained elsewhere 
(see pp. 52-6), this thesis assumed that the domestic sources of foreign policy (i.e. 
governmental politics and national identity politics) mediate between the input of 
Europeanization and the outcomes to be explained. It also argued that the mediating factors 
may convincingly account for the differentiated impact of Europeanization. In brief, the 
political systems framework was expected to provide a convenient organizing device for 
examining the domestic impact of Europeanization. 
The critique that might be addressed with regard to opting for the systemic model is 
that it is too mechanical and causal, while some of the assumptions of this thesis would 
suggest the need for a more flexible, more interpretive approach. However, as this thesis 
tried to clarify (see p. 54), ‘causality’ is not used in a positivist sense, especially with 
regard to the issue of identity change (see Ruggie, et al., 1998: 869), in which case there is 
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no discernible cause, but rather a specific context or environment potentially conducive to 
a change of prevailing norms at the domestic level. If this view of ‘causality’ is accepted, 
the abovementioned critique of the systems approach can be played down.  
Another critique might be raised with regard to the fact that this framework is too 
simple and, therefore, inappropriate in accounting for the complexity of the integration 
process. The answer to this potential critique is that the consistency of any analytical 
framework is given by the coherence between the initial assumptions, data collection and 
data analysis, irrespective of how complex is the chosen model. Besides, as explained in 
chapter four (p. 69), the three outputs of the Europeanization process (institutional change, 
elite socialization, and conduct of foreign policy) were selected because they were widely 
targeted by the Europeanization literature. In this way, it was possible to contrast the extent 
of change of these three outcomes not only across the countries examined as case-studies 
in this thesis (and across time), but by drawing lessons from other studies focused on 
different countries under similar conditions, facing comparable adaptational pressures.  
Hence, the systemic analytical framework proved a useful heuristic device for 
organizing the relationships between the independent variable (Europeanization), 
mediating factors (governmental politics and national identity politics) and outputs 
(institutions and policy-making, elite socialization and the formal content and conduct of 
foreign policy).   
 
8.3. To what extent have the empirical findings answered the research 
questions? 
The three principal research questions of this thesis served different purposes. The 
questions about the nature and extent of the Europeanization of foreign policy and the one 
about the extent to which Europeanization caused convergence or/and divergence were 
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descriptive. The question about the differentiated impact of Europeanization was 
explanatory. The first two were expected to provide empirical material with which the 
third question could be answered against the background of the initial assumptions. These 
assumptions were that the mediating role of governmental politics and national identity 
politics (the intervening factors proposed in this thesis) offer a convincing explanation for 
the differentiated impact of Europeanization in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.  
The following discuss in more details the empirical findings with regard to each of 
the six specific research questions and in the context of the distinct empirical chapters 
where these questions have been addressed. 
 
1. What is the nature and extent of institutional change of the national foreign 
policy systems in line with the formal and/or informal requirements of 
participation in EU foreign policy? 
 
The first empirical chapter employed a historical institutional approach in explaining 
institutional change and provided extensive empirical evidence with regard to the 
successive stages of transformation of the systems of coordination of European affairs and 
foreign policy making in the three countries in. The use of the pre-accession and 
integration stages was useful in mapping some of the major institutional adjustments in all 
three countries corresponding to similar stages of the European integration process. The 
Europe Agreement stage led to the creation of the institutions of association reflecting the 
provisions of the Europe Agreements. The opening of the negotiation talks led to the 
creation of the position of chief negotiator and his team and of departments of European 
affairs in all ministries and governmental agencies. Empirical findings suggested that 
institutional adjustment was likely to occur after the change of coalition governments. For 
instance, the system of coordinating European affairs was changed in Hungary after the 
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parliamentary elections in 1994 (moving the Office of European Affairs from the Ministry 
of International Economic Relations to the Ministry of International Trade, see pp. 102-
103). It happened also in 2002 (p. 116) and after the replacement as Prime Minister of 
Medgyessy with Ferenc Gyurcsány in August 2004, soon after accession (moving the 
coordination of European affairs back and forth between the MFA and PM’s Office, see p. 
118). The change of the governing coalition in Slovakia in 1998 led to a reinforcement of 
the institutional capacity of the MFA (p. 107). In Romania, significant decisions were 
adopted following the reshuffle of the governing coalition in 1999 (moving the 
coordination of European affairs to the MFA from the PM’s office) and after the general 
elections in late 2000 (creating a completely new Ministry of European Integration) (pp. 
122-4). Finally, the post-accession period eliminated most of the previous institutional 
arrangements due to the fact that the function they were supposed to perform was no 
longer needed (i.e the institutions of association). However, this approach did not say 
anything about why a particular design of coordination of European affairs was preferred 
over alternative options. The second research question assumed the task of clarifying why 
there was divergence across countries by testing the assumption that governmental politics 
is a key explanatory factor.  
 
2. Why does the institutional transformation in view of European integration 
reflect different patterns across the national systems of foreign policy in the 
three countries? 
  The extent to which the second research question elicited convincing answers 
deserves a more detailed analysis. The governmental politics was a key element of this 
discussion. It was made clear that there is a linkage between different coalition cabinets 
and the way in which national responses to Europeanization were formulated. An 
important characteristic of governmental politics in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania is the 
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fact that during the last two decades, the majority of cabinets have been coalition cabinets. 
It is true that coalition cabinets have a long history in Europe, being part of the daily 
functioning of most political systems (with the notable exception of the UK, at least until 
the most recent elections in May 2010, or Malta for that matter). From this point of view, 
the three countries examined here are not exceptional in any way. The salience of coalition 
cabinets adds an extra layer of complexity when it comes to deciphering the mechanisms 
of domestic politics. It has also been shown that intra-governmental competition between 
ministries was an important factor (although not the only one) explaining why the centre of 
gravity in managing European affairs changed over time. Besides, details were provided 
with regard to the roles played by political leaders or senior officials in the policy-making 
process.  
Deeper insights were acquired by focusing on the decisions taken by different 
cabinets or coalition cabinets and the inter-institutional competition within the core 
executive. Evidence has been provided with regard to the fact that the change of coalition 
governments was often (although not always) associated with both a new perspective of 
what represents European integration (foreign policy, external economic relations, or 
internal politics) and who was to be responsible for managing it. Here it is worth restating 
the choice to examine the problem of coordination of European affairs in the first empirical 
chapter. The choice might appear surprising, given the fact that the focus of this thesis is 
on foreign policy and foreign policy-making. However, European integration was 
perceived at times as a matter of foreign policy and some other times as something more 
complex, intermingled with domestic politics. The coordination of European affairs 
appears in this light as a component of the foreign policy-making process. This confusion 
was reflected in the way in which the system of coordination and management of European 
integration was designed, being managed either by the MFA, the PM’s Office or other 
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bodies. What European integration was about and who should deal with it was a puzzle in 
all three countries.  
It was interesting to see how the perception of different governments oscillated 
between a view which treated European affairs as either foreign policy or external 
economic relations and one which gradually moved towards viewing EU affairs as 
something more pervasive and complex, deeply affecting the domestic level. The way in 
which European integration was perceived had consequences on the decision of which 
domestic institutional actor had to be in charge of coordinating the process (e.g. the MFA, 
the PM’s office or a dedicated new ministry of European affairs, as was the case in 
Romania). It was clear that there is no unique pattern replicated across the three countries.  
Certainly, as this thesis has shown, the preferences defended by senior members of 
the cabinets were also linked to the dynamic of inter-ministerial competition. The 
assumption of the governmental politics approach is that administrative-bureaucratic 
bodies within the government tend to expand their role in the system of policy-making, 
acting as benefit maximizers. Controlling the management of European affairs was an 
important matter in the inter-institutional competition between ministries of foreign affairs, 
ministries of economy or the offices of the prime minister. Such a position meant greater 
budgetary resources and influence in relation to other ministries and governmental 
agencies, as well as greater political leverage for the minister responsible of European 
affairs within the cabinet. At the end of the day, European integration involved the transfer 
of substantial pre-accession funding from the EU’s coffers.  
On the other hand, the inter-institutional competition between different bureaucratic 
bodies accounts for institutional continuity or inertia as well, since the change of coalition 
government has not always led to a new adjustment of the institutional design of policy-
making. For instance, the Orbán cabinet largely preserved the design elaborated by the 
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Horn government between 1994 and 1998. The government of Robert Fico has not brought 
significant changes to the system of coordinating European affairs left in place by the 
Dzurinda cabinet. Similarly, in Romania, the Ministry of European Integration was not 
transformed into a department subordinated to the prime minister immediately after the 
elections in the November of 2004, but only two years later when it was clear that the EU 
accession was irreversible.  
 
3. Do the experts and diplomats from the Permanent Representations hold 
different views on the aims and means of EU foreign policy from those in the 
capitals, working in the ministries of foreign affairs? 
  The empirical findings to this research question suggested that the national 
representatives in Brussels did undertake a learning process during the first few years of 
participation in the meetings of EU Council, either as observers in the initial stage and as 
full members after accession. On the one hand, the learning process involved acquiring 
new knowledge about how precisely the EU foreign policy towards non-member states and 
with regard to specific issues is formulated.  On the other hand, learning the rules of the 
game, both formal and informal, learning new norms of compromise and consensus-
seeking, avoidance of hard bargaining and respect for other countries domaines réservés by 
the new national representatives was instrumental in their smooth insertion into the new 
environment. It became clear that there is a stark difference between the national officials 
detached to the Permanent Representations and those working in the national ministries of 
foreign affairs on the matter of knowing the policy and the rules of the game; the former 
were clearly better informed than their colleagues in the capitals. Their superior expertise 
of the national official in Brussels was widely acknowledged by interviewees in all three 
national capitals as well as the greater influence Permanent Representations have over the 
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formulation of national foreign policies (except in the case of sensitive issues, such as 
Kosovo declaration of independence).   
At the same time, more similarities than differences could be noticed between the 
two groups of national officials with regard to the perception of EU norms. In both cases, 
the relevance of these norms is accepted, but in an instrumental manner. What these views 
share is a certain degree of scepticism. However, the officials in Brussels tend to behave 
more according to the norms and rules of the EU culture of compromise than their fellow 
colleagues in the national capitals. This fact is not too surprising given the constraints and 
opportunities of the social environment in which human agents operate. In the case of the 
national officials in Brussels, not to play according to the rule of the game and by the 
norms of compromise and consensus means to be marginalized or miss opportunities. 
Therefore, it is a matter a rational calculation to follow the rules and behave according to 
the norms of the community to which an individual belong at a certain point in time.      
 
4. Is elite socialization simply a process of learning new norms and rules or does 
it have a deeper character that affects the inner self-identification of the 
participant agents?  
While the two research questions in the first chapter tried to explain cross-country 
variation drawing almost exclusively on governmental politics explanations, the second 
empirical chapter combined governmental politics and national identity politics as 
explanatory factors. The latter analytical category was defined as the ideas national policy-
makers hold about political community, which are used to activate a sense of unity and 
solidarity in order to legitimise political action. It was explained that there is no single set 
of ideas equally shared by all political actors (see pp. 138). Instead, it emerged that 
political parties, which were members of the coalition government or in opposition, play 
the issues of national and European identity differently.  
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Again, this is not unusual in Europe or elsewhere in the world. In a Burkeian fashion, 
conservative parties tend to stress the importance of traditional institutions and oppose 
change. Nationalist parties go even further in stressing the prevalence of national identity 
over other forms of regional or local identification. At the same time, given their 
internationalist ideology, the socialist or social-democratic parties tend to be focused the 
least on the question of national identity (except in the case of fusion between left and 
nationalist ideologies). Certainly, the national identity discourse was played heavily in 
Slovakia or Romania under Vladimír Me"iar and Ion Iliescu (the latter being the case of a 
fusion of leftist ideology and nationalism) and in Hungary under the József Antall and 
Viktor Orbán premierships. The post-2006 political developments in Slovakia (such as the 
adoption of the controversial Slovak language law) also suggest a fusion between the left-
wing ideology and the emphasis of the national identity discourse of the governing 
coalition. The recent elections in Hungary in the spring of 2010, which were won by a 
landslide by FIDESZ, and the newly announced policy of offering Hungarian citizenship to 
the Magyars in neighbouring countries also confirm this point. 
The discussion on the persistence of national identities and the way in which the 
official discourses targeting the issue of national identity and the relationship between the 
nation and Europe/European identity is important insofar as it provides the background for 
understanding the limits of elite socialization. The aphorism of governmental politics that 
‘where you stand is where you sit’ or, in other words, the fact that individual preferences 
are determined by the roles individuals play within institutional settings (see Sears et al., 
2003: 259), may account for different degrees of socialization. Hence, the primary loyalty 
rests with the home institutions. It was difficult to discern a transfer of loyalty towards the 
EU institutions, although empirical findings confirmed the assumption that senior officials 
and diplomats working in the permanent representations in Brussels have learnt how to 
241 
‘play’ their roles of ‘compromise-seekers’ and ‘consensus-seekers’ according to the EU’s 
rules and norms. Nonetheless, there is a difference between role-playing and beliefs. The 
assumption that diplomats in Brussels also performed the role of ‘norms entrepreneurs’ in 
relation to their colleagues in the capital was not upheld by consistent empirical evidence. 
The separation of national officials in two distinct groups proved problematic eventually, 
due to the high fluctuation of individuals back and forth between Brussels and the capitals, 
as well as the short terms of secondment in Brussels (see more on this at the section on 
research limitations, p. 246).  
 
5. To what extent do the officially stated foreign policy priorities and 
commitments, interests and the means of achieving them reflect a more 
salient European dimension after accession? 
Both governmental politics and national identity politics proved useful explanatory 
factors with regard to the issue of the formal conduct of foreign policy. The third chapter 
showed that foreign policy priorities often change in order to reflect the policy preferences 
of the governing coalition in power, which are also a function of the way in which 
constituent political parties perceive and define the issue of national identity. The official 
stance towards the EU and NATO integration of the post-communist governments of 
Romania until 1996 and Slovakia until 1998 lacked credibility, in spite of some formal 
steps in this direction. The case of Hungary plainly illustrated that the left-wing coalition 
governments had preferred to pursue the objectives of European, Euro-Atlantic integration, 
and a policy of good neighbourly relations, while the fate of national policy towards kin-
Hungarians in neighbouring countries mattered more for the right wing cabinets.  
 
 
242 
6. To what extent does the conduct of foreign policy reflects a preference for EU 
channels rather than using other national/international tools? 
The third empirical chapter examined at length the way in which the national foreign 
policies have related to the European foreign policy in routine policy making situations as 
well as in cases of critical external shock. The aim was to learn whether the EU channels 
were preferred over alternative options as an indicator of Europeanization in both 
situations of routine policy-making and external crises. The use of the two sub-case studies 
of US-war in Iraq and Kosovo independence (including the NATO intervention in 
Yugoslavia in 1999) offered additional material to this aim. 
Routine foreign policy-making suggests the institutionalization of the long-term 
strategic objectives of foreign policy, which are pursued by political actors and 
bureaucratic machinery regardless of which government is in power. Maintaining a key 
role for the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe, developing the CFSP as a complementary 
and not competing instrument to NATO, seeking and preserving a privileged relationship 
with the United States, as well as focusing on the immediate neighbourhood have been and 
continue to be the key tenets of foreign policy in the Central and Eastern European 
countries. These long-term strategic objectives stayed the same even if the emphasis on 
one or another foreign policy priority might have shifted with a change of coalition 
government (as pointed out above).   
In general, the emergence of the CFSP was viewed with scepticism by the new 
member states from CEE, especially due to the perception that it might undermine the role 
of the United States in European security. However, the support for the development of the 
CFSP was facilitated by a number of factors. During the accession talks, the CFSP was 
concluded amongst the very first, being one of the least problematic. The fact that national 
foreign policies were aligned with the EU common positions and joint actions almost 
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mechanically was because most of these issues targeted areas of the world of limited 
interest for the CEE countries. On the other hand, when the EU targeted regions like the 
Western Balkans or Eastern Europe, even if the national views were different from the 
EU’s position, the importance of the objective of entering the EU overshadowed other 
concerns. The CEE countries’ contribution to the emerging EU involvement in crisis 
management operations was helped by the previous experience of Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania of participating in UN peacekeeping missions. The involvement in EU missions 
was seen as way of upholding the UN’s multilateralism to which all three countries were 
formally committed.  
The position of the three countries with regard to the US-led war in Iraq was 
certainly a clear illustration of the preference for non-EU channels of foreign policy-
making. At the same time, the rift within the EU itself helped to justify the positions of the 
CEE countries. Indeed, this was a peculiar situation, which demonstrated the salience of 
national interests over a common European interest, which failed to materialize. However, 
a clear European position did emerge with regard to the International Criminal Court, 
while the Romanian government failed to align to this position, preferring to uphold the 
US stance. Again, this was an illustration of the absence of Europeanization, defined as 
preferring European foreign policy channels to other national or international instruments.  
Similarly, the Kosovo declaration of independence illustrated once more that in 
extreme situations the EU’s leverage over its member states is limited. Romania and 
Slovakia preferred not to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, 
siding with the Serbian government and against the mainstream position within the EU. 
Again, such a position was helped by the fact that there were several other countries (i.e. 
Spain, Greece, Cyprus), which defected and undermined the EU’s common front. This 
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inability of EU governments to agree recalled the observation of Jürgen Habermas and 
Jaques Derrida, who asked the question:  
‘what use is a new office (the European foreign minister) as long as the governments 
do not agree on a common policy’ (Habermas and Derrida, 2003: 292).  
 
It is not my aim here to engage in a deeper discussion on this matter, but only to 
show that both before and after accession there were instances when national preferences 
were forcefully put forward. In fact, this thesis has illustrated that the ‘Europeanization’ of 
foreign policy of the three countries has to be seen with caution.  
 
Summary 
The empirical findings to all six research questions, which were subsumed to the 
three broader questions about the Europeanization of foreign policy in the three countries, 
suggest that the impact of Europeanization has been uneven across countries and issues. 
The first empirical chapter argued that the institutional change of the system of foreign 
policy making and coordination of European affairs was required by European integration, 
but the final shape and nature of institutional transformation was mainly caused by 
domestic factors. It was also hard to prove the Europeanization through the process of elite 
socialization; the persistence of national identities and loyalties was the norm. Even if the 
officially stated foreign policy priorities have integrated a more salient European 
dimension, the conduct of foreign policy shows that when vital national interests are 
considered threatened by the EU common action, than the EU channels are avoided, as it 
was the case of Kosovo declaration of independence. 
The context in which the foreign policy is conducted is certainly more complex, 
providing better opportunities to relate to third countries from a more comfortable position 
of being an EU member state. This view was highlighted by policy makers from the three 
245 
countries interviewed during the research fieldwork. From this point of view, European 
integration has empowered and given extra weight to the foreign policy of the new 
member states.  
At the same time, it is difficult to talk about full convergence of national foreign 
policy, but rather about an accommodation with and more flexibility towards the positions 
of other member states. This is certainly facilitated by the constant exchange of knowledge 
and information at European level as part of the socialization process. The second 
empirical chapter argued that the norms of compromise and consensus-seeking were 
considered necessary by policy makers from the new member states in order to avoid 
policy blockage that may result when national preferences are defended to rigidly, without 
taking into account the interests of the other countries and the EU interest as a whole. Yet, 
as the sub-case studies of Iraq and Kosovo demonstrated, Europeanization is limited when 
it comes to core national interests. For this reason, this thesis discussed at length the crucial 
role played by domestic factors, such as the way in which the national interest and identity 
are perceived and defined by different political actors and how these differently colour the 
Europeanization process in various countries. 
 
8.4. Research limitations 
The analytical framework of this thesis proved solid and delivered the expected 
results. However, a couple of aspects merit discussion. One concerns the fieldwork and the 
use of the interview as a research method. The second refers to the issue of elite 
socialization. 
As previously discussed (pp. 85-6), the fieldwork was conducted in Brussels in 
December 2007, in Bratislava and Budapest between April and June 2008 and in Bucharest 
in October 2008. The declaration of Kosovo independence took place in February 2008, a 
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couple of months after I interviewed national officials in the three permanent 
representations in Brussels, which meant that the feedback from interviewees could not 
capture developments at the level of EU working groups and committees during the period 
following the declaration of independence. From this point of view, a second research trip 
to Brussels might have provided interesting insights on this matter, different from the 
feedback from the senior officials in the capitals. Yet resource constraints made a second 
trip difficult and eventually not feasible. However, the timing for collecting data in 
Brussels was appropriate. The Kosovo declaration of independence featured high on the 
EU agenda, the potential implications being a source of great concern. The discussions 
within working groups and committees reflected this state of mind. It was therefore 
possible to capture some of the feelings and concerns as expressed by the interviewees. On 
a slightly different note, the fieldwork took place during the Portuguese presidency, at a 
time when the EU leaders signed the Lisbon Treaty, ending the painful and uninspired 
process of constitutionalizing the EU and returning to the traditional treaty-driven 
integration process.    
With regard to the issue of elite socialization, the separation of the target group into 
two clusters of policy-makers in Brussels and in the capitals raised some difficulties with 
regard to testing the proposition that socialization affects differently the two categories. It 
was clear from the very beginning that only using in-depth interviews as a method of data 
collection would be unlikely to produce reliable data. For this reason, as explained in the 
methodology chapter (see pp. 76-7), this thesis used triangulation (observation, secondary 
literature and speeches or interviews analysis) as a way of increasing data validity and 
reliability.  
Question marks can also be raised with regard to the sample of interviewees. For 
practical reasons, it was not possible to interview more than a few people in the 
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organizations targeted by research (e.g. PermReps, MFA, PM’s Office etc). Searching for 
people with a senior rank was a way of compensating for this problem. The assumption 
was that more senior and experienced policy-makers are less reluctant to offer insights into 
the activity of their organization, in any case speaking more freely than a junior expert 
would do it. This assumption was valid and the interviewees offered a rich research 
material for analysis. 
Given these observations, the discussion about elite socialization balancing between 
the logic of consequentiality and that of appropriateness ought to be seen with due caution. 
However, the chapter on elite socialization offered original empirical material to show how 
the new context and experiences shaped the perception and behaviour of the policy-makers 
from the new member states and to examine the question of resilience of national identities 
as a key factor directing national foreign policy preferences.     
 
8.5. Broader implications 
This last section of the concluding chapter sets out the contribution of this research 
project to the literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy. This thesis contributes to 
the literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy in three ways. Firstly, it enriches the 
existing literature on the domestic impact of European integration on foreign policy on the 
new member states from CEE and by extension the literature on the domestic impact of 
international organizations or institutions. The second contribution is that the use of the 
multiple case study research design in this thesis strikes the right balance between 
idiosyncrasy and universalism, which in turn helps the aim of generalization. Thirdly, it 
opens the avenue for future research on the relationship between power, interests and 
identity in the study of Europeanization of foreign policy. 
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As illustrated in the literature review chapter, the study of the Europeanization of 
foreign policy has mainly targeted the Western European members of the European Union, 
although the scope of this literature has moved eastwards during the last few years. As 
such, not only have new member states become objects of analysis, but also candidate 
countries or even third countries. Yet, as discussed, this is still an emerging field of 
research and further empirical material is needed in order to provide a comprehensive 
picture of what has been the impact of Europeanization on foreign policy of the old and 
new member states alike. This accumulation of empirical data would offer the possibility 
of conducting comparative research across a larger number of countries, both old and new 
member states. The comparative approach may target broad policy trends, concrete 
institutional analysis or the study of specific foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, it 
would allow for the consolidation of the Europeanization research agenda, which needs a 
solid empirical base against which the theoretical assumptions may be tested and 
alternative methodologies applied. Against this background, the propositions of the 
Europeanization approach can be reevaluated, refuted and reformulated. This was exactly 
what this thesis has done. The Europeanization literature targeting the foreign policy of the 
old member states helped to clarify the approach of this thesis, namely that instead of 
searching for evidence of convergence, it has to start from the assumption that 
Europeanization affect in uneven ways foreign policy of the new member states. 
Moreover, it helped to clarify the argument that the source of variation has to be found not 
in the converging pressures of the EU, but in domestic centrifugal forces.  
Indeed, one of the key and perhaps the most contested assumption of this emerging 
research agenda is the issue of convergence of national foreign policies (Wong, 2007: 
325). In relation to the convergence assumption, this thesis adopted a critical stance. 
Instead of simply asking whether Europeanization caused convergence, it first looked at 
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the previous empirical findings, which suggested that a mix of policy convergence in 
certain areas and persistent divergence in other areas is the most likely outcome of 
Europeanization rather than full convergence, at least in the case of foreign policy. It 
should be mentioned here that most of the previous studies looked at a single country’s 
foreign policy in relation to European foreign policy, instead of comparing across several 
countries, as this thesis did. Based on these initial considerations, this thesis considered 
that it is more important not to ask whether the national foreign policies are converging 
and to try to find empirical findings in this direction. Instead, the question asked was why 
there are differences and what factors account for this variation, in short, why is 
Europeanization associated with divergent national responses. Therefore, as suggested by 
some recent assessments of the state of the art in the Europeanization research (Radaelli 
and Pasquier, 2007: 40, Wong, 2007: 332), this thesis made the correct step in the direction 
of searching for alternative explanations instead of simply ascribing a causal role to the 
Europeanization process. As previously discussed, the impact of Europeanization was 
contrasted with the role played by governmental politics and national identity politics. 
This thesis also contributes to the wider literature on the domestic impact of 
international institutions. There are countless studies examining the impact of international 
regimes, international norms of various kind (e.g. respects for human rights), or 
international organizations (e.g. NATO, the United Nations, regional organizations), on the 
behaviour of states (and/or sub-state actors) in the international system. One example is the 
study mentioned in the methodological chapter about the socialization influence of NATO 
over Czech and Romanian officials (see p. 76). At the same time, the two domestic factors 
used in this thesis to explain the differentiated impact of Europeanization are likely to 
perform well in a different scenario of top-down interaction between an international entity 
and national foreign policy. It is likely that governmental politics and national identity 
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politics would account fairly well for divergent national responses in the case of other 
external pressures. This is a safe assumption insofar as other international organization are 
far less integrated or cohesive than the EU, which is an exceptional form of international 
cooperation, given the depth of the integration process and the extent to which member 
states, willingly or not, have ended up gradually surrendering chunks of national 
sovereignty. Hence, the contribution rests on the fact that the role of governmental politics 
and national identity politics may account for the differentiated influence of any given 
international organization on the way in which national positions are formulated. Certainly, 
there are considerable differences between other international organizations and the EU. 
No international institution organized as an intergovernmental framework of interstate 
cooperation has exhibited to date the ambition of building a common foreign policy. At the 
same time, As Reuben Wong underlined (2007: 333), the fact should not be overlooked 
that Europeanization is ultimately driven by European integration, which can be ultimately 
traced back to the political and economic imperatives of coordinated action between the 
member states.  
The second contribution of this study comes from the research design and selection 
of cases. The analytical and methodological chapters explained at length why the multiple 
case study research design was considered the most likely to produce a satisfactory 
explanation of how Europeanization has changed foreign policy and foreign policy-making 
in the new member states and why there is cross-country variation. A potential option for a 
single case study research design would have made the why question of this thesis 
irrelevant. It would have been impossible to examine the question of divergence in the 
absence of cross-country comparison. Only by comparing it is possible to identify 
differences between countries. This is not to say that the multiple case study design of this 
thesis is in itself innovative insofar as other authors used it, most notably Ben Tonra in his 
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influential study of the Europeanization of Danish, Dutch and Irish foreign policies (see 
also the literature review chapter, p. 21). Yet, this is more the exception than the norm. 
From this point of view, this thesis has not only enriched the general literature on the 
Europeanization of foreign policy, but also added to the collection of multiple case-studies 
types of research design on similar topics.  
The choice of this kind of design was correct for at least two reasons. First, the 
number of countries (three) was small enough not to hinder the process of data collection, 
while still allowing for cross-country comparison. Secondly, the selection of countries 
(Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) offered an excellent testing ground for the assumption 
of this thesis. This was not only because of their accession record (which was one of the 
criterion for selection), but also due to the specific historical and geographical 
circumstances linking the three countries together. As illustrated throughout this thesis, the 
presence of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania was and still is a critical factor 
affecting in intricate ways national identification in all three countries and the political 
preferences of political parties in government. The same issue of ethnic Hungarians was at 
times played similarly, and at other times differently, in Slovakia and Romania.  
At the same time, the empirical analysis of the position of the three countries on the 
challenging issue of Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a distinct contribution of this 
thesis. Although there is no shortage of studies about this event, the focus is especially on 
the legal implications for the international order (with reference to other secessionist 
regions) and security. Less attention has been paid to date to the stance of the new member 
states of the EU within the EU context (the search for a common position against the 
background of contradictory and competing national preferences). The fact that political 
forces, except for the political representatives of the Hungarian minorities, in Slovakia and 
Romania opposed the independence of Kosovo says a lot about the link between national 
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identity and foreign policy preferences. Besides, it demonstrated that the otherwise 
different ideologies and policy preferences of mainstream political parties converge when 
the perception and definition of national interest becomes securitized (although the security 
threat was linked to the international legal norms rather than to national security per se).  
Moreover, it was useful to examine the two instances of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence and the NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia a decade before. The 
context was important. Despite the popular misgivings about NATO airstrikes, the 
governments of Slovakia and Romania decided to support these actions as a way to speed 
their accession into NATO and the EU. One decade later, as full members of the two 
organizations, they decided to pursue the national interest rather than European integration 
(a common European position on this matter). In both the 1999 and 2008, the international 
legality of the two actions was highly disputed. Yet, the international status of the two 
countries was different and this led to different, more assertive, stances. By contrast, 
although Yugoslavia and after that Serbia had a direct border with Hungary, and despite 
concerns for the fate of kin-Hungarians in Vojvodina, the government in Budapest stood 
alongside NATO, in 1999, and the EU, in 2008. The perception and definition of the 
national interest meant that siding with NATO in 1999 and the EU, in 2008, was more 
beneficial for the Hungary as a country and for the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina on 
the long run. Therefore, all three cases showed that there is a link between the definition of 
the national interest and self-identification, which transcended inter-party competition 
(again, with the notable exception, which confirms the rule, of the Hungarian organizations 
in Slovakia and Romania).  
The third contribution of this thesis is that it brought back the notions of power and 
interests to the study of Europeanization of foreign policy. Most studies of Europeanization 
of foreign policy are conducted from an institutionalist and/or social constructivist 
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perspective. While the first is focused on the adaptation of the formal institutional 
structures to the requirement of functioning within the EU, the latter is concerned with the 
processes of socialization into the new norms and rules of the EU. Certainly, both 
approaches are building blocks of this thesis as well. The point was made clear several 
times throughout this thesis with regard to the importance of using similar analytical 
categories in view of empirically expanding the Europeanization research agenda.  
However, different from other studies, this thesis also turned to examining how the 
perception of power affects the process of Europeanization and how the perception of 
national interest changed with accession. The empirical findings suggest that both concepts 
merit more attention. Europeanization, as a top-down approach, has an inherent component 
of power, in which one party, the EU, exerts a certain degree of influence over the other, 
the candidate or the new (or old) member state. At the same time, the issue of competing 
national interests needs to be brought back into the Europeanization research agenda. As 
Christopher Hill remarked a decade ago, all EU member states have to a greater or lesser 
extent distinct interests, which limit or even hinder the convergence of national foreign 
policies (Hill, 1997: 36-7).   
This is not to deny the progress made in the further institutionalization of foreign 
policy cooperation at EU level. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty certainly opened 
up great expectations about the future of the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) of the EU. It is not the aim of this study to review the innovations of the 
Lisbon Treaty with regard to the streamlining of the decision making process in this field. 
However, in the light of what has been mentioned above about the resilience of the 
national interest, it is worth highlighting the fact that the major winners are the national 
governments and not the supranational institutions in Brussels. Certainly, the process of 
Brusselization of foreign policy (defined as a steady increase in the Brussels-based 
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decision-making bodies, see  Allen, 1998: 42) is likely to be boosted by the creation of the 
European External Action Service under the coordination of Baroness Catherine Ashton as 
the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (also Vice-President 
of the Commission). The shifting balance of institutional power from the European 
Commission as the engine of European integration towards the European Council (now 
having its own budget and president),143 confirms the assertiveness of national 
governments in reining in the integration process. The inter-institutional competition in 
Brussels has not been eased by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, quite the contrary 
(Mayhew, 2010: 2).  
On the other hand, the question of whether a European foreign policy can evolve 
from the expansion of foreign policy institutions in Brussels is as valid as ever. As David 
Allen remarked in the aftermath of the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, a 
European foreign policy cannot be created in Brussels in the absence of defining and 
pursuing the European interest by the national governments of the EU member states 
themselves (Allen, 1998: 57). Ten years later, the fundamental question is still the same. 
The ambiguity of EU foreign policy results exactly from the absence of a shared European 
interest. Despite the growing institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation, the key 
problem of defining and agreeing on what is the common European interest is unresolved 
and emerges forcefully in external crises. The failure to forge a common position in the 
abovementioned case of Kosovo’s declaration of independence is but one, albeit recent, 
illustration from a long range of examples which highlight the difficulty of agreeing of 
what the European interest is. 
                                                
143 This observation was made by Jörg Monar and Lucia Serena Rossi at the conference ‘The European 
Union after the Lisbon Treaty’, Brussels, 25th May 2010 (see EU Observer, “European Council seen as 
winner under Lisbon Treaty”, 27th May 2010). 
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Against this background, the Europeanization research agenda needs to ponder more 
seriously the role of perceptions (individual, group and national) with regard to the way in 
which power and influence are distributed and exercised within the EU. In addition, it 
needs to ponder the modalities in which these factors affect the process of Europeanization 
and strengthen the perception that the pursuit of national interest is legitimate and 
beneficial even if the common European interest is undermined. From this point of view, 
the Europeanization of foreign policy research agenda might benefit by bringing back 
well-established psycho-cognitive approaches to foreign policy analysis, such as 
operational codes, cognitive maps or roles. For instance, the learning approach, also 
derived from the psycho-cognitive approaches to FPA, has been employed in this thesis in 
order to study the issue of the socialization of foreign policy makers. Potentially, the major 
benefit would be the fact that there is already a substantive scholarship on these 
approaches, tested on various other cases and in other historical circumstances. On the 
other hand, the study of Europeanization of foreign policy is a new research agenda, 
searching not only for empirical materials from all countries affected or potentially 
affected by Europeanization, but also for new analytical approaches, including those 
generated during the behaviourist era in the study of foreign policy. 
To sum up, this thesis has provided empirical evidence from new, less researched 
cases, using a multiple case-study research design that balanced between local specificity 
and the potential to generalize the findings, and opened up new avenues for research by 
highlighting the role of power and interest inherent in the process of foreign policy 
Europeanization.  
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Annex 1 - List of interviews 
 
Interviews with Hungarian officials and experts 
- Balázs, Péter, Director of the Centre for EU Enlargement Studies of the Central 
European University (former Secretary of State for European Affairs, Permanent 
Representative of Hungary to the EU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs), 19 June 2008. 
- Juhasz, Laszlo, Head of the Secretariat of the Committee on European Affairs, 
National Assembly of Hungary, 12 June 2008. 
- Kantor, Zoltan, Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 12 June 
2008. 
- Karoli, Sardi, Counsellor in charge of Western Balkans Working Group (COWEB), 
Hungarian Permanent Representation to the EU, 14 December 2007. 
- Molnar, Sandor, Minister Counsellor, Head of External Policy Unit (Deputy PSC), 
Hungarian Permanent Representation to the EU, 12 December 2007. 
- Pataki, Zsolt, Head of the CFSP Department, MFA, 16 June 2008. 
- Rácz, András, research fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 12 June 
2008. 
- Revfy, Tivadar, Head of Unit, EU Coordination and Legal Affairs Department, MFA, 
13 June 2008. 
- Szucs, Mariann, Deputy Head of the EU Coordination and Legal Affairs Department, 
16 June 2008. 
 
Interview with Slovak officials and experts 
- Ballek, Ladislav, ESDP Coordinator, Representative in PMG, Slovak Permanent 
Representation to the EU, 12 December 2007. 
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- Bil!ík, Vladimir, Senior Researcher, Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 24 April 
2008 
- Duleba, Alexander, Director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 28 April 2008 
- Jurisová, Katarína, 3rd Secretary in charge of Western Balkans Working Group 
(COWEB) and the Stability Pact, Slovak Permanent Representation to the EU, 12 
December 2007. 
- Kicinova, Eva, Head of the Department for European Affairs, Chancellery of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic, 19 May 2008. 
- Kirnag, Robert, Director of the EU General Affairs and Institutions, MFA, 28 April 
2008 
- Kukan, Eduard, Member of the National Council, former minister of foreign affairs 
of the Slovak Republic, 21 May 2008. 
- Madrova, Gabriela, Counsellor, Department for European Affairs, Chancellery of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic, 19 May 2008. 
- Mese"nikov, Grigorij, Chairman of Institute for Public Affairs, 21 May 2008. 
- Otruba, Albin, European Correspondent, CFSP Department, MFA, 2 May 2008. 
- Sveda, Tomas, Adviser, Section of European Affairs, Prime-Minister Office, 30 April 
08 
- Wlachovsky, Miroslav, Head of the Strategic Planning Directorate, MFA, 22 May 
2008. 
 
Interviews with Romanian officials  
- Anghel, Gheorghe, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Embassy of Romania to the Slovak 
Republic, 29 April 2008. 
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- Badea, Bogdan, Head of the Directorate for coordinating positions for the internal 
market, Department for European Affairs, PM Cabinet. 22 October 2008. 
- Ciobanu, Maria, Counsellor of State, Department of International Relations, 
Presidential Administration, 30 October 2008. 
- Hobjil#, Doru, 3rd Secretary in charge of Western Balkans Working Group (COWEB), 
Romanian Permanent Representation to the EU, 11 December 2007. 
- Iliescu, Ioana, deputy head, Directorate for EU Policies, MFA, 21 October 2008. 
- Neac$u, Milica, 1st Secretary, Representative in PMG, Romanian Permanent 
Representation to the EU, 11 December 2007. 
- Negril#, Cristian, 1st Secretary in charge of Western Balkans Working Group 
(COWEB), Romanian Permanent Representation to the EU, 10 December 2007. 
- Odobescu, Lumini%a, Head of the Directorate General European Union, MFA, 21 
October 2008. 
- Olimid, Cristian, Head of the Political Affairs and ESDP Sections, Romanian 
Permanent Representation to the EU, 10 December 2007. 
- Pu$ca$, Vasile, former Chief Negotiator for Romanian accession to the EU, currently 
member of the European Affairs Committee of the Romanian Parliament, 28 October 
2010. 
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Annex no. 2 – Interview structure 
 
Introduction - Introducing the topic, briefly explaining the research 
Questions related to institutionalization, coordination, and elite socialization 
1. Could you briefly present your professional experiences? (e.g. How long have you 
been working in the MFA, in which departments? What is your international 
experience? Have you been seconded as national representative to international 
organizations, or to diplomatic missions abroad? How long have you been dealing with 
EU affairs and which aspects in particular?)  
2. I would like to ask you few questions about the period following the signing of the 
accession treaty to the EU, since your country became an active observer and started 
participating to all Council’s meetings. For a start, have you been involved in the 
process of reorganization of the MFA and Permanent Representation in Brussels, in 
view of membership? If yes, in what way, what was your (your team) contribution?  
3. Could you describe how the EU (CFSP / Relex / ESDP etc) department is organized, 
what is its place in the overall architecture of the MFA, what are its main tasks?  
4. Have you participated in EU Council’s meetings at political (or technical level)?  
4.1. If yes, how often and what was your status?  
4.2. What was your first impression, how would you describe your own views about 
the working methods, length and format of meetings? I refer to the effectiveness in 
coming to an agreement on a decision for instance.  
4.3. What would you see as an improvement in this sense? Do you think that the 
number of member states around the table is a factor impeding the effective 
decision-making within Council’s working groups? 
260 
5. Have you had the feeling that the working procedures in the Council were something 
new, different from how other international organizations work? If yes, in what sense? 
Have you had the feeling that you have to learn new procedures in order to contribute 
and participate effectively in the policy-making process once a full member? 
6. At the same time, during the period your country had observer status, preparing for 
membership, the interaction between MFA and the Permanent Representation has been 
increasing in the sense that you started receiving information on policy initiatives 
discussed in Council’s working groups and committees. I think it was something new 
for both the Representation and the MFA, so I would be interested in your experience 
in this sense. How would you describe this iterative process of communication between 
capital and Representation in Brussels?  
7. If to describe the working style in the EU department, or in the MFA, do you think that 
the civil servants come up with their own initiatives and proposals, based on their 
expertise, acting in an anticipatory way? Are they encouraged to assume 
responsibilities? Or do they rather expect instructions or orders from higher policy 
levels before acting? In other words, would you describe the process as being guided 
top-down by the senior or political levels of decision-making, or based on a bottom-up 
input from expert to political level?  
7.1. Is this working style characterizing the relationship between the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels and the EU Department in the MFA? Do they expect 
instructions from MFA before acting or they rather suggest what the official 
position should be? My question would be what is the extent to which the official 
position is defined in Brussels? Or, how much of it is defined in Brussels and how 
much in the MFA? 
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8. Do you think that the position of the national representatives in the Council’s working 
groups and committees tends to be more compromise-oriented, even if this sometimes 
comes up against the instructions from capitals? To be more precise, do you think that 
being in Brussels, meeting other national representatives in the Council so often, both 
formally and informally, so, because of that do they tend to take more into 
consideration the interests of other member states, of the General Secretariat of the 
Council, or the Commission, than if they were in the MFA, back in the capital? 
Questions related to the problem of foreign policy content and action  
1. I would turn now to a different problem. Do you think that the CFSP is a platform for 
the promotion of the national interests of the EU’s member states (especially the major 
countries) or it is a based on a genuine need to defend and project a European common 
interest in the world? If the former, could you provide some examples? If the later, 
what is this common European interest?  
2. What would you see as beneficial for the CFSP: more integration along community 
lines, and a greater role for the Commission or the preservation of the role of the 
member states?   
3. The scope of the EU foreign policy is quite broad, probably far beyond the traditional 
interest, mainly regional, of most member states. Based on that, my question is if you 
think that EU policies toward remote part of the world are transforming you country’s 
foreign policy and in what way? 
I would like to move now to the last part of this interview and to ask you few questions 
about the EU position on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 
4. First, why do you think the Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia was so 
divisive within the EU Council of Ministers despite the fact that stability and security 
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in the Western Balkans is the aim of all individual member states? Why did some 
countries support it and others didn’t? 
5. What were the arguments backing your country position within the EU Council of 
Ministers when Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia? 
5.1. Do you think that a different government, of the opposition, would have 
adopted the same position? 
5.2. As far as you know, what is the opinion of the public; is it along the official 
position of the country or is it rather divided?  
6. I think that an important factor in the final decision was the way other EU member 
states have reacted, as well as United States and Russia. How much was the position of 
your country decided by considering their options? For instance, if all EU member 
states were in favour of supporting independence, what would have been the position 
of your country144?  
7. Do you see any similarity between the way your country reacted to NATO’s military 
intervention in 1999 against Serbia and the Kosovo’s declaration of independence this 
year? In both cases the back-up of the United Nations was missing. How much do you 
think the prospect of membership in NATO and the European Union weighted in the 
decision to support Western partners in 1999? Given that the membership in both 
organizations is a reality now, do you think that your country can define and defend its 
national interests without being constraint by the political pressures and conditionality 
associated with the accession process? 
Concluding the interview, reiterating how I intend to use the information, pointing out 
ethical considerations, securing support for other interviews (if necessary).  
                                                
144 The question devised in this way is not for interviews in Hungary, only for Romania and Slovakia. 
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